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Ruth Mason & Michael S. Knoll

What Is Tax Discrimination?
abstract. Prohibitions of tax discrimination have long appeared in constitutions, tax
treaties, trade treaties, and other sources, but despite their ubiquity, little agreement exists as to
how such provisions should be interpreted. Some commentators have concluded that tax
discrimination is an incoherent concept. In this Article, we argue that in common markets, like
the EU and the United States, the best interpretation of the nondiscrimination principle is that it
requires what we call “competitive neutrality,” which prevents states from putting residents at a
tax-induced competitive advantage or disadvantage relative to nonresidents in securing jobs. We
show that, contrary to the prevailing view, maintaining a level playing field between resident and
nonresident taxpayers requires neither tax rate harmonization nor equal taxation of residents and
nonresidents. Our approach produces simple rules of thumb that provide states and courts with
clear direction in writing tax laws and evaluating challenges to those laws.
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what is tax discrimination?

introduction
States may be accused of “tax discrimination” when they tax outsiders
differently from insiders, where “insiders” refers to nationals, resident
individuals, and resident companies.1 Stating the tax nondiscrimination
principle is deceptively simple: tax likes alike. For example, suppose a resident
and a nonresident both earn $100,000 in the same jurisdiction. At first blush, a
principle of tax nondiscrimination would seem to require that the resident and
nonresident be taxed the same. But differences between insiders and outsiders,
such as their usage of government services, may justify differences in their tax
treatment. Accordingly, before we can conclude that treating such taxpayers
differently is discriminatory, we must first understand what values the
nondiscrimination principle promotes.
So far, however, judges, government officials, and scholars have failed to
clearly articulate the value or values that legal prohibitions of tax
discrimination promote. That failure has provoked commentators to describe
the concept of nondiscrimination adopted by the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) as “baffling,”2 “theoretical and arcane,”3 and “incoherent.”4 Similarly,
commentators describe the U.S. tax discrimination cases as “slippery”5 and in
need of a “principled approach.”6 And the Supreme Court has labeled its own
tax discrimination jurisprudence a “quagmire”7 and a “‘tangled underbrush.’”8

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.
6.

7.

Residence for tax purposes is determined by a taxpayer’s connections with a jurisdiction.
For example, states define tax residence for natural persons with respect to a person’s
citizenship, domicile, or physical presence. See HUGH J. AULT & BRIAN J. ARNOLD,
COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION: A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 347-49 (2d ed. 2004).
Mary C. Bennett, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture: Nondiscrimination in International Tax
Law: A Concept in Search of a Principle, 59 TAX L. REV. 439, 439 (2006) (comparing EU and
tax treaty approaches to nondiscrimination).
Luc Hinnekens & Philippe Hinnekens, General Report, 93a CAHIERS DE DROIT FISCAL INT’L
15, 50 (2008) (surveying enforcement of tax nondiscrimination in domestic law, in EU law,
and under tax treaties in two dozen countries).
Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Income Tax Discrimination Against International Commerce, 54 TAX L.
REV. 131, 131 (2001) (discussing trade treaty, tax treaty, EU treaty, and U.S. constitutional
conceptions of nondiscrimination).
Daniel Shaviro, An Economic and Political Look at Federalism in Taxation, 90 MICH. L. REV.
895, 929 (1992) (discussing nondiscrimination under the dormant Commerce Clause).
Dan T. Coenen & Walter Hellerstein, Suspect Linkage: The Interplay of State Taxing and
Spending Measures in the Application of Constitutional Antidiscrimination Rules, 95 MICH. L.
REV. 2167, 2173 (1997) (considering the treatment of linked tax-and-subsidy schemes under
the dormant Commerce Clause).
Nw. States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458 (1959); see also Wardair
Can., Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 17 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring in part
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Lack of a clear definition has not prevented prohibitions of tax
discrimination from appearing in (or being read into) statutes, constitutions,
and international treaties.9 For example, the Supreme Court interprets the
dormant Commerce Clause to prohibit tax discrimination by U.S. states.10
Similarly, the ECJ has interpreted the fundamental freedoms of the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) to prevent tax discrimination
by EU member states.11 Explicit prohibitions of tax discrimination also appear
in every U.S. income tax treaty currently in force,12 and the influential model
tax treaties of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD),13 the United States,14 and the United Nations15 all dedicate an article
to tax discrimination. Finally, prohibitions of tax discrimination appear in
major multilateral and regional trade agreements.16
Although the concept of tax discrimination is ill-defined and poorly
understood, its influence seems continually to expand. It has become
particularly important in the EU, where tax cases constitute about 10% of the
ECJ’s caseload.17 The ECJ has relied upon the nondiscrimination concept to

8.
9.

10.
11.
12.
13.

14.
15.

16.
17.

and concurring in the judgment) (referring to “the cloudy waters of this Court’s ‘dormant
Commerce Clause’ doctrine”).
Nw. States Portland Cemen Co., 358 U.S. at 457 (quoting Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311
U.S. 435, 445 (1940)).
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 891 (2006) (permitting the U.S. President to double the tax rates of
foreigners if their home state subjects U.S. persons to “discriminatory or extraterritorial
taxes”).
See JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION ¶¶ 4.01-.26 (3d ed.
1999 & Supp. 2009).
See RUTH MASON, PRIMER ON DIRECT TAXATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 37-113 (2011).
See RICHARD E. ANDERSEN, ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES INCOME TAX TREATIES ¶ 20.01
(2011).
See OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, art. 24 (July 22, 2010)
[hereinafter OECD Model Tax Treaty], condensed version available at http://www.oecd
-ilibrary.org/taxation/model-tax-convention-on-income-and-on-capital-condensed-version
-2010_mtc_cond-2010-en.
See United States Model Income Tax Convention of November 15, 2006, 1 Tax Treaties
(CCH) ¶ 209.24, art. 24 (2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-trty/model006.pdf.
U.N. Model Double Taxation Convention Between Developed and Developing Countries,
art. 24, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/PAD/SER.E/21 (U.N. Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs 2001),
available at http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=ST/ESA/PAD/SER.E/21.
See Warren, supra note 4, at 141-46.
See Ruth Mason, Made in America for European Tax: The Internal Consistency Test,
49 B.C. L. REV. 1277, 1281 (2008) (citing annual statistics kept by the ECJ, which aggregate
direct and indirect tax cases). Our concern here is only with direct tax cases, but the ECJ
does not separate out statistics on direct tax cases.
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justify invalidating longstanding tax practices, prompting harsh criticism from
scholars and tax officials.18 For example, the ECJ held that an EU member state
could not categorically deny an EU national earning income within its territory
but residing in another member state the same deductions for personal and
family expenses that it allowed to its own residents.19 The court held such
denials discriminatory notwithstanding the fact that the practice is widespread
internationally and expressly permitted under tax treaties.20 In interpreting the
Privileges and Immunities Clause, the U.S. Supreme Court has drawn the
same conclusion: a U.S. state cannot categorically deny personal tax benefits to
residents of other U.S. states.21 Spurred by these judicial decisions, tax officials
and scholars have begun to scrutinize the nondiscrimination concept
intensely.22 Notwithstanding this scrutiny, a clear definition of tax
discrimination has failed to emerge. This continuing lack of guidance leaves
government officials to develop tax policies and taxpayers to make business
decisions in a highly uncertain legal environment.
Although legal limits on tax discrimination are widely viewed as promoting
economic efficiency, there is no consensus regarding what efficiency value they
promote. As this Article explains, economists and policymakers traditionally
have evaluated cross-border tax policies under two competing efficiency

18.

19.
20.
21.

22.

See, e.g., Philip Baker, Protection of the Taxpayer by the European Court of Justice, 44 EUR.
TAX’N 453, 453-54 (2004) (describing criticism of tax officials); Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C.
Warren, Jr., Income Tax Discrimination and the Political and Economic Integration of Europe,
115 YALE L.J. 1186, 1219 (2006).
See, e.g., Case C-279/93, Finanzamt Köln-Altstadt v. Schumacker, 1995 E.C.R. I-225,
discussed infra Section I.C.
Ruth Mason, Tax Expenditures and Global Labor Mobility, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1540, 1608-10
(2009) (discussing Schumacker).
See, e.g., Lunding v. N.Y. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287 (1998) (holding that New
York violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause when it denied alimony deductions to a
Connecticut resident with New York-taxable income while permitting New York residents
to deduct alimony).
See, e.g., COMPARATIVE FISCAL FEDERALISM: COMPARING THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE
AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT’S TAX JURISPRUDENCE (Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, James R.
Hines, Jr. & Michael Lang eds., 2007) (publishing proceedings of a tax discrimination
conference at the University of Michigan Law School); Hugh J. Ault & Jacques Sasseville,
Taxation and Non-Discrimination: A Reconsideration, 2 WORLD TAX J. 101 (2010) [hereinafter
OECD Discussion Draft] (introducing published proceedings of an OECD conference at the
International Tax Centre, Leiden); Symposium, Corporate Tax Policy in the European Union,
62 TAX L. REV. 1 (2009) (publishing proceedings of a tax discrimination conference at
N.Y.U. School of Law).
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criteria: capital export neutrality and capital import neutrality.23 A law is
capital-export-neutral when it does not distort the allocation of capital across
states.24 In contrast, a law is capital-import-neutral when it does not differently
distort the savings-consumption tradeoff across taxpayers residing in different
states.25
In an influential recent article in this Journal, Professors Michael Graetz
and Alvin Warren argued that the ECJ’s approach to tax discrimination cases is
fundamentally inconsistent.26 As support for this claim, Graetz and Warren
pointed to the fact that the ECJ has imposed nondiscrimination obligations on
both states taxing in a source capacity and states taxing in a residence
capacity.27 In international tax parlance, the source state is the state where the
taxpayer earns income, while the residence state is the state where the taxpayer
resides. But a capital export neutrality construction of nondiscrimination
would impose nondiscrimination obligations only on residence states, whereas
a capital import neutrality construction of nondiscrimination would impose
nondiscrimination obligations only on source states.28 Graetz and Warren
argued that the ECJ’s imposition of nondiscrimination obligations at both
source and residence did not appear to pursue either neutrality principle.
Making matters worse in their view, by imposing nondiscrimination
obligations at both source and residence, the ECJ seemed to evince an intention
simultaneously to achieve both capital export neutrality and capital import
neutrality. But, as Graetz and Warren correctly point out, it is impossible for
states to achieve both kinds of efficiency benchmarks simultaneously unless
they harmonize their tax rates and bases.29 Accordingly, because the ECJ has
repeatedly held that EU law does not require tax harmonization on the grounds

23.

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

See Michael J. Graetz, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture: Taxing International Income:
Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 TAX L. REV. 261 (2001)
(criticizing the use of these concepts to evaluate U.S. international tax policies because they
elevate worldwide welfare over national welfare).
See discussion infra Section II.B.
See discussion infra Section II.C.
Graetz & Warren, supra note 18, at 1219.
Id. at 1216-19.
For further discussion, see infra Sections II.A-E.
Graetz & Warren, supra note 18, at 1212-23. The inability to establish both neutrality
benchmarks in the absence of tax harmonization has been well established. See, e.g., Reuven
S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State,
113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1606 (2000). For an explanation of this phenomenon, see discussion
infra notes 135-138 and accompanying text.
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that such harmonization would invade the member states’ tax autonomy,30
imposition of nondiscrimination obligations at source and residence seemed
not only to serve no clear efficiency goal, but also erected, in Graetz and
Warren’s terms, a “labyrinth of impossibility.”31 Similarly, although Graetz and
Warren did not address the issue, tax discrimination doctrine in the United
States is susceptible to the same criticism, since U.S. courts have interpreted
the Constitution to place nondiscrimination obligations on states taxing in
both source and residence capacities, while at the same time holding that the
Constitution does not require states to harmonize their taxes.32
In this Article, we provide a way out of this “labyrinth of impossibility” by
offering a new efficiency benchmark that is consistent with imposing
nondiscrimination obligations on both source and residence states. We draw
on recent scholarship by economists Michael Devereux, Mihir Desai, and James
Hines to formulate a new version of nondiscrimination, one we call
“competitive neutrality.”33 A tax law is competitively neutral when it does not
distort the matching of owners with investments (or workers with jobs).
Viewed in this way, a tax system is competitively neutral if it maintains a level
tax playing field between resident and nonresident taxpayers. As a result,
competitive neutrality formalizes the intuition that the nondiscrimination
principle is about promoting competition.
Part I provides background on tax discrimination and uses examples from
ECJ case law to illustrate the kinds of state tax practices that give rise to
discrimination challenges. Part I also shows that a clear conception of the
principle of tax nondiscrimination has failed to emerge.
Part II provides three alternative interpretations for tax discrimination.
Because we analyze labor taxation, in Part II we translate the traditional tax
efficiency benchmarks, which were developed to analyze capital taxes, into the
labor tax context. We call the labor analogue of capital export neutrality
“locational neutrality,” because it obtains when taxes do not distort the
allocation of labor across states. We call the labor analogue of capital import
neutrality “leisure neutrality,” because it obtains when taxes do not differently
distort the work-leisure tradeoffs faced by taxpayers residing in different states.

30.
31.
32.
33.

See, e.g., Case C-336/96, Gilly v. Directeur des Services Fiscaux du Bas-Rhin, 1998 E.C.R.
I-2793, para. 34.
Graetz & Warren, supra note 18, at 1243.
See discussion infra Part IV.
See Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines Jr., Evaluating International Tax Reform, 56 NAT’L TAX
J. 487, 494 (2003); Michael P. Devereux, Capital Export Neutrality, Capital Import
Neutrality, Capital Ownership Neutrality and All That (June 11, 1990) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the authors).
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In Part II, we provide the first formal account of what it would mean to
interpret the nondiscrimination principle to require locational neutrality or
leisure neutrality. Thus, for courts and scholars that reject our argument that
the efficiency component of the tax nondiscrimination principle in common
markets best accords with competitive neutrality, we provide clear guidelines
for resolving cases under the two traditional tax efficiency benchmarks. In Part
II, we also explain why imposing nondiscrimination obligations at both source
and residence is not compatible with either locational or leisure neutrality. We
dedicate the largest portion of Part II to the introduction of competitive
neutrality, the new tax neutrality benchmark. We explain its formal
requirements, explain how it would work as a nondiscrimination principle
using simple examples, and show that competitive neutrality is consistent with
imposing nondiscrimination obligations on both source and residence states.
Finally, Part II makes our formal discussion of the three neutrality benchmarks
concrete by showing how each benchmark would apply to the ECJ labor tax
cases discussed in Part I.
While the principal goal of this Article is to elaborate an efficiency
benchmark that accords better with the ECJ’s tax doctrine than do either of the
traditional benchmarks, Part III goes further to argue that competitive
neutrality also represents a better interpretation of the TFEU than do either of
the other benchmarks. In Part III, we also set forth normative and practical
arguments in favor of a competitive neutrality interpretation of
nondiscrimination. For example, leveling the playing field between resident
and nonresident workers and between foreign and domestic work would
promote welfare. This becomes clear when we consider that protectionist
sentiments can be strong, especially during tough economic times. We also
argue that competitive neutrality aligns better than do the other benchmarks
with other non-efficiency goals, such as the promotion of political unity among
EU nationals from different member states. On a more practical note, expressly
adopting a competitive neutrality interpretation of nondiscrimination would
simplify the resolution of tax cases and further integrate the common market.
Finally, it would resolve several persistent questions posed in the scholarly
literature analyzing tax discrimination. For example, we show that, contrary to
widespread assumption, discrimination cannot be identified by a simple
comparison of absolute tax rates.
While we use the ECJ tax cases as an example to illustrate our arguments
about the meaning of tax discrimination, our arguments have broader
applicability due to the pervasiveness of legal prohibitions of tax discrimination.
Accordingly, Part IV discusses the implications of our arguments for U.S.
constitutional law. Although the U.S. Constitution does not contain an express
prohibition of tax discrimination, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Equal
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Protection, Commerce, and Privileges and Immunities Clauses to prohibit the
states from engaging in tax discrimination. Our guidelines for how to interpret
nondiscrimination to require, in the alternative, locational, leisure, or
competitive neutrality, also could be used by U.S. courts adjudicating tax
discrimination claims brought under the Constitution. Moreover, we argue
that, like the ECJ, the Supreme Court regards competitive neutrality as an
important component of tax nondiscrimination under the Constitution. As
with the ECJ, clear announcement by the Supreme Court that tax
nondiscrimination requires competitive neutrality (or either of the other two
benchmarks) would bring much-needed clarity and predictability to the
Supreme Court’s tax discrimination cases.
We conclude by observing that, although we rely heavily on economic
analysis in arguing that the principle of nondiscrimination in taxation should
be understood as promoting competitive neutrality, the approach we develop
does not require courts to engage in extensive economic analysis. Rather, our
approach reduces to straightforward directives both for courts to apply when
evaluating tax discrimination claims and for legislatures to follow when
enacting tax laws.
i. nondiscrimination in eu taxation
This Part provides background on tax discrimination in common markets,
and, in particular, in the EU common market. Section I.A briefly traces the
origins of the prohibition of tax discrimination in the EU, and Section I.B
illustrates the operation of that principle in two canonical ECJ tax
discrimination cases. Together, these Sections illustrate that a clear guiding
principle for resolving such cases has failed to emerge, resulting in haphazard
and unsatisfying decisions.
A. Goals of the EU
The fundamental economic purpose motivating adoption of the EU treaties
was to raise European wages and living standards by uniting the independent
nations of Europe into a cohesive economic union that would eliminate barriers
to cross-border trade, investment, business, and work.34 The founders of the

34.

See, e.g., Towards a Single Market Act for a Highly Competitive Social Market Economy: 50
Proposals for Improving Our Work, Business, and Exchanges with One Another, at 2, COM
(2010) 608 final (Oct. 27, 2010) (“The construction of one big market is at the heart of the
European project envisaged by the founding fathers.”).
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EU believed that fusing the separate national economies of Europe into a single
and substantially larger economy would allow local, European-based
companies to assemble capital, labor, and resources on a larger and more
efficient scale. The resulting improvement in productivity would be the engine
of economic growth and improved living standards.35
Since the adoption of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the member states of
what is now the EU have endorsed the notion that they can improve the living
and working conditions of their citizens by furthering the integration of
the member states’ economies.36 The Single European Act of 1986 and the
Maastricht Treaty of 1992 reiterate this position.37 The entry into force of the
Treaty of Lisbon at the end of 2009 preserves and reinforces the primacy of
economic integration. Throughout this Article, we refer to both the EU and the
United States as “common markets,” although the integration of the EU
member states’ economies has been referred to variously as establishing a
common market, a “single market,” or an “internal market.”38
Economic integration among the EU member states is accomplished
through both “positive integration” and “negative integration.”39 Positive
integration refers to legislative harmonization of member state policies
pursuant to EU-level regulations or directives.40 For example, EU-wide
harmonization of value-added taxation was accomplished by a series of council
directives.41
Negative integration refers to elimination by the ECJ of individual member
state policies and practices that, in violation of EU law, impede the integration
of the various member states into a single market.42 Principles of negative
integration usually take the form of “thou-shalt-not” dictates directed to the

35.

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

See Rita de la Feria & Clemens Fuest, Closer to an Internal Market? The Economic Effects of EU
Tax Jurisprudence 3-4 (Oxford Univ. Ctr. for Bus. Taxation, Working Paper No. 11/12, 2011),
available at http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/centres/tax/papers/Documents/WP1112.pdf.
See Wolfgang Schön, Tax Competition in Europe—The Legal Perspective, 9 EC TAX REV. 90,
90 (2000).
Id.
Id. The current Treaty on European Union and the TFEU use the term “internal market,”
although in the past the EU and EC treaties also used the term “common market.”
ADOLFO J. MARTIN JIMÉNEZ, TOWARDS CORPORATE TAX HARMONIZATION IN THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY: AN INSTITUTIONAL AND PROCEDURAL ANALYSIS 2-3 (1999).
See JOSEPHINE STEINER & LORNA WOODS, EU LAW 361-62 (2009).
See, e.g., Council Regulation 1777/2005, Laying Down Implementing Measures for Directive
77/388/EEC on the Common System of Value Added Tax, 2005 O.J. (L 288) (EC).
BÉLA BALASSA, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION (1961); JIMÉNEZ, supra note 39, at 3.
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member states,43 but they can also be stated affirmatively, usually as rights.
The EU “fundamental freedoms” prominently promote negative integration.44
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) sets forth
four fundamental freedoms—the free movement of goods, workers, capital,
and services.45 Together with the freedom of establishment,46 these freedoms
represent the cornerstones of the EU’s internal market, and the principle of tax
nondiscrimination derives from them. For example, Article 45 of the TFEU
states that the freedom of movement of workers “entail[s] the abolition of any
discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Member States as
regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and
employment.”47
Although Article 45 does not mention taxation, the ECJ has interpreted it to
prevent nationality-based tax discrimination. Specifically, a member state may
not use its tax system to discriminate against nationals of other member states
who enter its territory to work.48 Nor may a member state use its tax system to
discriminate against its own nationals when they earn income in other member
states.49 Moreover, since it regards tax residence as a proxy for nationality, the
ECJ also has interpreted the TFEU to forbid residence-based tax
discrimination.50 The ECJ likewise has interpreted the Treaty’s other

43.
44.
45.

46.
47.
48.

49.
50.

JIMÉNEZ, supra note 39, at 3.
See Servaas van Thiel, The Direct Income Tax Case Law of the European Court of Justice: Past
Trends and Future Developments, 62 TAX L. REV. 143 (2008).
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 18, Mar.
30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 56 [hereinafter TFEU] (“[A]ny discrimination on grounds of
nationality shall be prohibited.”); id. art. 45, at 66 (“Such freedom of movement shall entail
the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality . . . .”); id. art. 49, at 67 (business
establishment); id. art. 56, at 70 (services); id. art. 63, at 71 (capital and payments).
Id. art. 49, at 67.
Id. art. 45, at 66.
In Bachmann v. Belgium, for example, the court held that Belgium discriminated in violation
of the free movement of workers by allowing deduction of life insurance premiums only
when those premiums were paid to Belgian insurance companies. The court reasoned that
since nonresident workers were more likely to hold life insurance policies written by
non-Belgian insurers than were resident workers, the rule was likely to disadvantage EU
nationals from other states who worked in Belgium. See Case C-204/90, Bachmann v.
Belgium, 1992 E.C.R. I-249 (holding that this treatment constituted discrimination but was
nonetheless justified on other grounds).
See, for example, the De Groot case, discussed infra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Case C-279/93, Finanzamt Köln-Altstadt v. Schumacker, 1995 E.C.R. I-225, paras.
27-29 (concluding that a member state tax provision that denied benefits to nonresidents
was liable to operate primarily to the detriment of non-nationals). Most states define tax
residence for natural persons by reference to physical presence. For example, some EU
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fundamental freedoms to prohibit discrimination in the taxation of business
establishments, the provision of services, and investment.51
The ECJ interprets the EU’s four freedoms, and consequently the tax
nondiscrimination principle, to give rise to private rights of action in national
courts; in EU parlance, the four freedoms have “direct effect.” The ECJ and
national courts enforce the four freedoms as individual rights by looking
closely at the claims of plaintiffs to standing and in evaluating whether a state’s
tax laws interfere with EU nationals’ exercise of their fundamental freedoms.52
Thus, in the EU, tax discrimination violates the personal rights of private
parties, who have standing to sue in a national court for abridgement of those
rights.
EU nationals regularly challenge member state tax laws that they believe
interfere with their fundamental freedoms. Such suits arise in the first instance
in the national court of the offending member state, but under certain
circumstances the TFEU permits or requires national courts to refer questions
of EU law to the ECJ for binding interpretive rulings.53 All of the ECJ cases
discussed in this Article consist of such references from national courts to the
ECJ.
B. ECJ Interpretations of Tax Discrimination
This Section gives background on EU taxation and the ECJ’s tax
discrimination doctrine. Each member state has its own tax system, and since
national income tax law is not harmonized in the EU, tax bases and rates vary
significantly across the member states, as do methods of taxing cross-border
income. These differences in member state tax systems may create barriers to
the exercise by EU nationals of their fundamental freedoms to work, reside,
invest, provide services, and establish businesses anywhere in the EU.

51.
52.
53.

member states consider persons spending more than six continuous months in the state to
be a tax resident. See AULT & ARNOLD, supra note 1, at 433.
See MASON, supra note 11, at 37-92.
Standing also would seem to be essential to administration, which relies heavily on
individuals bringing suit to enforce their rights.
TFEU, supra note 45, art. 267 (stating that lower national courts may, and courts of last
resort must, refer to the ECJ for preliminary ruling any EU question that is vital to the
resolution of a case before them). But see Case 283/81, CILFIT v. Ministry of Health, 1982
E.C.R. 3415 (holding that national courts have discretion not to refer questions identical to
those previously decided by the ECJ or questions where the correct application of EU law is
obvious).

1026

what is tax discrimination?

Generally, two states have jurisdiction to tax cross-border income. The
state where the income was earned (the “source” state) has jurisdiction to tax
on a “source” basis, and the state where the taxpayer resides (the “residence”
state) has jurisdiction to tax on a “residence” basis. Thus, a musician who
resides in the Netherlands but earns income from performances in Germany
will be taxable by both states. Under longstanding custom, the tax entitlement
of the source state is superior to that of the residence state.54 As a result, the
residence state typically employs one of the following two methods to prevent
double taxation.55 A state implementing “exemption” forgoes its opportunity to
tax its residents’ foreign-source income. A state implementing “worldwide
taxation” taxes such foreign-source income as if it had been earned
domestically, but allows a credit for taxes paid to the source jurisdiction.
Source states tax nonresidents differently than residents. For example,
source states typically tax nonresidents on their gross income at flat tax rates,
whereas they tax residents on their net income at progressive tax rates. The flat
tax rate applicable to nonresidents typically falls somewhere between the top
and the bottom progressive rates applicable to residents. At least two reasons
justify this difference in treatment. First, taxing nonresidents on a gross, rather
than net, basis means that nonresidents do not have to file complete income tax
returns in their source state(s), which reduces their compliance burden.
Second, states argue that nonresidents would secure an unfair tax advantage if
progressive tax rates applied only to the income earned in the source state,
since that income usually represents only a portion of the cross-border
worker’s overall income.56 In the same vein, source states argue that they lack
sufficient information about nonresident taxpayers to confer upon them
personal tax benefits. As a result, most states confer personal tax benefits on

54.

55.

56.

This is true as a practical matter because the source state has the first opportunity to tax the
income. Source state priority is reinforced by the international tax norm that places the
obligation to relieve juridical double taxation entirely on the residence state in the absence of
a tax treaty. See Warren, supra note 4, at 132.
A third alternative not currently practiced would involve reducing the tax on residents’
foreign income by allowing a deduction from taxable income for source state taxes.
However, this method would not fully relieve double taxation.
If each state applied its progressive tax rates to only the portion of the cross-border worker’s
overall income that she earned within its territory, more of her overall income would fall
into low tax brackets compared to workers who earned the same overall amount of income
from a single state. The simplest design for a progressive tax system in which the brackets
depend upon global (not just local) income would proportionately reduce the size of each
state’s tax brackets to correspond to the share of income the cross-border worker earned in
that state. Such systems would require accurate reporting of worldwide income and would
be very difficult to police.
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resident, but not nonresident, taxpayers. Such tax benefits may include social
welfare expenditures (such as wage supplements for low-income taxpayers) or
deductions for personal expenses (such as home mortgage interest, childcare,
and medical expenses).
When a state administers social benefits through its tax system but limits
those benefits to resident taxpayers, the result may be the application of
systematically lower tax rates to resident than nonresident taxpayers.
Nonetheless, the ECJ has held that under certain circumstances, a source state
may deny nonresidents the personal tax benefits it grants to its own residents.57
Thus, the nondiscrimination principle does not appear to require source states
to equalize tax rates for residents and nonresidents.
Likewise, under the ECJ’s interpretation, the nondiscrimination principle
does not appear to require that states equalize the tax rates that their residents
pay on foreign-source and domestic-source income. For example, in Gilly v.
Directeur des Services Fiscaux du Bas-Rhin, a French resident worked as a teacher
in Germany, where her salary was taxable on a source basis. Because German
tax rates were higher than French tax rates, Gilly paid more tax on her salary
when she worked in Germany than she would have paid on an equivalent
amount in France.58 She argued that the higher taxes she paid for work in
Germany violated the freedom of movement of workers, and as a result, that
France should be required to credit her German taxes fully. The ECJ rejected
this argument, concluding that there was no EU law requirement “to ensure
that the tax to which the taxpayer is subject in one state is no higher than that
to which he or she would be subject in the other.”59 Thus, the ECJ held that
France did not violate the freedom of movement of workers by failing to
equalize the rates its residents paid abroad with the rates they would have paid
at home.
These examples show that not all tax barriers to European economic
integration constitute discrimination within the meaning of the TFEU. Other
examples reinforce the point. For instance, tax rate differentials distort the
allocation of capital and labor among member states by discouraging residents

57.

58.
59.

See, e.g., Case C-234/01, Gerritse v. Finanzamt Neukölln-Nord, 2003 E.C.R. I-5933 (holding
that a source state may deny nonresidents the benefit of personal tax exemptions, as long as
the nonresident does not earn all or almost all her income in the source state). In contrast,
the ECJ held that Greece discriminated when it taxed Greek banks doing business in Greece
at only 35%, while taxing banks residing in other member states doing business in Greece at
40%. Case C-311/97, Royal Bank of Scot. plc v. Greece, 1999 E.C.R. I-2651.
Case C-336/96, Gilly v. Directeur des Services Fiscaux du Bas-Rhin, 1998 E.C.R. I-2793,
paras. 11-12.
Id. para. 46.
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of EU member states from working, investing, or establishing businesses in
high-tax states.60 However, because EU law does not require harmonization of
tax rates and bases, the ECJ has expressly held that cross-border tax
disadvantages arising from rate differentials do not constitute discrimination,
as long as the defendant member state does not single out cross-border
taxpayers or cross-border income for higher taxation.61 Thus, if Germany taxed
all income at 50%, while France taxed all income at 25%, neither state would
discriminate, even though a French resident might suffer a tax increase if she
worked in Germany as compared to if she worked in France.
The challenge for the ECJ is distinguishing permissible from impermissible
tax differentials imposed on cross-border economic activity. The ECJ takes the
following approach to evaluating member state tax laws for discrimination.
First, the ECJ compares the complaining taxpayer—who is a nonresident with
income from sources within the defendant member state (or a resident with
income sourced in other EU member states)—to a “similarly situated” resident
taxpayer with income from only domestic sources. If the nonresident (or
resident with foreign-source income) receives worse tax treatment than the
similarly situated resident with only domestic income, the court generally
concludes that the defendant member state engaged in discrimination. Unless
the discrimination can be justified for public policy reasons, such as the need to
prevent tax fraud, the court will hold the provision incompatible with EU
law.62 Determining whether taxpayers are similarly situated is therefore crucial
for determining whether there is discrimination. But the ECJ has not provided
clear guidance on when resident and nonresident taxpayers are similarly

60.

61.

62.

See, e.g., PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, UNITED STATES TAXATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT INCOME
74-75 (1969); Thomas Horst, A Note on the Optimal Taxation of International Investment
Income, 94 Q.J. ECON. 793, 796 (1980).
See, e.g., Gilly, 1998 E.C.R. I-2793, paras. 49, 53 (holding that a cross-border disadvantage
due to differences in national tax rates was not discriminatory); see also Case C-294/97,
Eurowings Luftverkehrs AG v. Finanzamt Dortmund-Unna, 1999 E.C.R. I-7447 (rejecting as
a justification for discriminatory source taxation against nonresidents the fact that such
nonresidents may be subject to no or lesser taxation in their residence state).
Although the ECJ has held that public policies may justify tax discrimination, it rarely finds
the means used by the state proportional to its justifiable goal. For cases in which the ECJ
held that tax discrimination was justified and proportionate, see Case C-446/03, Marks &
Spencer plc v. Halsey, 2005 E.C.R. I-10837, which holds that discrimination was justified by
the need to protect a balanced allocation of tax power among the member states, the need to
avoid duplication of tax losses, and the need to prevent tax avoidance; and Case C-204/90,
Bachmann v. Belgium, 1992 E.C.R. I-249, which holds that tax discrimination was justified
by the member state’s need to maintain the fiscal cohesion of its tax system. For
justifications in tax cases generally, see MASON, supra note 11, at 93-115.
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situated, such that they must be taxed the same way, and when they are not.63
The resulting collection of decisions is a hodgepodge, lacking any clear set of
guiding principles. Not surprisingly, the ECJ’s tax jurisprudence is highly
controversial. Reflecting fundamental uncertainty regarding the meaning of tax
discrimination, many of the court’s critics argue that it has been overzealous in
its interpretation of nondiscrimination,64 while others argue that the court has
not been zealous enough.65
C. Two Cases
This Section selects two cross-border labor tax cases—one involving source
taxes and the other involving residence taxes—to illustrate the controversies
surrounding EU tax discrimination doctrine.
The landmark Schumacker case involved source taxes. Schumacker resided
in Belgium but earned all his income in Germany. Because he was a
nonresident, Germany denied Schumacker several tax benefits available to
residents, including marital income splitting, automatic refunds of tax overwithholding, and certain other personal and family deductions.66 Schumacker
argued that by denying him these tax benefits, Germany placed him in “a less
advantageous position than residents,” thereby discriminating against him in
violation of the EU freedom of movement of workers.67
The ECJ concluded that a state need not always tax residents and
nonresidents the same way because residents and nonresidents ordinarily are
not “similarly situated,” in part because nonresident workers typically earn
only part of their overall income in the source state. As a result, cross-border
workers ordinarily should seek personal tax benefits only from their residence
state, where the court assumed that they would earn most of their income.68
Despite its conclusion that resident and nonresident workers ordinarily are not
similarly situated, the court held that Schumacker’s case was special because he
earned all of his income from Germany, and his residence state (Belgium)

63.

64.
65.

66.
67.
68.

See Ruth Mason, Flunking the ECJ’s Tax Discrimination Test, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 72
(2007) (arguing that the ECJ has not provided clear guidelines on when two taxpayers are
similar for tax discrimination purposes).
See, e.g., Graetz & Warren, supra note 18.
See, e.g., Georg W. Kofler & Ruth Mason, Double Taxation: A European “Switch in Time?,”
14 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 63, 97-98 (2007) (criticizing the ECJ for ruling that member states’
failure to relieve juridical double taxation did not violate EU law).
Case C-279/93, Finanzamt Köln-Altstadt v. Schumacker, 1995 E.C.R. I-225.
Id. para. 52.
Id. para. 32.
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exempted his foreign-source income. Thus, any claims Schumacker had to
personal tax benefits in Belgium were of no use to him because he had no tax
liability there. As a result, if Germany did not take his personal expenses into
account, they would not be accounted for anywhere.69 To solve this dilemma,
the court held that when a nonresident worker earns “almost all” of his income
in a source state, such that his residence state cannot grant him personal tax
benefits, the source state must tax him like a resident worker.70 This so-called
Schumacker Rule runs contrary to long-standing tax treaty practice, under
which a source state is not obliged to grant nonresident taxpayers personal tax
benefits under any circumstances.71 Thus, in Schumacker, the ECJ established a
new EU law requirement, namely, that although cross-border workers should
not be able to claim duplicative personal tax benefits in more than one EU
state,72 they must be able to claim such benefits in at least one state. We call
this the “once somewhere” principle.73
In addition to cases like Schumacker, in which the ECJ found states taxing
in a source capacity to discriminate, the ECJ has also found states taxing in a
residence capacity to discriminate when they use their tax systems to
discourage their own residents from working in other EU member states. For
example, the ECJ case De Groot involved a Dutch resident taxpayer who earned
income from several other EU member states.74 To avoid double taxation, the
Netherlands exempted De Groot’s foreign-source income from tax, but it also
reduced his entitlement to personal tax benefits (such as personal deductions
and the personal exemption) in proportion to his exempt foreign-source
income.75 De Groot argued that by reducing his residence state tax benefits in

69.
70.
71.
72.

73.

74.
75.

Id. para. 36.
Id. para. 38.
See OECD Model Tax Treaty, supra note 13, art. 24, para. 3; see also Mason, supra note 20
(arguing that this OECD tax treaty practice is simple, efficient, and fair).
In Schumacker, as in prior cases, the court based the conclusion that workers should seek
personal tax benefits from their residence state in part on the need to avoid situations in
which cross-border workers would deduct the same personal expenses both at home and
abroad. Id. paras. 40-41 (citing Case C-204/90 Bachmann v. Belgium, 1992 E.C.R. I-249,
para. 28).
See Peter J. Wattel, Judicial Restraint and Three Trends in the ECJ’s Direct Tax Case Law,
62 TAX L. REV. 205, 216 (2008) (referring to the ECJ’s “always-somewhere” approach to
deductions).
Case C-385/00, De Groot v. Staatssecretaris van Financiën, 2002 E.C.R. I-11819.
Id. para. 18. For example, suppose that if De Groot earned all of his income in the
Netherlands, he would be entitled to the full Dutch personal exemption of ¤10,000 and
other personal deductions worth ¤5000. Under proportionality, if De Groot earned 60% of
his income abroad, he would be taxable by the Netherlands only on the 40% he earned in
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proportion to his foreign-source income, the Netherlands discouraged him
from working abroad.76 The Netherlands responded that a proportionate
reduction in residence state tax benefits was a necessary complement to
exempting his foreign-source income; since the Netherlands did not tax all of
De Groot’s income, why should it grant him a full set of personal tax
benefits?77 The Netherlands argued that, instead, the other member states in
which De Groot earned income should grant De Groot a fraction of their
personal tax benefits proportional to the fraction of his worldwide income
earned and taxed in each state.78 Having already ruled in Schumacker that the
residence state has the primary duty to afford cross-border workers personal
tax benefits, however, the ECJ rejected the Dutch proportionality method in De
Groot because it “discourage[d]” De Groot from “tak[ing] up paid
employment” in another member state.79
Even these two cases show that tax discrimination cases raise complex
questions without ready solutions. For instance, how do tax rate differentials
impact the determination of whether there has been discrimination? Does
subjecting nonresidents to higher taxation always constitute discrimination? If
not—as suggested by the ECJ’s conclusion in Schumacker that residents and
nonresidents ordinarily are not similarly situated (and confirmed in its later
rulings)80—then under what circumstances does higher taxation constitute
discrimination? Such questions generate significant commentary, but neither
the judicial opinions themselves nor academic commentary on them provide
answers to these fundamental questions. While we discuss the issue at greater

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

the Netherlands, and the other 60% would be exempt. However, the Netherlands would
also reduce by 60% De Groot’s personal exemption to ¤4000 and his personal deductions to
¤2000.
Id. para. 33.
Id. paras. 59-62.
Id. paras. 57-59.
Id. para. 84.
In Schumacker, the ECJ concluded that residents and nonresidents ordinarily are not
similarly situated because nonresidents usually earn most of their income outside the source
state. Case C-279/93, Finanzamt Köln-Altstadt v. Schumacker, 1995 E.C.R. I-225, para. 31.
In another case, where a source state denied its personal exemption to a nonresident who
did not earn almost all of his income in the source state, the ECJ found no discrimination
even though the denial had the effect of raising the nonresident’s tax burden compared to
residents who received the benefit of personal exemptions. See Case C-234/01, Gerritse v.
Finanzamt Neukölln-Nord, 2003 E.C.R. I-5933.
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length later, for now we simply note that very similar cases have arisen in the
U.S. context.81
Despite the lack of clear guidelines on how to resolve specific cases, one
thing is clear: the ECJ consistently demonstrates concern for the functioning of
the common market and the promotion of the freedom of movement in its tax
discrimination cases. The ECJ frequently concludes that tax policies
discriminate because they “discourage” or “deter” cross-border economic
activity.82 This interpretation makes sense when we consider that one of the
express purposes of the formation of the EU was to integrate the economies of
previously independent states by tearing down barriers to cross-border
economic activities and by preventing states from enacting new barriers that
would prevent taxpayers from operating across borders. The problem with the
tax discrimination decisions, however, is that they provide little guidance as to
when tax policies “discourage” or “deter” the relevant type of cross-border
economic activity. Providing a clear, operational theory of tax discrimination is
the principal challenge in this area, and one we undertake in the next Part.
ii. toward a coherent conception of tax discrimination
In this Part, we introduce three alternative efficiency interpretations for tax
nondiscrimination. Two of these alternatives derive from the traditional capital
neutrality benchmarks that have been used to analyze international tax laws
since the 1960s. They are: locational neutrality, which minimizes distortions of
decisions about where to work, and leisure neutrality, which minimizes
distortions about how much to work. The third alternative, which we call
“competitive neutrality,” derives from recent economics literature. Rather than

81.

82.

See, e.g., Lunding v. N.Y. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287 (1998) (holding that a state
violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause when it denied nonresident taxpayers
alimony deductions available to resident taxpayers); Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co.,
252 U.S. 60 (1920) (holding that a state violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause when
it denied nonresident taxpayers personal exemptions available to resident taxpayers);
Wheeler v. State, 249 A.2d 887 (Vt. 1969) (rejecting equal-protection and privileges-andimmunities challenges to a law that applied Vermont’s progressive tax rates to both in-state
and out-of-state taxpayers).
See, e.g., Case C-334/02, Comm’n of the Eur. Cmty. v. France, 2004 E.C.R. I-2229, para. 23;
Case C-242/03, Ministre des Finances v. Weidert, 2004 E.C.R. I-7379, paras. 13-14; Case
C-364/01, Barbier v. Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst, 2003 E.C.R. I-15013, para. 62;
De Groot, 2002 E.C.R. I-11819, paras. 84, 91; Case C-436/00, X & Y v. Riksskatteverket,
2002 E.C.R. I-10829, para. 36; Case C-294/97, Eurowings Luftverkehrs AG v. Finanzamt
Dortmund-Unna, 1999 E.C.R. I-7447, para. 37; Case C-439/97, Sandoz GmbH v.
Finanzlandesdirektion für Wien, 1999 E.C.R. I-7041, para. 19; Case C-118/96, Safir v.
Skattemyndigheten i Dalarnas Län, 1998 E.C.R. I-1897, para. 29.

1033

the yale law journal

seeking to ensure that every worker in a particular jurisdiction faces the same
tax rate, or that any given worker who resides in a particular jurisdiction faces
the same tax rate regardless of where she works, competitive neutrality seeks to
ensure that tax-rate differences do not differentially affect each worker’s choice
of job. That is to say, competitive neutrality requires that tax rate differences
not affect comparative advantage.83 More precisely, if the tax system causes
Worker 1, who is relatively more productive than Worker 2 in State X as
compared to State Y, to work in State Y, and causes Worker 2, who is relatively
more productive than Worker 1 in State Y as compared to State X, to work in
State X, then the tax system violates competitive neutrality. Expressed more
colloquially, a competitively neutral tax system does not interfere with the
matching of workers to jobs, whereas a system that violates this neutrality is
one in which workers sort into jobs not only on the basis of comparative
advantage, but also residence. In addition to explaining the benchmarks, this
Part provides, for the first time in the scholarly literature, clear guidelines for
interpreting the tax nondiscrimination principle to require each kind of
neutrality. Later, in Part III, we will argue that, of the three benchmarks,
competitive neutrality best reflects EU goals and the ECJ’s nondiscrimination
doctrine.
A. Some Caveats
Before presenting our three alternatives for interpreting nondiscrimination,
we set out a few caveats and assumptions in this Section.
1. Economic Efficiency
This Subsection discusses our decision to focus on the economic efficiency
rationale for the tax nondiscrimination principle. Commentators recognize
three “standard” values promoted by prohibitions on discrimination by states
in a common market: economic efficiency, representation reinforcement, and

83.

The use of the principle of comparative advantage in this context might seem unfamiliar or
misplaced to some readers because the principle, which was first described by David Ricardo
in the context of trade in goods between states, is the foundation for the economic argument
in favor of free trade between states. The principle, however, applies more broadly,
including to individuals, and is as much about the benefits of specialization as it is about the
benefits of exchange. See, e.g., PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS
679-81 (15th ed. 1995) (illustrating the principle of comparative advantage using the
example of the best lawyer in town who is also the best typist and arguing that the lawyer
should practice law and her secretary should type, even though her secretary is not as good a
typist as is she).
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promoting political unity.84 Despite its modest origins after World War II as a
coal and steel customs union among six European nations, over the last halfcentury the EU has evolved into considerably more.85 With 450 million people
living in twenty-seven member states, today the EU is the largest common
market in the world. In addition to a well-integrated economy, the EU
continues to make strides towards political unity, in part by guaranteeing EU
nationals the freedom of movement for reasons other than work or business
and by expanding the role of the European Parliament.
Despite these transformative developments, and our acknowledgement that
the EU tax nondiscrimination principle also promotes representation
reinforcement and political unity, we nevertheless focus primarily on the
economic efficiency component of tax nondiscrimination. We make this choice
for several reasons. First, the rhetoric of “ever closer union” does not seem to
play a prominent role in discussions of direct taxation.86 For example, direct
taxation remains one of a shrinking number of policy areas that require
member state unanimity for the passage of legislation.87 In the negotiations for
the EU Constitution, member state representatives even discussed limiting the
ECJ’s jurisdiction in tax matters.88 Furthermore, the ECJ’s reasoning in tax

84.
85.

86.

87.

88.

Lisa Heinzerling, The Commercial Constitution, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 217, 220.
See, e.g., Single Market Act: Twelve Levers To Boost Growth and Strengthen Confidence: Working
Together To Create New Growth, at 3, COM (2011) 206 final (Apr. 13, 2011) (“At the heart of
the European project since its inception, the common market . . . has for over 50 years
woven strands of solidarity between the men and women of Europe, whilst opening up new
opportunities for growth for more than 21 million European businesses.”).
TFEU, supra note 45, pmbl. (citing as one of the motivations for the Treaty the desire for
“an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe”). Although political unity has not
played a role in tax discrimination cases, it is considered by the European Economic and
Social Committee (EESC) to be an important element of the movement of workers. See, e.g.,
Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on ‘Freedom of Movement for Workers in the
Single Market (Single Market Observatory),’ 2001 O.J. (C 155) 47, ¶ 1.1.2 (“Freedom of
movement of workers is, in the [EESC’s] view, a key factor in the achievement of an ever
closer Union. It is also one of the most concrete expressions of the concept of Union
citizenship.”). The EESC provides a forum for EU interest groups to express views on EU
issues, and the TFEU obliges the Council to consult with both the European Parliament and
the EESC before undertaking tax and other kinds of legislation. See TFEU, supra note 45,
art. 115.
TFEU, supra note 45, art. 115 (“[T]he Council shall, acting unanimously in accordance with
a special legislative procedure and after consulting the European Parliament and the
Economic and Social Committee, issue directives for the approximation of such laws,
regulations or administrative provisions of the Member States as directly affect the
establishment or functioning of the internal market.”).
See Frans Vanistendael, The ECJ at the Crossroads: Balancing Tax Sovereignty Against the
Imperatives of the Single Market, 46 EUR. TAX’N 413, 413 (2006).
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discrimination cases continues to hew closely to the economic justifications for
the formation of the EU, even as the court increasingly stresses the importance
of noneconomic EU values, such as political unity and equality, in other areas
of law.89 Specifically, the ECJ has never invoked the representation
reinforcement or political unity rationales in its tax discrimination cases.
Indeed, to our knowledge, the ECJ has never invoked values other than
economic efficiency in deciding whether a state used its tax system to
discriminate.
The ECJ’s bifurcated approach to deciding tax cases also reinforces the
primacy of economic efficiency concepts in deciding tax nondiscrimination
cases. The court’s decisions generally proceed in two stages.90 In the first stage,
the court considers whether the state discriminated by looking to whether the
challenged tax law “discourages” or “deters” cross-border economic activity.91
It is not until the second stage of the court’s ruling, the justification stage, that
the court even considers other values. Yet, even here, the ECJ has only accepted
a limited number of justifications, such as the need to prevent fraud or tax
evasion, all of which directly relate to economic efficiency.92
Because our goal in this Article is to try to get a clearer understanding of
what the tax nondiscrimination principle requires, it seems prudent to discuss
what the ECJ itself has identified as tax nondiscrimination’s most important
underlying value. Thus, in focusing on efficiency, we take our cue from the
ECJ. Later, however, we discuss the implications of our interpretation of
nondiscrimination for representation reinforcement and political unity.93
2. Labor, Not Capital
All three of the economic efficiency benchmarks we discuss in this Article
were developed for the analysis of capital taxation, not labor taxation.

89.

90.
91.
92.
93.

The ECJ has declared its expectation that Union citizenship will continue to take on greater
importance as a source of legal rights for EU nationals. See, e.g., Case C-184/99, Grzelczyk v.
Centre Public d’Aide Sociale d’Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve, 2001 E.C.R. I-6193, para. 31
(“Union citizenship is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member
States, enabling those who find themselves in the same situation to enjoy the same
treatment in law irrespective of their nationality, subject to such exceptions as are expressly
provided for.”).
See MASON, supra note 11, at 93-114 (discussing justifications for tax discrimination).
See sources cited supra note 82.
See MASON, supra note 11, at 93-114 (reviewing the limited justifications the ECJ has accepted
in tax cases, such as the need to prevent tax fraud and the need for fiscal supervision).
See discussion infra Subsection III.B.3.
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Nevertheless, we focus on labor taxation for several reasons. First, labor tax
cases affect many people because many people work outside their residence
state or have labor income from more than one state.94 Second, because the
facts, law, and institutional setting of labor tax cases are relatively
straightforward, they are much easier to explain and understand than are the
capital tax cases.95 Third, illustrating our arguments using labor, rather than
capital, allows the reader to more readily connect our conception of tax
nondiscrimination with more intuitive notions of nondiscrimination that
implicate political equality, such as discrimination on the basis of race or
national origin. Thus, the labor tax cases remind us that the desire to avoid
nationality discrimination animates the fundamental freedoms, as does the
desire to forge political unity among the peoples of Europe, even though the
ECJ has not specifically acknowledged that value in its tax discrimination
doctrine. Finally, the freedom of capital movement has a different scope than
do the other fundamental freedoms. Specifically, while the other fundamental
freedoms, including the free movement of goods, workers, services, and
business establishments, only apply to EU situations, the freedom of capital
movement also applies to capital moving into or out of the EU.96 The
application of the freedom of capital movement to so-called third countries and
the consequent protection of non-EU nationals under that freedom has

94.

95.

96.

Although we could not find statistics on the number of people working outside their state of
tax residence, statistics on related cross-border worker mobility issues provide some insight
into the size of that population. See Reaffirming the Free Movement of Workers: Rights and
Major Developments, at 2, COM (2010) 373 final at 2 (July 13, 2010) (noting that “10% of
persons polled in EU-27 replied that they had lived and worked in another country at some
point in the past, while 17% intended to take advantage of free movement in the future”); cf.
Posting of Workers in the Framework of the Provision of Services: Maximizing Its Benefits and
Potential While Guaranteeing the Protection of Workers, at 3, COM (2007) 304 final at 3 (June
13, 2007) (noting that the number of workers employed in one member state, but
temporarily posted by their employer in another member state was “just under 1 million, or
about 0.4% of the EU working age population in 2005”).
Members of the court have remarked on the complexities in these cases. See, e.g., Case
C-374/04, Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Grp. Litig. v. Comm’rs of Inland Revenue,
2006 E.C.R. I-11673, para.3 (opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed) (“This is an area in
which the Court, faced with increasingly complicated factual and legislative contexts and
arguments seeking to test the limits of the Treaty, has developed a substantial body of rather
complex case-law.”). Scholars agree. See, e.g., Walter Hellerstein et al., Constitutional
Restraints on Corporate Tax Integration, 62 TAX L. REV. 1, 18, 65 (2008) (describing the
corporate tax integration jurisprudence in the ECJ as “woefully complex”).
TFEU, supra note 45, art. 63, para. 2 (“[A]ll restrictions on payments between Member
States and between Member States and third countries shall be prohibited.”).
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complicated its interpretation.97 Because our goal in this Article is to address
the meaning of tax discrimination within a common market, we do not
expressly consider the freedom of capital movement, which has third-party
effects. Although our arguments have implications for capital taxation, we do
not consider those implications here.
3. Assumptions
As part of our analysis, we present a simple two-state model of how
taxation distorts labor markets. In developing that model, we make two
assumptions, namely, that only taxes matter and that tax residence is fixed.
The more important assumption is that only taxes matter. Of course, taxes are
not the only factor that workers consider when answering important questions,
such as where to work, how much to work, and which job to work. A whole
variety of other factors—both economic and noneconomic—influence such
decisions. These varied factors include everything from wage rates to climate,
from religion to love of unpasteurized cheese. People’s work decisions depend
not only on taxation but also on geography, working conditions, family and
community support and expectations, cultural factors, standards and costs of
living, labor and immigration regulations, moving costs, transportation costs,
and other frictions. Many of these factors weigh more heavily than taxation in
decisions about work. However, in order to isolate the effect of taxation on
work decisions, we assume that the only factor that influences work decisions
is taxation and that there are no nontax costs of moving.98
Second, in order to explore the impact of taxes on decisions about where to
work, how much to work, and which job to work, we hold taxpayers’ residence
fixed. This means that we assume that taxes will not cause workers to change
their state of tax residence, even though taxes may cause people to commute to
other jurisdictions or to work there for long periods. Although this assumption
is contrary to fact, it is justified given the limited applicability of the legal
prohibition of tax discrimination under EU law. Specifically, EU law only
covers cross-border situations. For example, EU nondiscrimination law
protects an EU national who is a French tax resident when she earns income
from Germany. However, should the French resident move her residence to

97.

98.

See, e.g., Case C-452/04, Fidium Finanz AG v. Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht,
2006 E.C.R. I-9521 (struggling to determine whether cross-border lending involves the
freedom to provide services, the freedom of capital movement, or both).
We do not believe that introducing these complications would dramatically change our
results, although doing so would dramatically complicate our examples, exposition, and
analysis.
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Germany and continue to work in Germany, her tax treatment would no longer
be a concern of EU law, since she would be a resident of Germany earning only
domestic income. EU nondiscrimination law generally does not concern
member states’ tax treatment of their own residents’ purely domestic income.99
If the taxpayer became a German tax resident, Germany would treat her like
other German tax residents (most of whom are German nationals). Because tax
law applies on the basis of residence, rather than nationality, once a taxpayer
establishes tax residency in a member state, that state generally will treat her
the same as other tax residents.100 Thus, the application of the tax
nondiscrimination principle generally concerns cases in which an EU national
resides in one state, but earns income in another state. Of course, should the
taxpayer in our example, who now resides in Germany, begin to earn income
from work in Belgium, EU law would protect her from tax discrimination by
Germany or Belgium. And in our analysis, we now would assume that her
residence is fixed in Germany.101

99.

100.

101.

That is not to say that the ECJ never looks at member states’ tax treatments of their own
residents with only domestic income. It regularly does so in comparison with residents of
other member states earning income in that country or with its own residents earning
income abroad. The purpose of such assessments, however, is to determine whether the
state is discriminating against foreign residents working or seeking to work in that country
or domestic residents seeking to work abroad. See, e.g., Case C-385/00, De Groot v.
Staatssecretaris van Financiën, 2002 E.C.R. I-11819 (comparing the Netherlands’ treatment
of it residents’ foreign-source income with the Netherlands’ treatment of its residents’
Dutch-source income); Case C-279/93, Finanzamt Köln-Altstadt v. Schumacker,
1995 E.C.R. I-225 (comparing Germany’s treatment of its own residents’ German-source
income with Germany’s treatment of nonresidents’ German-source income).
Cf. Case C-112/91, Werner v. Finanzamt Aachen-Innenstadt, 1993 E.C.R. I-429 (holding
that the freedom of establishment did not apply to a German national establishing a
business in Germany). We could imagine scenarios involving discrimination against new
residents, which would be a concern for EU law, but we are aware of no such cases in the
EU.
Similarly, in the U.S. state tax context, the assumption of fixed residence allows us to
focus on the most constitutionally relevant set of circumstances: specifically, occasions when
a taxpayer resides in one state, but has income from another. While it is not impossible for a
state to discriminate against its own residents with only in-state income (or only in-state
activities), such cases have proven exceptional in comparison to the bulk of cases, which
involve state tax discrimination against nonresidents or against residents with out-of-state
income. Cf. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 12 (1992) (ruling that California’s Proposition
13A, which based property taxes on assessments made in 1975-76, did not discriminate
against new residents in violation of the Equal Protection Clause because the rule was
rationally related to the state’s goal to encourage “neighborhood preservation, continuity,
and stability”).
Moreover, the assumption of fixed residence, although designed to make our models
tractable, is not necessary for our results, as we show later. See infra note 170.
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4. What We Mean by Welfare
Throughout this Article, we use the traditional economist’s concept of
welfare. We derive welfare from individual preferences. We also generally
ignore the possibility of externalities and so generally assume that an
unregulated environment would yield an efficient equilibrium. At the same
time, we recognize that governments raise revenue through taxes for a variety
of purposes, some of which are because of market imperfections, such as
externalities. Such taxes, however, distort behavior along a number of different
dimensions. In our view, a tax distorts behavior if it would in theory be
possible for a central planner to adjust behavior, compensate the losers, and
have a surplus remaining. Thus, when we talk about welfare we are using the
criterion of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.102
5. Why These Benchmarks?
Finally, given the many possible margins upon which tax-induced
distortions can occur, one might question our choice to consider whether the
tax nondiscrimination principle can best be understood as requiring only
locational neutrality, leisure neutrality, or competitive neutrality. We chose
these benchmarks because they dominate cross-border tax debates.103 In
addition the ECJ has made clear that the nondiscrimination principle does not
govern certain margins, such as residence-based discrimination by a member
state against its own nationals with only domestic income,104 although the
freedom of EU nationals to choose their state of residence is protected by other
parts of the TFEU.105

102.
103.

104.

105.

See generally BALASSA, supra note 42, at 10-14 (discussing how integration of the economies
of different states can impact economic welfare).
See, e.g., STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 102D CONG., FACTORS AFFECTING THE
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS OF THE UNITED STATES 5 (Comm. Print 1991) (discussing
locational neutrality and savings neutrality); see also Desai & Hines, supra note 33 (discussing
all three benchmarks); Graetz, supra note 23 (discussing locational and savings neutrality
and arguing that U.S. international tax policy should focus more on promoting national
welfare).
Werner, 1993 E.C.R. I-429, para. 17 (holding that EU law “does not preclude a Member
State from imposing on its nationals who carry on their professional activities within its
territory and who earn all or almost all of their income there or possess all or almost all of
their assets there a heavier tax burden if they do not reside in that State than if they do”).
TFEU, supra note 45, art. 21 (“Every citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and
reside freely within the territory of the Member States, subject to the limitations and
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The first of the benchmarks we consider is locational neutrality, and it
obtains when taxes do not distort the location of workers. In the capital tax
context, this benchmark is known as “capital export neutrality,” and it obtains
when taxes do not distort the location in which capital is employed. Capital
export neutrality, which requires an investor to pay the same tax regardless of
where an investment is located, was described by economist Peggy Musgrave
in the 1960s.106 It has become one of the standard tools for evaluating the
impact of national tax measures upon the efficiency of global capital markets.
Reflecting its importance, explicit appeals to locational neutrality appear in
foundational policy documents written by domestic tax authorities107 and
major international tax policymaking bodies, such as the OECD.108
The second benchmark, savings neutrality, obtains when the supply of
savings is allocated efficiently across jurisdictions. Savings neutrality was
explained most clearly by economist Thomas Horst in the 1980s under the
term “capital import neutrality.” Capital import neutrality requires residents of
different states to face the same consumption-saving tradeoff. In the form
described by Horst, capital import neutrality does not have many advocates
among policymakers or economists.109 Nevertheless, capital export neutrality
and capital import neutrality together represent the standard efficiency
benchmarks for analyzing cross-border tax issues, and so our analysis would be
incomplete without them.110
We also consider what we call competitive neutrality. We derive
competitive neutrality from recent scholarship by economists Michael
Devereux, Mihir Desai, and James Hines emphasizing “capital ownership
neutrality,” which obtains when taxes do not distort the ownership of assets.111
Although economists have only recently formalized the requirements of capital
ownership neutrality, the notion of competitive or ownership neutrality is
older. Discussions of the role that internal, firm-specific factors play in
understanding the pattern of foreign direct investment first appeared in the

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

111.

conditions laid down in the Treaties and by the measures adopted to give them effect.”).
Article 21 of the TFEU was not in force at the time of the Werner decision.
PEGGY BREWER RICHMAN, TAXATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT INCOME 8 (1963).
See Graetz, supra note 23, at 270-77.
See, e.g., OECD Discussion Draft, supra note 22, at 102-03.
Horst, supra note 60.
See Graetz, supra note 23, at 270-77 (criticizing the overreliance by the U.S. Treasury
Department on the concept of locational neutrality, and citing many government
publications referencing the neutrality benchmarks).
Desai & Hines, supra note 33; Devereux, supra note 33.
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economics literature in the 1950s.112 References to competitive or ownership
neutrality first appeared in academic scholarship in the 1990s.113 In the U.S.
legal literature, we believe the term “ownership neutrality” was first used in
1994.114 But even before the introduction of the term “ownership neutrality,”
international tax analysts and policymakers had long emphasized the
importance of maintaining a level playing field among taxpayers resident in
different states who compete for jobs, investments, or customers in the same
markets. Given the sustained importance assigned to competitiveness by
policymakers and experts, and given the new emphasis on the formal
requirements of ownership neutrality in economics scholarship, we add
analysis of competitive neutrality to the usual approach to international tax
questions, which limits discussion to capital export neutrality and capital
import neutrality. As we will show, competitive neutrality turns out to be a
better fit than locational neutrality or leisure neutrality for the
nondiscrimination principle, given the text of the TFEU, the goals of the EU,
and the ECJ’s tax nondiscrimination doctrine.
Our last caveat involves the acknowledgement that international tax
scholarship and policy documents reflect confusion over the meaning of the
term capital import neutrality. Noneconomist international tax experts have
long used the term to refer to something akin to competitive or ownership
neutrality, while economists have used the term to refer to savings neutrality.
This divergence in usage between economists and others has created significant
confusion.115 To avoid this confusion, we do not use the term capital import
neutrality. Instead, we use the term “savings neutrality” to refer to what
economists call capital import neutrality, and we use the term “leisure
neutrality” to refer to the labor analogue of savings neutrality. Finally, we use
the term “competitive neutrality” to refer to both what economists call capital
ownership neutrality as well as to its labor analogue.

112.

113.
114.

115.

EDWARD M. GRAHAM & PAUL R. KRUGMAN, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES 191-93 (3d ed. 1995) (surveying economic explanations for foreign direct
investment).
Devereux, supra note 33.
See Robert A. Green, The Troubled Rule of Nondiscrimination in Taxing Foreign Direct
Investment, 26 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 113, 138 (1994) (“Ownership neutrality prevails if the
international tax system is neutral with respect to the identity of the firm that owns and
controls capital in a given country.”).
Michael S. Knoll, Reconsidering International Tax Neutrality, 64 TAX L. REV. 99, 101-18 (2011)
(arguing that Musgrave’s original description of capital import neutrality was a type of
competitive neutrality and that many noneconomists continued to use the term capital
import neutrality to refer to competitive neutrality long after economists following Horst
switched to using the term to refer to savings neutrality).
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B. Locational Neutrality
Capital export neutrality is the first traditional tax neutrality benchmark. A
tax system achieves capital export neutrality when it does not distort the
location of capital. If the tax system achieves capital export neutrality, then
shifting capital across borders does not increase global output.116 We label both
capital export neutrality and its labor analogue “locational neutrality.” A tax
system is locationally neutral when it does not distort the location where
individuals work. If the tax system achieves locational neutrality, then shifting
workers across jurisdictions does not increase global welfare.
As with taxing capital income, taxing labor income may create distortions.
We demonstrate the notion that taxes can distort the location of labor with a
simple example. If the world consisted only of two states, France and
Germany, Figure 1 would describe the four possible categories of workers
based on where they work and where they reside.117 The bottom left quadrant
(Quadrant 1) represents German residents working in Germany. The top left
quadrant (Quadrant 2) represents German residents working in France. The
bottom right quadrant (Quadrant 3) represents French residents working in
Germany. The top right quadrant (Quadrant 4) represents French residents
working in France.

116.

117.

For concise explanations of capital export neutrality and capital import neutrality, see
DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, DECODING THE U.S. CORPORATE TAX 122-25 (2009); and Richard A.
Musgrave & Peggy B. Musgrave, Inter-Nation Equity, in MODERN FISCAL ISSUES: ESSAYS IN
HONOR OF CARL S. SHOUP 63 (Richard M. Bird & John G. Head eds., 1972).
Figure 1 is similar to the figure developed by Professor Alvin Warren to describe
discrimination against foreign production and foreign producers. See Warren, supra note 4,
at 149. Our analysis differs from his, however, because we emphasize labor mobility and
competitive neutrality.
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Figure 1.

four types of workers
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The solid vertical line separating Quadrants 1 and 2 from Quadrants 3 and 4
separates the work done by German residents from that done by French
residents. Similarly, the solid horizontal line separating Quadrants 1 and 3 from
Quadrants 2 and 4 separates the work done in Germany from that done in
France. Figure 1 assumes an environment without taxes (or with harmonized
taxes).118

118.

The solid horizontal line separating Quadrants 1 and 3 from Quadrants 2 and 4 separates
work that is efficiently performed in Germany (below that line) from work that is efficiently
performed in France (above that line). Accordingly, the area just below that line represents
tasks performed in Germany that could be performed almost (but not quite) as efficiently if
those tasks were shifted to France. Similarly, the solid vertical line separating Quadrants 1
and 2 from Quadrants 3 and 4 separates work that is most efficiently performed by German
residents (left of that line) from work that is most efficiently performed by French residents
(right of that line). Accordingly, the area just to the left of that line represents tasks
performed by German residents that could be performed almost (but not quite) as
efficiently by French residents. Thus, the area in the lower left corner of Quadrant 1
represents tasks that can be performed much more efficiently by German residents working
in Germany than by French residents working in either Germany or France or by German
residents working in France (for example, designing and testing German grammar books
for German primary school students). In contrast, the area in the lower right corner of
Quadrant 3 represents tasks that can be performed much more efficiently by French
residents working in Germany than by German residents working anywhere or French
residents working in France (for example, baking soufflés for customers in Berlin).
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Throughout this Article, we assume Germany is considering imposing a
tax. In contrast, France, which represents the rest of the world or at least the
rest of the EU, will not change its tax policies regardless of what Germany
does. Because France represents the rest of the world, Germany is
(counterfactually) a small state relative to France. That implies that prices and
wages in France are given and will not be affected by German tax policies.
German prices and wages, however, will change in response to the tax.
Suppose, for example, Germany imposes a uniform 10% source tax. By a
“uniform” source tax we mean that the state applies the tax to all workers with
income from its territory, regardless of the workers’ residence. Thus, to be
uniform, Germany would have to apply the tax to both German residents and
French residents working in Germany. We represent the work performed in
Germany that is subject to the uniform source tax with light shading in Figure
2. Because all workers in Quadrants 1 and 3 are subject to the German source
tax, we shade all of Quadrant 1 and all of Quadrant 3.
Figure 2.

source-tax-induced distortion of location
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from work in Germany in the
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from work in Germany under a
10% German source tax

As compared to Figure 1, which represented the no-tax world, in Figure 2
Quadrants 1 and 3 are smaller and Quadrants 2 and 4 are larger. The shift in
the size of the quadrants represents the locational distortion caused by the
German source tax; the German source tax drives labor out of Germany and
into France. Specifically, a taxpayer will choose to work in Germany only if she
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earns at least 111% of what she can earn in France.119 Thus, the effect of the tax
would be to shift workers from Germany to France, as represented by the
downward shift in the solid horizontal line separating work in France from
work in Germany. This locational distortion reduces welfare by reducing work
and therefore production in Germany.120
Any source tax, including a uniform source tax that applies to both
residents and nonresidents like the one described here, distorts locational
neutrality. To raise tax revenue without distorting the location of labor, states
must ensure that their residents face the same tax burden on their work, no
matter whether they earn their income at home or abroad.121 If where they earn
their income has no effect on how much tax they pay, workers will choose
where to work based on where they earn the highest pre-tax wages. There are
two tax systems that can achieve this effect without requiring global
harmonization of tax rates and bases: residence-only taxation and worldwide
taxation with unlimited credits for source taxes.122
Under residence-only taxation, states would tax all their residents’ income,
whether earned domestically or abroad, and source taxation would be
forbidden. Similarly, under worldwide taxation with unlimited credits

119.

120.

121.

Viewing France as a proxy for the rest of the world and assuming that Germany is not such a
large state in labor markets that its policies affect wages elsewhere, it follows that the
productivity of workers in France will remain unchanged.
To see why, consider a worker who could earn ¤111 in Germany, but who works in France
where she earns only ¤100. She is indifferent between working in France where she earns
¤100, which is not subject to tax, and working in Germany, where she would earn ¤111, but
pay ¤11 in tax. Shifting her work to Germany will allow her to produce ¤111. Of that
amount, ¤100 would be enough to compensate the worker for her lost French wages. We
need not compensate the French government, which does not tax, nor the German
government, because before the shift the French resident worked in France and so the
German government collected no tax from her. Thus, the shift leaves a surplus of ¤11, which
is proof of the locational distortion.
Let

Rrw( (DF))
represent the after-all-taxes retention rate on work performed by an individual who resides
in jurisdiction D on work performed in jurisdiction F. The retention rate is the portion of
the worker’s before-tax salary that she retains after paying all source and all residence taxes.
Thus, locational neutrality requires that

Rrw( (DF)) = Rrw( (DD) ) .

122.

In our two-state example, this means that for all German residents, the retention rate on
Quadrant 2 must equal the retention rate on Quadrant 1. Likewise, for all French residents,
the retention rate on Quadrant 3 must equal the retention rate on Quadrant 4.
States also could maintain locational neutrality by agreeing to assess taxes at the same rate.
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(“worldwide taxation”), states also would tax all their residents’ income, no
matter where earned. But source taxation would be permitted. To maintain
locational neutrality, states would fully credit any taxes their residents paid to
source states. In this way, residents of a particular state would always face the
same tax burden on their income, no matter where they earned it, so the
presence of higher or lower tax rates in other states would not influence
residents’ decisions about where to work.123 Because we assume residence is
fixed, worldwide taxation tends to push before-tax wages into equality across
borders so that shifting labor across jurisdictions will not increase output.
Worldwide taxation is an example of what we call a “uniform residence tax”
because it applies on the same basis to all residents, regardless of the source of
their income.
C. Leisure Neutrality
The second traditional tax neutrality benchmark is “capital import
neutrality,” or “savings neutrality,” which obtains when savings are allocated
efficiently across jurisdictions.124 We call capital import neutrality “savings
neutrality,” and we call the labor analogue to savings neutrality “leisure
neutrality.” Leisure neutrality obtains when leisure is allocated efficiently
across jurisdictions. In other words, leisure-neutral taxes do not create different
distortions of the labor/leisure tradeoff for workers residing in different states.
In the absence of taxes, people would decide how much time to devote to
work and how much to leisure based purely on their preferences regarding
those activities. However, because income from work is taxed, whereas leisure
is not taxed, all income tax systems favor leisure over work. This distortion
between work and leisure arises under any system that taxes income, and
would exist even if the world consisted of a single taxing jurisdiction. But the
existence of multiple jurisdictions that impose taxes at different rates creates an
additional distortion. For example, if Germany is a high-tax jurisdiction, and
France is a low-tax jurisdiction, French residents will receive higher after-tax
wages from their work than will German residents. As a result, French
residents may work too much compared to German residents, who work too

123.

124.

See Musgrave & Musgrave, supra note 116, at 69. Notice that, to maintain locational
neutrality, states would have to refund foreign taxes that exceeded their own. The United
States relieves double taxation via the credit method, but it limits the credit to the tax that
would have been due on domestic income. Thus, if a U.S. resident earns $100 of foreign
source income and if the U.S. tax rate is 35%, then the maximum credit for foreign taxes it
will allow is $35, even if a U.S. resident pays a higher rate abroad. See I.R.C. § 901 (2006).
Horst, supra note 60, at 794-96; see also Knoll, supra note 115 (discussing terminology).
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little.125 Thus, shifting units of work from French residents to German
residents could improve global welfare.126
A tax system violates leisure neutrality when residents of different states
face different work-leisure tradeoffs. A tax system satisfies leisure neutrality
when residents from different states face the same work-leisure tradeoff. That
will occur only if everyone working in a jurisdiction faces the same marginal
tax rate. Of course, even if everyone faced the same marginal tax rate, there
would still be a work-leisure distortion as long as the tax rate was not zero.
However, there would not be a differential distortion across residents of
different states. As we use the term here, “leisure neutrality” refers to the
elimination of differential work-leisure distortions across residents of different
states.
We demonstrate that residence taxation distorts leisure neutrality using our
two-state example. Suppose that the only tax is a uniform 20% German
residence tax. Recall that a uniform residence tax is one that a state applies to
all its residents’ income, regardless of where earned. Thus, Germany would tax
the income of all German residents at 20%, regardless of whether they earn
that income in Germany or abroad in France. When Germany taxes its
residents, it makes work less attractive for them than it is for French residents
because German residents keep only 80% of what they earn after taxes,
whereas French residents keep 100%. As a result, whether they work in
Germany or France, German residents face a different work-leisure tradeoff
than do French residents. This difference is a violation of leisure neutrality.
The effect of the German tax on the total hours worked by Germans is
theoretically indeterminate: it could go either up or down. If the substitution
effect predominates,127 such that taxpayers prefer to spend more time at leisure
than to work more to earn after-tax wages, then by lowering the after-tax
wages of German residents relative to French residents, the German residence
tax reduces the amount worked by German residents compared to French
residents. For no special reason, we drew Figure 3 using the assumption that
the substitution effect would predominate.

125.

126.
127.

Cf. Rosanne Altshuler, Recent Developments in the Debate on Deferral, 20 TAX NOTES INT’L
1579, 1581-82 (2000) (discussing capital taxation, and therefore couching her discussion in
terms of savings and consumption, rather than work and leisure).
Cf. SHAVIRO, supra note 116, at 122-26 (analyzing capital taxes); Altshuler, supra note 125
(analyzing capital taxes).
The substitution effect states that when the price of a good (such as ice cream or leisure)
rises, consumers tend to consume less of that good, and vice versa. SAMUELSON &
NORDHAUS, supra note 83, at 78.
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As in the last figure, we use light shading to represent the work that is
subject to the German tax. In this case, however, because we posit a uniform
German residence tax, all workers in Quadrants 1 and 2 are subject to the tax so
we shade all of Quadrant 1 and all of Quadrant 2:
Figure 3.

residence-tax-induced distortion of leisure
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Under our assumption that the substitution effect predominates, the
German residence tax shifts units of work from German residents to French
residents, and it therefore shifts to the left the solid line separating Quadrants 1
and 2 from Quadrants 3 and 4, as compared to its position in a no-tax world.
Unlike in Figure 2, in Figure 3, the change in the size of the quadrants does not
represent a physical shift of workers across state borders. Instead, in Figure 3,
the change in the size of the quadrants represents a shift in the amount of work
done by the workers in each quadrant relative to the no-tax world. Uniform
residence taxation does not cause anyone to change where they work;128 instead,

128.

In the previous Section, we explained that uniform residence taxation does not create
locational distortions.
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it causes people to change the amount they work. That distortion reduces
welfare.129
In Figure 3, we assumed that the substitution effect would dominate, but it
is possible that the income effect may dominate instead,130 such that earning
lower after-tax wages encourages German residents to work more in order to
increase these wages. In that case, there would still be a distortion: the solid
vertical line separating Quadrants 1 and 2 from Quadrants 3 and 4 would shift
to the right as compared to its position in a no-tax world. Now welfare could
be improved by having German residents work less and French residents work
more. No matter whether the substitution or income effect dominates, in the
absence of global tax rate harmonization, all residence taxation distorts leisure

129.

130.

The German residence tax creates a distortion by shifting units of work from German
residents to French residents. We demonstrate this distortion by showing that it is possible
to increase aggregate welfare by rearranging work and leisure between French and German
residents. Assume an additional unit of work by either a French or German resident is just
enough to generate ¤100 before tax. At the margin, because the German residence tax does
not apply to residents of France, a French resident is indifferent between working the
additional unit (thereby earning ¤100) and not working. Similarly, at the margin, a German
resident, who must pay residence tax at 20%, is indifferent between working the additional
unit (thereby earning ¤80 after the German residence tax) and not working. Recall that in
our example in the text, we assumed that the substitution effect would dominate, so that the
German residence tax would reduce work by German residents. Now consider the
possibility of partially offsetting that change by reducing the work of a French resident and
increasing the work of a German resident. Because the French resident is indifferent at the
margin between working and earning ¤100 and not working, reducing the French resident’s
work by one unit will reduce her income by ¤100 without reducing her welfare. The
German resident has to be paid only ¤80 for the additional work to compensate for his lost
leisure. We need not compensate the French government for any loss of tax, since, no matter
who performs the work, France will not tax it. Nor need we compensate the German
government, since, if the French resident had performed the work instead of the German
resident, Germany would not have collected any tax on it. Thus, as compared to the scenario
where the French worker performs the work and demands ¤100 to compensate her for her
lost leisure, if the German resident performs the work he demands only ¤80 to compensate
him for his lost leisure, leaving ¤20 to be shared among the German worker and his
employer. This is proof of the work-leisure distortion across residents of different states.
The income effect is the effect of a change in income on the quantity of a good (such as ice
cream or leisure) consumed. SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 83, at 79. For most
goods, the quantity consumed increases with income, but for some goods (economists called
these inferior goods) the quantity decreases as income rises (e.g., packaged ramen noodles).
See id. at 754 (defining inferior goods). When the price of a good rises, there is both a
substitution effect, which is away from the good, and an income effect, which can be away
from or towards the good. An income tax lowers the price of leisure, which encourages
consumption of leisure, but it also lowers income, which would lower such consumption
(assuming leisure is a normal, not an inferior, good). Thus, with an income tax, the
substitution and income effects on leisure are in the opposite direction. See id. at 79.
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neutrality, although uniform residence taxes do not also distort locational
neutrality.131
To achieve leisure neutrality in the absence of global tax rate
harmonization, taxpayers must earn the same after-tax wage, no matter where
they reside.132 This means that states may not assess taxes on a residence basis.
Instead, they must practice exemption. Additionally, states that tax on a source
basis must use uniform source taxes—those that apply on the same basis to
resident and nonresident workers.133 Under this system, after-tax wages
converge across jurisdictions, so shifting leisure among residents of different
states would not raise welfare.
Many common tax policies violate leisure neutrality. For example, some
states tax resident workers on a net basis but nonresident workers on a gross
basis. Applying different tax bases to residents and nonresidents working in
the same jurisdiction distorts their labor/leisure decisions because members of
the group that faces the higher effective tax rate will either work fewer hours (if
the substitution effect predominates) or more hours (if the income effect
predominates) than the other group. Both cases violate leisure neutrality.
Likewise, in the absence of tax rate harmonization, all residence taxation
violates leisure neutrality because taxpayers pay different rates depending upon
where they reside.
D. Competitive Neutrality
As we have shown, to achieve locational neutrality, all taxpayers residing in
the same state must face the same tax burden on their foreign and domestic
earned income, namely, the residence state’s tax rate. Thus, the burden to
maintain locational neutrality falls on residence states, which must tax
residents’ foreign and domestic income the same way, including by granting
unlimited credits for source taxes if necessary. In contrast, to achieve leisure

131.
132.

133.

See supra Section II.B.
w( D )
w( D )
Using the notation supra in note 121, leisure neutrality requires that Rr ( F ) equal Rr ( D ) .
In our two-state example, this means that the retention rate for all taxpayers who work in
Germany must be the same no matter where those workers reside (i.e., the retention rate for
Quadrant 1 must equal the retention rate for Quadrant 3). Likewise, the retention rate for all
taxpayers who work in France must be the same no matter where those workers reside (i.e.,
the retention rate for Quadrant 2 must equal the retention rate for Quadrant 4).
In the terminology of international law, states must grant nonresidents national treatment
with respect to source taxes. Since states must extend national treatment to all nonresidents
regardless of where they reside, leisure neutrality effectively also encompasses a mostfavored-nation treatment requirement for source taxation. Leisure neutrality forbids
residence taxation in the absence of rate harmonization.
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neutrality, all taxpayers must face the same tax burden on income earned in a
jurisdiction no matter where they reside, namely, the source state’s tax rate.
This means that residence states must not tax at all and source states must tax
nonresidents the same way that they tax residents.134 Thus, the burden to
maintain leisure neutrality falls primarily on source states, because only source
states tax under leisure neutrality.
Notwithstanding that the burden to maintain locational neutrality would
fall on residence states and the burden to maintain leisure neutrality would fall
on source states, the ECJ has imposed nondiscrimination obligations on states
taxing in both a source capacity and a residence capacity. Professors Graetz and
Warren have argued that imposition of nondiscrimination at both source and
residence shows that the ECJ’s approach to nondiscrimination is incoherent.135
Crucial to their argument is the fact that, unless all states harmonize their tax
rates, locational neutrality is incompatible with leisure neutrality.136 This is a
simple matter of logic: if locational neutrality requires cross-border workers to
be taxed at their residence state’s rate, and leisure neutrality requires crossborder workers to be taxed at their source state’s rate, then those two
requirements can only hold simultaneously if the source and residence states
have the same tax rate.
But the ECJ repeatedly has held that EU law does not require tax rate
harmonization, because rate harmonization would invade the member states’
retained tax autonomy.137 Thus, the ECJ’s imposition of nondiscrimination
burdens at both source and residence cannot logically be understood as an

134.

135.
136.

137.

Leisure neutrality is not distorted by source states taxing at different rates from each other.
Assuming each state has a single tax rate, wages across states will adjust so that after-tax
wages are the same everywhere. Thus, workers will face the same labor/leisure tradeoff
regardless of where they work or where they reside. The lower wage paid in a low-tax state
is called an implicit tax. Thus, the total tax—the sum of implicit and explicit tax—is equal
across states.
Graetz & Warren, supra note 18, at 1219.
Id. at 1212-23 (couching their discussion in terms of capital export neutrality and capital
import neutrality rather than locational neutrality and leisure neutrality); see also Michael J.
Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Dividend Taxation in Europe: When the ECJ Makes Tax Policy,
44 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1577, 1577 (2007) (“[T]he Court’s general approach to income tax
issues is incoherent because it seeks to eliminate discrimination based on both the origin and
destination of economic activity—an impossible quest in the absence of harmonized income
tax bases and rates . . . .”). The inability to achieve locational neutrality and savings (leisure)
neutrality simultaneously in the absence of rate harmonization is well-established. See
Graetz & Warren, supra note 18, at 1217 (framing their discussion in terms of capital import
and export neutrality).
See, e.g., Case C-336/96, Gilly v. Directeur des Services Fiscaux du Bas-Rhin, 1998 E.C.R.
I-2793, para. 34.
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attempt by the court to impose both locational and leisure neutrality. Or, at
least, if the court were trying to impose both neutrality benchmarks
simultaneously, it would be entering, in Graetz and Warren’s terms, a
“labyrinth of impossibility.”138
The competitive neutrality construction of nondiscrimination offers a way
out of this labyrinth. From a competitive neutrality perspective, there is
nothing fundamentally incoherent about imposing nondiscrimination
obligations at both source and residence.
A tax system is competitively neutral when it is not possible to increase
productivity by shifting jobs among people. In contrast with locational
neutrality, which concerns the global allocation of workers across all
jurisdictions, competitive neutrality concerns the matching of workers with
jobs. States violate competitive neutrality when their tax systems distort which
people occupy particular jobs. If the tax system causes one worker who is more
productive in State X to work in State Y instead and causes another worker
who is more productive in State Y to work in State X instead, the tax system
violates competitive neutrality.139
The principal insight of competitive neutrality for capital is that if
productivity differs across capital owners, then removing tax distortions to
ownership can increase welfare. Whereas outmoded theories conceived of
foreign direct investment and the firms that engaged in it as mere conduits for
net transfers of savings between states, modern economic theory emphasizes
that multinational firms exist to exploit the advantages of common ownership
of proprietary assets across different jurisdictions. For example, by investing in
a jurisdiction directly through a controlled subsidiary, rather than dealing at
arm’s length with local firms, multinational firms can exploit unique
intangibles (such as patents, production processes, brands, and know-how) in
the local jurisdiction without having to license or otherwise share the
intangibles with local firms.140 That significant foreign direct investment by
multinationals takes the form of acquisitions of local firms and assets (rather

138.
139.

140.

Graetz & Warren, supra note 18, at 1243.
For example, if the effective tax rate on French residents working in France relative to the
effective tax rate of French residents working in Germany is lower than the effective tax rate
on German residents working in France relative to the effective tax rate of German residents
working in Germany (taking into consideration both source and residence taxes), then taxes
might allow a French resident to underbid a German resident for the job in France, even if
the German resident is the better candidate.
For developments in the literature on foreign direct investment, see Desai & Hines, supra
note 33, at 488-91. Other advantages of multinational firms include the opportunity to
integrate local production into preexisting global production processes. Id. at 489.
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than new investments) suggests that multinationals sometimes possess
productivity advantages over local firms.141 If differences in ownership result in
differences in productivity, then taxes that distort ownership reduce welfare.142
The easiest way to conceive of competitive neutrality for capital is as a
competition between taxpayers residing in different states to acquire a target
asset. We adopt Professor Mitchell Kane’s formulation of competitive
neutrality for capital, which states that competitive neutrality obtains when
“the potential acquirer with the greatest productivity advantage will be able to
offer the highest bid for the target.”143 This requires that an investor not face
tax advantages or disadvantages in the acquisition of assets in a jurisdiction
relative to competing investors in that jurisdiction. This logic carries over to
labor because workers compete for jobs similarly to how investors compete for
assets: investors bid up prices and down rates of return, whereas workers bid
down wages.
Both types of competition can be distorted by taxation. Just as competitive
neutrality for capital obtains when it is not possible to increase productivity by
shifting assets among owners, competitive neutrality for labor obtains when it
is not possible to increase productivity by shifting jobs among people.
Violations of competitive neutrality occur when states assess nonuniform
source taxes or nonuniform residence taxes.144 Source taxes are nonuniform if

141.
142.

143.
144.

Id. at 490 (noting that the evidence on acquisitions also tends to negate the view that foreign
direct investment represents merely transfers of net savings across jurisdictions).
The welfare gains from achieving competitive neutrality have not been estimated. In
developing the capital ownership neutrality framework, Desai and Hines begin with the
“extreme case in which the total stock of physical capital in each country is unaffected by
international tax rules.” Id. at 494. They acknowledge that “[t]he welfare implications of
[capital ownership neutrality] are less decisive in settings in which the location of plant,
equipment, and other productive factors is mobile between countries in response to tax rate
differences.” Id. at 495. Moreover, if achieved via source-only taxation, capital ownership
neutrality would violate locational neutrality, “encourag[ing] excessive investment in lowtax countries” resulting in potentially “substantial” welfare impacts. Id. at 495-96. Mitchell
Kane challenges the notion that ownership distortions caused by methods of double tax
relief justify adopting ownership neutrality as a normative benchmark. See Mitchell A. Kane,
Ownership Neutrality, Ownership Distortions, and International Tax Welfare Benchmarks,
26 VA. TAX REV. 53, 60-66 (2006).
Kane, supra note 142, at 59.
As explained supra Section II.C, residence taxes always violate leisure neutrality unless they
are harmonized across all the states. In addition to violating competitive neutrality,
nonuniform source taxes also violate locational neutrality, unless all states have adopted
worldwide taxation with unlimited credits for source taxes. Nonuniform source taxes do not
violate locational neutrality under such a system because the availability of unlimited foreign
tax credits means that taxation at source has no impact on the cross-border worker’s overall
tax burden.
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they do not apply on the same basis to all workers in the jurisdiction, both
residents and nonresidents. Residence taxes are nonuniform if they do not
apply on the same basis to all residents, no matter where they earn their
income.
1. Source Taxes
Consider nonuniform source taxes first. Suppose that in our hypothetical
world consisting only of Germany and France, Germany assesses a 10% source
tax only on French residents working in Germany. French residents working in
Germany pay the tax, but no one else does, including German residents
working in Germany. In Figure 4, we represent with light shading of Quadrant
3 the work that is subject to German tax. Notice that, unlike in our prior
examples, because this tax is nonuniform, it applies to only one quadrant,
namely Quadrant 3. While this tax is highly stylized, real world examples of
nonuniform source taxes abound. For example, when a state taxes nonresidents
on their gross income while taxing residents on their net income, the state
assesses nonuniform source taxes.145

145.

Since tax benefits are economically equivalent to negative taxes, a state could also be said to
apply nonuniform source taxes when it grants a tax holiday to nonresident taxpayers but
fails to make that holiday available to residents. This would be equivalent to a German
source tax only on Quadrant 1.

1055

the yale law journal

Figure 4.

source-tax-induced distortion of competition
German
Resident

Works in
France

2

French
Resident

4

}
Works in
Germany

1

3

Locational Distortion:
French workers move from Germany
to France to avoid German source
tax.

Competitive Distortions:
Upper dark shaded region: French residents can underbid equally and (certain) more
productive German residents for work in France. Since in our example, France is large
compared to Germany, the distortion is smaller in France than in Germany.
Lower dark shaded region: German residents can underbid equally and (certain) more
productive French residents for work in Germany.

The nonuniform German source tax in our example causes a locational
distortion. It causes some French residents to work in France, even if they
could earn more in Germany before taxes. Specifically, under the 10% German
source tax that applies only to French residents, unless a French resident can
earn more than 111% in Germany of what she could earn in France, she will
work in France to avoid the tax. Thus, some work done by French workers in
Germany that can easily be shifted to France will move to France (e.g., the
baking of croissants in German border towns). In Figure 4, we represent this
distortion by enlarging Quadrant 4 relative to Quadrant 3; compared to the notax world, fewer French residents work in Germany when they face German
source taxation.
But there is an additional distortion. Since German residents are not taxed,
they will work wherever they earn the most. Thus, taxes distort French, but not
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German, residents’ decisions about where to work, thereby distorting
competition between French and German residents for jobs.146 Accordingly,
some jobs previously performed by French residents in Germany will remain in
Germany, but those jobs now will be performed by German residents rather
than by French residents (e.g., waiting tables at French restaurants in German
border towns). This impact is different from the locational distortion because
instead of affecting the aggregate number of workers in Germany, it affects the
composition of the workforce in Germany, skewing it in favor of German
residents. We represent this distortion with the lower, dark-shaded region in
Figure 4. In addition to giving German residents a competitive advantage over
French residents in Germany, the nonuniform German source tax, which
applies only to French residents working in France, also gives French residents
a competitive advantage over German residents for work in France. Thus, in
addition to skewing the workforce in Germany towards Germans, the
nonuniform source tax also skews the workforce in France towards French
residents. We represent this distortion with the upper dark-shaded region of
Figure 4. This (two-directional) distortion of competitive neutrality means that
the vertical line separating work performed by French and German residents is
not continuous because workers with the same earning potential will work in
different jurisdictions based on where they reside.
2. Residence Taxes
Now consider nonuniform residence taxes, which also distort competition
for jobs. There are many real-world examples of nonuniform residence taxes.
Such taxes may create a preference for foreign work. For example, for U.S.
residents meeting certain statutory requirements, the United States exempts

146.

Nonuniform source taxes also violate locational neutrality, unless the residence state
implements worldwide taxation with unlimited foreign tax credits. For a numerical
example, see supra note 120.
Nonuniform source taxes also violate leisure neutrality. This can be seen in the current
example because French residents face a different tradeoff between work and leisure than do
German residents. German residents always retain 100% of their productivity-determined
wage. In contrast, French residents working in Germany retain less than their productivitydetermined wage due to the source tax. This includes French residents who are between
100% and 111% as productive in Germany as France and therefore work in France to avoid
German source taxes. They earn ¤100 in France, but France does not tax. It also includes
French residents whose productivity in Germany is more than 110% of their productivity in
France. This latter group works in Germany but receives only 90% of their productivitydetermined wage due to German source taxes. Thus, whereas French residents face variable
work-leisure tradeoffs, Germans always face the same tradeoff. This violates leisure
neutrality.
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nearly $100,000 of their foreign-earned income.147 Other nonuniform
residence taxes create a preference for domestic work.148 For example, the
United States limits the foreign tax credit to the amount of tax that the United
States would have assessed on the relevant income, and it restricts the credit in
various other ways.
We use another example to illustrate that nonuniform residence taxes
violate competitive neutrality. Suppose Germany applies a 20% tax to German
residents’ foreign-source income (but not to German residents’ domestic
income). The only people who pay taxes in this system are German residents
who work in France.149 This tax is nonuniform; Germany applies the tax to
only one quadrant, namely Quadrant 2. In Figure 5, we represent the work
performed by German residents in France that is subject to the tax with light
shading.

147.

148.
149.

I.R.C. §§ 911(a)(1) and (b)(2) allow for the exclusion of foreign income up to a statutorily
established cap, which is indexed for inflation. A maximum of $92,900 was excludable in
2011. See Foreign Earned Income Exclusion—Requirements, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/international/article/0,,id=96817,00.html
(last
updated Dec. 6, 2011).
For example, when enacted by low-tax states, exemption systems may preference residents’
domestic work over their foreign work.
Thus, nonuniform residence taxation violates leisure neutrality because German residents
working in France keep 80% of what they earn whereas French residents working in France
keep 100%.
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Figure 5.

residence-tax-induced distortion of competition
German
Resident

2
Locational
Distortion:
German workers
move from France to
Germany to avoid
nonuniform German
residence tax.

French
Resident

Works in
France

4

{
1

3

Works in
Germany

Competitive Distortions:
Upper dark shaded region: French residents can underbid equally
(and certain more) productive German residents for jobs in
France.
Lower dark shaded region: German residents can underbid equally
(and certain more) productive French residents for jobs in
Germany.

As in the last example, the nonunifom tax causes both a locational and a
competitive distortion. It causes a locational distortion by discouraging some
German residents from taking jobs in France, even if they would earn more
there on a pre-tax basis. Specifically, German residents will choose to work in
Germany as long as they can earn at least 80% in Germany of what they can
earn in France before taxes. To the extent that it shifts jobs from France to
Germany, the nonuniform residence tax causes a locational distortion. We
represent this distortion in Figure 5 by enlarging Quadrant 1 relative to
Quadrant 2.
But the tax also causes a competitive distortion. Specifically, it causes some
jobs in Germany to be occupied by Germans instead of French residents.150 In

150.

The tax has another effect: German residents working in Germany will earn less after taxes
than French residents earning the same before-tax wage. Whether German wages decline or
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addition, the tax causes French residents to occupy some of the jobs in France
vacated by departing Germans. We represent that two-directional distortion
with the two dark shaded rectangles in Figure 5. In the current example, where
German residents face a nonuniform 20% residence tax that applies only to
income they earn in France, some German residents who have a comparative
advantage for working in France will nevertheless work in Germany to avoid
the tax.151 Because these German residents are willing to lower the wage they
seek in Germany to avoid the nonuniform residence tax (which applies only to
wages they earn in France), they may win jobs from French residents seeking
to work in Germany, even in cases where the French residents have a
comparative advantage for working in Germany over France. Thus, the result
of the tax is that some German residents with a comparative advantage for
working in France will work in Germany and some French residents with a
comparative advantage for working in Germany will work in France. Thus,
nonuniform residence taxation distorts the matching of workers to jobs
because workers sort into jobs not solely according to productivity or earnings
potential, but also according to residence.
3. Maintaining Competitive Neutrality
Taxes would not distort competition for jobs if all states had exactly the
same tax base and rates. In the absence of global tax harmonization, however,
there are two principal ways to prevent competitive distortions.152 First, all
states could adopt worldwide taxation with unlimited credits for source taxes.
Under worldwide taxation, each state sets its own tax rates. Source taxes
become irrelevant to competition because they are effectively refunded by the
residence state through the unlimited credit. Thus, only residence taxes matter,
and states must apply their residence taxes uniformly to all their residents, no
matter where those residents earn their income. Because competitive neutrality
does not require tax rate harmonization, taxpayers residing in different states
will earn different after-all-tax wages.153 Specifically, residents of high-tax

151.
152.
153.

French wages rise depends on the demand and supply of labor. Assuming Germany is a
small state relative to France, German wages are likely to decline more than French wages
rise.
Specifically, German residents whose productivity in Germany is between 80% and 100% of
their productivity in France will work in Germany.
Forbidding source taxation entirely would also satisfy competitive neutrality, but since all
states tax on a source basis, we do not consider this option.
Non-harmonized residence taxes distort leisure neutrality, since taxpayers residing in
different states face different labor/leisure tradeoffs.
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states will tend to earn less (after all taxes) than residents of low-tax states.
However, such taxes will not distort competitive neutrality.154
A concrete example will help illustrate this point and drive home the notion
that it is comparative, not absolute, tax rates that matter for competitive
neutrality. Suppose Françoise resides in France and Günther resides in
Germany, and that they both compete for a job in each jurisdiction. Assume
further that Françoise and Günther are equally productive working in France,
but that Françoise is substantially more productive than Günther when
working in Germany. Putting some numbers to these assumptions, let us say
that Françoise and Günther both would produce €100 of output in France, that
Günther would produce €100 in Germany, and that Françoise would produce
€150 in Germany. Table 1 illustrates this.

154.

Using the notation supra note 121, competitive neutrality requires that

Rrw( (DD) )
Rrw( (DF))

Rrw( (FD) )

=

.

Rrw( (FF) )

In a world with only two states, France and Germany, to prevent competitive tax distortions
between two equally competitive German and French workers, the ratio of the French
worker’s retention rate on work in France compared to her retention rate on work in
Germany must be the same as the ratio of the German worker’s retention rate in France
compared to his retention rate in Germany, i.e.,

Rrw((FrFr))
w( Ger)
r ( Fr )

Fr )
Rrw((Ger
)

=

R

R

.

w ( Ger )
r ( Ger )

In terms of Figure 4, this means that
Retention rate on Quadrant 4
Retention rate on Quadrant 3

=

Retention rate on Quadrant 2
Retention rate on Quadrant 1

.

Notice that the equality of these ratios does not require that French and German
workers pay the same effective marginal tax rate on work in France or Germany (i.e., the tax
rate on Quadrant 2 need not equal the tax rate on Quadrant 4, and the tax rate on Quadrant
1 need not equal the tax rate on Quadrant 3). Instead, what is required is that the ratios of
the taxes they pay on work in those jurisdictions must be the same. See infra note 156 for a
demonstration that worldwide taxation does not distort competitive neutrality.
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Table 1.

competitive neutrality in a no-tax world
JOB IN FRANCE

Gross Income and
Take-home Pay

Françoise
100

Günther
100

JOB IN GERMANY

Françoise
150

Günther
100

Under these circumstances, productive efficiency requires Françoise to
work in Germany and Günther to work in France. Françoise should work in
France because the ratio (1½) of her productivity in Germany (€150) to her
productivity in France (€100) exceeds the ratio (1) of Günther’s productivity in
Germany (€100) to his productivity in France (€100). Conversely, Günther
should work in France because the ratio (1) of his productivity in France (€100)
to his productivity in Germany (€100) exceeds the ratio (2/3) of Françoise’s
productivity in France (€100) as compared to her productivity in Germany
(€150).
That the market will reach the productively efficient matching of workers
to jobs can be seen by assuming that Françoise and Günther compete for jobs
by offering to take less than the full value that they produce. When considering
how much to bid for a job in Germany, both Françoise and Günther consider
their alternative job opportunities in France. Since Günther can earn €100 if he
takes a job in France, which is the full value of his output there, he will not be
willing to accept less than €100 in Germany, which is the full value of his
output in Germany. In contrast, because Françoise is more productive in
Germany than in France, she can lower the wage she demands in Germany
(relative to her productivity) and still come out ahead compared to if she works
in France, where the maximum she can earn is €100 (the full value of her
output in France). Specifically, Françoise will be willing to work for as little as
€100 in Germany, even though she produces €150 there. Assuming that there
are many Françoises and Günthers and that employers are not restricted to
hiring a fixed number of employees, but rather are trying to produce a given
output at least cost, then employers will select employees with the greatest
relative difference between their wage and their output. Thus, because
Françoise would be willing to accept as little as 2/3 of her total output in
Germany as payment for her services for working there, Françoise will
outcompete Günther for the job in Germany. In contrast, Günther, who
requires payment equal to his full productivity in either state, will work in
France. Because it results in Françoise working in Germany and Günther
working in France, the no-tax world maintains competitive neutrality.
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Now we show that the introduction of residence taxes with unlimited
credits for foreign taxes likewise maintains competitive neutrality. Assume that
both France and Germany implement worldwide taxation with unlimited
foreign tax credits. Assume further that France taxes at 20% and Germany
taxes at 50%. The following chart compares how much each worker would take
home after taxes if each earned his or her productivity-determined wage in
each state:
Table 2.

competitive neutrality under worldwide taxation

job in france
Uniform 20%
worldwide taxation

job in germany
Uniform 50%
worldwide taxation

Françoise
100
(20)

Günther
100
(20)

Françoise
150
(75)

Günther
100
(50)

Net Residence Tax/Refund

0

(30)

45

0

Take-home Pay

80

50

120

50

a.
b.

Gross Income
Source Tax

c.
d.

155

As residents of different states that have different tax rates, Françoise and
Günther take home different amounts after payment of all taxes. However,
because the ratio of their after-tax wages relative to each other are unchanged
from the world without taxes, taxation has not distorted the competition
between Françoise and Günther for jobs. Even after taxes, Françoise still earns
50% more when she works in Germany than when she works in France,
whereas Günther still earns the same amount no matter where he works.
Although Françoise is taxed at a total tax rate of 20% whereas Günther is taxed
at a total tax rate of 50%, the difference in tax liability does not translate into a
change in the ratio of Françoise’s earnings in Germany relative to her earnings
in France; nor does it translate into a change in the ratio of Günther’s earnings
in Germany relative to his earnings in France. (Hence, it does not result in a
change in the ratio of these two ratios.) Thus, in order to have a job in
Germany rather than in France, Françoise still would be willing to accept a
salary equal to only two-thirds of what she produces in Germany. In contrast,
Günther still would require payment for all he produces in Germany (or

155.

Taxes paid and cash outflows are negative numbers and are in parentheses; refunds and
cash inflows are positive numbers and are not in parentheses. Our examples assume that the
residence state provides unlimited credits for source taxes under worldwide taxation.
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France). Thus, implementation of worldwide taxation with unlimited foreign
tax credits maintains competitive neutrality even in the presence of national tax
rate diversity.
Expressed in the language of comparative advantage, although Françoise
and Günther are taxed at different rates, the tax system does not affect
comparative advantage because comparative advantage is based on the ratio of
two ratios. Since universal adoption of worldwide taxation with unlimited
foreign tax credits does not affect either ratio, it does not affect comparative
advantage. It therefore follows that such a system maintains competitive
neutrality.156
The second way to achieve competitive neutrality would be for all states to
enact what we call “ideal deduction” or the “ideal deduction method” of double
tax relief, one instantiation of which is exemption. Under this method, taxes on
cross-border income would consist of two stages. The first stage would consist
of uniform source taxes. That is, each state would apply its source tax regime
on the same basis to both nonresidents and residents who work in its territory.
In the second stage, states would tax the worldwide income of their residents,
but first-stage taxes (i.e., source taxes, including domestic source taxes) would
be deductible from income taxable at residence. Thus, under the ideal
deduction method, states would tax their own residents on two jurisdictional
predicates: source and residence.157 Under ideal deduction, states need not

156.

157.

In the absence of taxes, Françoise has a comparative advantage in Germany because her
productivity-determined wage in Germany (¤150) relative to France (¤100) as compared to
Günther’s productivity-determined wage in Germany (¤100) relative to France (¤100) is
3/2. Conversely, Günther has a comparative advantage in France because Günther’s
productivity-determined wage in France (¤100) relative to Germany (¤100) as compared to
Françoise’s productivity-determined wage in France (¤100) relative to Germany (¤150) is
3/2. Introduce uniform worldwide taxation at 20% in France and at 50% in Germany.
Françoise still has a comparative advantage in Germany because her productivitydetermined wage in Germany (¤120) relative to France (¤80) as compared to Günther’s
productivity-determined wage in Germany (¤50) relative to France (¤50) is 3/2 as in the
example without taxes. Conversely, Günther’s productivity-determined wage in France
(¤50) relative to Germany (¤50) as compared to Françoise’s productivity-determined wage
in France (¤80) relative to Germany (¤120) is 3/2 again, as in the example without taxes. It,
therefore, follows that uniform taxation does not distort competitive neutrality because
none of the ratios expressing comparative advantage (3/2) changes upon the introduction of
the tax.
Although the tax method contemplated here might seem unfamiliar, it resembles the way
corporate profits are generally taxed. Many states tax active (corporate) income on a source
basis and also tax passive (personal investment) income on a residence basis. It also
resembles the way states provide personal tax benefits in the context of an income tax. States
often tax income on a source basis and grant tax benefits on a residence basis.
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adopt the same tax rates as each other; that is, they need not harmonize their
tax rates. However, each state must apply its own taxes uniformly.
A small adjustment in the example will show that ideal deduction does not
distort competition.158 Again assume Françoise resides in France where both
source taxes and residence taxes are 20%, and Günther resides in Germany
where both source and residence taxes are 50%. Because German-source
income is taxed at 50%, whereas French-source income is taxed at only 20%, in
equilibrium jobs in Germany will pay more than jobs in France so that,
regardless of their residence, workers will earn the same amount after payment
of source taxes. For example, if a French job pays €100, then the equivalent job
in Germany will pay €160.159 Thus, in equilibrium, the after-source-tax wage in
each jurisdiction will be the same, namely €80.
For this example, we maintain our assumption that Françoise and Günther
are equally productive when they work in France, and we assume that they
would both earn €100 (before tax) for work there. When they work in
Germany, however, since in equilibrium wages are 60% higher in Germany
than in France to compensate for higher German source taxes, both Françoise
and Günther will earn more in Germany than in France.160 Since we continue
to assume for this example that Françoise is 50% more productive than
Günther when they both work in Germany, Günther will earn €160 if he works
in Germany and Françoise will earn €240 if she works in Germany. If both
states implement ideal deduction, which requires residence states to allow
deductions for source state taxes, the following chart shows that competitive
neutrality is maintained. 161

158.

159.

160.
161.

Under this system, because each state assesses the same source taxes against resident and
nonresident workers, before-tax wages will differ across states by the difference in source
taxes. And because states assess different residence taxes, after-tax wages also will differ for
residents of different states by the difference in residence taxes. Thus, taxpayers from hightax states will tend to earn less (after all taxes) than residents from low-tax states. However,
as long as each state assesses residence taxes at the same rate on all its residents (whether
they have foreign or domestic income), then such taxes will not violate competitive
neutrality.
Given the salary in France (¤100), the salary in Germany is calculated as follows:
¤160 = ¤100 x (1-20%) / (1-50%).
The higher German taxes will drive jobs to France. Only those positions in which workers
are productive enough to cover the additional German source taxes will remain in Germany.
The simplest version of ideal deduction is an exemption system. If the example in the text
were changed so that France and Germany employed exemption, the tax rate in the second
stage would be zero, which effectively eliminates the second stage. The taxpayers’ takehome pay would be as follows:
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Table 3.

competitive neutrality under ideal deduction

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

Gross Income
Source Tax
Residence Income
Residence Tax162
Take-home Pay

job in france
Uniform 20% source
and residence taxes

job in germany
Uniform 50% source
and residence taxes

Françoise

Günther

Françoise

Günther

100
(20)
80
(16)
64

100
(20)
80
(40)
40

240
(120)
120
(24)
96

160
(80)
80
(40)
40

As in the example with worldwide taxation, Françoise and Günther earn
different after-all-tax wages and pay taxes at different total rates. Even so,
taxation will not affect the matching of workers with jobs. Günther will
continue to work in France, and Françoise will continue to work in Germany.
As in the prior examples, Günther is not willing to accept less than the full
value of what he produces in order to take a job in Germany, whereas Françoise
is willing to take a one-third discount. Thus, as with worldwide taxation,

Table A.
competitive neutrality under exemption
job in france
Uniform 20% source tax,
no residence tax

162.

job in germany
Uniform 50% source tax,
no residence tax

a.
b.
c.

Gross Income
Source Tax
Residence Tax

Françoise
100
(20)
N/A

Günther
100
(20)
N/A

Françoise
240
(120)
N/A

Günther
160
(80)
N/A

d.

Take-home Pay

80

80

120

80

When all the states employ exemption, no worker has a tax-induced advantage or
disadvantage compared to any other for work in any particular jurisdiction. Thus,
exemption maintains competitive neutrality.
Under ideal deduction, workers are subject to tax on their worldwide income at their
residence state’s rate, but source taxes (including domestic source taxes) are deductible from
taxable income.
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implementation of the ideal deduction method maintains competitive
neutrality even in the presence of national tax rate diversity.163

163.

Using a numerical example, we argued in the text that universal adoption of either
worldwide taxation or the ideal deduction method will not compromise competitive
neutrality. In this footnote, we provide a more general example for the two-worker and twostate example. Denote the productivity of a worker in any quadrant by P with a subscript to
indicate the quadrant. Thus, P1 represents the productivity of a German worker in Germany,
P2 represents the productivity of a German worker in France, P3 represents the productivity
of a French worker in Germany, and P4 represents the productivity of a French worker in
France.
If (P2 /P 1) / (P 4 /P 3 ) > 1, then the German resident has a comparative advantage in France
(and the French resident has a comparative advantage in Germany), but if (P 4 /P 3 )/ (P 2/P 1 )
> 1, then the French resident has a comparative advantage in France (and the German
resident has a comparative advantage in Germany). Note that it is not possible to have a
comparative advantage in both states.
Denote the total tax rate in any quadrant by t with a subscript for the quadrant number.
It follows that the tax system does not affect comparative advantage and so does not
compromise competitive neutrality if:
Equation (1)
P2
___
P1

(1-t2)P2
______
(1-t1)P1
(1-t4)P4
______
(1-t3)P3

=

P4
___
P3

Because the fraction for comparative advantage is on both sides of the equation, it can
be eliminated from both sides of the equation. After rearranging terms, this yields:
Equation (2)
1-t2
1-t1

=

1-t4
1-t3

,

which is the requirement for a tax system not to distort competitive neutrality.
If all states adopt worldwide taxation with unlimited foreign tax credits, then a taxpayer
pays the same tax rate wherever that taxpayer works, although taxpayers resident in
different states might pay tax at different rates. This implies that the left and right sides of
equation 2 both equal 1. Since worldwide taxation with unlimited foreign tax credits satisfies
equation 2 (i.e., the two sides of the equation are equal), it thus follows that worldwide
taxation does not distort competitive neutrality.
The derivation is slightly more complicated when all states use the ideal deduction
method. More notation is needed because both source and residence taxation affects the
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We offer one final numerical example to show that adoption by all states of
the same method for taxing cross-border income (i.e., all states enact
worldwide taxation or all states enact ideal deduction) is not enough to achieve
competitive neutrality. Rather, competitive neutrality also requires states to
implement uniform taxes. For example, assume that both France and Germany
still implement ideal deduction and that France assesses uniform source and
residence taxes. Specifically, France assesses uniform 20% source taxes on all
workers in France, no matter where they reside. France also assesses uniform
20% residence taxes on French residents’ income, no matter where earned.164
Although Germany assesses uniform 20% source taxes, its residence taxes are
nonuniform. Germany imposes a 10% tax on the income earned by German
residents working in Germany, but it taxes income earned by Germans abroad
at 50%. Table 4 shows that even though both states adopt ideal deduction,

taxpayer’s final liability. Let subscripts and superscripts G denote Germany and F denote
France. Let a subscript denote a residence tax and a superscript denote a source tax. Thus,
for example, with the ideal deduction method, the after-tax income of a French resident who
G
earns €1 in Germany (Quadrant 3) is €1(1-tF)(1-t ). Thus, substituting the French and
German taxes into the condition for competitive neutrality given by Equation (2), that
condition can be rewritten as:
Equation (3)
F
(1-tG)(1-t )
G
(1-tG)(1-t )

=

(1-tF)(1-tF)
(1-tF)(1-tG)

Simplifying Equation (3) by dropping the expression (1-tG) from the left side of the
equation because it appears in both the numerator and the denominator and by dropping
the expression (1-tF) from the right side of the equation for the same reason, we are left with
just the source taxes, which is equivalent to universal adoption of the exemption method:
Equation (4)

164.

F
G
F
G
(1-t )/(1-t ) = (1-t )/(1-t )

Equation (4) is obviously true. Thus, the ideal deduction method achieves competitive
neutrality because it also does not distort comparative advantage.
Note that although for the sake of simplicity we set the German and French source tax rates
to be the same, that assumption is not necessary for the results. Likewise, although we set
the French source tax rate to be the same as the French residence tax rate in this example (as
well as in other examples in this Section), “uniformity,” as we use the term throughout this
Article, does not require a state to adopt the same tax rate for source and residence taxes.
Rather, uniformity for source taxation means that source taxes are imposed at the same rate
and upon the same base for both resident and nonresident workers. Uniformity for
residence taxes means that both foreign and domestic income is taxed at the same rate and
upon the same base.
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competitive neutrality nevertheless is lost when the German tax system is not
uniform.165
Table 4.

nonuniform residence taxation violates competitive neutrality
job in france
Uniform 20% source
and residence taxes

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

Gross Income
Source Tax
Residence Income
Residence Tax
Take-home Pay

Françoise
100
(20)
80
(16)
64

Günther
100
(20)
80
(40)
40

job in germany
Uniform 20% source tax,
nonuniform (10%, 50%)
residence tax
Françoise
150
(30)
120
(24)
96

Günther
100
(20)
80
(8)
72

As Table 4 illustrates, although Françoise earns more after all taxes than
does Günther regardless of where they work, Günther now has an advantage in
the competition to secure a job in Germany. As in the prior examples, Françoise
is willing to accept as little as 67% (i.e., €64/€96) of her productivitydetermined wage in Germany to secure a job in Germany rather than a job in
France at which she would be less productive.166 However, because Günther
faces a much lower residence tax when he works in Germany than when he
works in France, Günther is willing to accept as little as 56% (i.e., €40/€72) of
his productivity-determined wage in Germany in order to secure the job in
Germany rather than the job in France that would subject him to high German
residence taxation. Because employers will hire the worker with the largest
relative difference between productivity and wage, employers in Germany will
prefer to hire Günther, who demands in wages only 56% of what his
productivity-determined wage would be, than to hire Françoise, who demands

165.

166.

That competitive neutrality requires uniform source taxation is an important point that has
been missed in the literature on capital ownership neutrality. See, e.g., Desai & Hines, supra
note 33, at 494-99 (describing global adoption of exemption as achieving competitive
neutrality for capital without noting that source taxes also must be uniform). Although
states may assess source taxes that differ from the source taxes applied by other states, to
maintain competitive neutrality, each state must apply its own source taxes uniformly to all
workers within its jurisdiction, regardless of workers’ residence.
By “productivity-determined wage” we mean the value of marginal product (i.e., the value
of the marginal output of the factor at issue (labor)). See N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES
OF ECONOMICS 380 (6th ed. 2008) (explaining that a profit-maximizing firm will hire
workers up to the point where the value of marginal product equals the wage).
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in wages 67% of what her productivity-determined wage would be. In spite of
Günther’s lower absolute productivity in Germany (compared to Françoise)
and his lower relative productivity in Germany than in France (compared to
Françoise’s relative productivity), nonuniform taxation results in Günther
being able to outbid Françoise for the job in Germany.
At the same time, Germany’s nonuniform residence taxation gives
Françoise a competitive advantage over Günther for the job in France, even
though she is no more productive than Günther there. Compared with
working in Germany, Françoise will demand in France a smaller portion of her
productivity-determined wage (i.e., €96/€64), than will Günther (i.e.,
€72/€40).167 Thus, Françoise will outbid Günther for the job in France. As the
example illustrates, the reason why the nonuniform tax distorts competitive
neutrality is because it affects comparative advantage—the ratio of Françoise’s
earnings in France to her earnings in Germany as compared to the ratio of
Günther’s earnings in France to his earnings in Germany. In the example, the
nonuniform German residence tax raises the ratio of Günther’s earnings in
Germany to his earnings in France, thereby tilting Günther’s comparative
advantage towards Germany and hence Françoise’s towards France. Similar
analysis would show that nonuniform source taxation also violates competitive
neutrality. These results are consistent with the ECJ’s case law, in which the
court has held that the nondiscrimination principle neither requires residents
and nonresidents to be taxed at the same tax rate,168 nor requires foreignsource income to be taxed at the same rate as domestic income.169
We take the opportunity here to clarify a difference between locational
neutrality and competitive neutrality. In contrast to competitive neutrality,
locational neutrality represents a distortion that encourages movement in only
one direction. In a world with two states and no taxes, if State X violates
locational neutrality by imposing a source tax, then the source tax will
encourage workers in State X to give up work in State X for work in State Y.
However, the tax does not encourage other workers to give up work in State Y
for work in State X. More generally, the source tax in State X does not create a

167.

168.
169.

For example, assume that Günther outbids Françoise for the job in Germany by accepting a
shade under 2/3 of his productivity-determined wage. Thus, Günther will earn ¤66.67, pay
¤13.33 in source tax to Germany, and pay ¤5.33 in residence tax to Germany, leaving him
with ¤48. To match these after-tax earnings in France, Günther would require 120% of his
productivity-determined wage (¤48/¤40) in France. In contrast, Françoise requires only
100% of her productivity-determined wage (¤64/¤64) to work in France. As a result,
Françoise can outcompete Günther in France.
See supra note 57.
See supra notes 58-59.
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situation where welfare can be improved by shifting a worker in State Y to
State X and vice versa. Unlike locational neutrality, which concerns movements
of workers in only one direction (away from the state assessing the tax),
competitive neutrality concerns distortions that encourage movement in two
directions—both into and out of the taxing state. The example we just gave of
the nonuniform German residence tax caused distortions in two directions: it
enabled Günther to outbid Françoise for work in Germany (despite Françoise’s
higher productivity than Günther in Germany) and it also enabled Françoise to
outbid Günther for work in France (despite the two workers’ equal
productivity there, and despite the fact that Françoise would be less productive
in France than in Germany). Stated more generally, if in a world without taxes
State X imposes a tax that violates competitive neutrality, then the tax will
induce some workers to shift from State X to State Y and other workers to
move in the opposite direction, from State Y to State X. If the tax violates
competitive neutrality, then it is possible to increase welfare by shifting a
worker from State X to State Y and another worker from State Y to State X.
Furthermore, as the above examples with Françoise and Günther
demonstrate, in order to attain competitive neutrality it is not necessary for a
state to tax its own residents and foreign residents earning income in its
territory at the same total tax rate. For example, in Table 3 above, France taxed
French residents working in France at 36%, while it taxed German residents
working in France at only 20%. As we showed, this scheme did not violate
competitive neutrality. Nor is it necessary for a state to tax residents earning
income at home at the same total tax rate as residents earning income abroad.
In Table A above, when Françoise worked in France, her effective tax rate was
20%, whereas when she worked in Germany, her effective tax rate was 50%.
We showed that these differences did not affect the competition between
Françoise and Günther for jobs, and they did not compromise competitive
neutrality.
While the foregoing discussion of competitive neutrality has been complex,
it reduces to straightforward guidelines for identifying taxes that violate
competitive neutrality. Simply put, uniform taxes promote competitive
neutrality,170 whereas nonuniform taxes distort competitive neutrality.171 That

170.

We developed our argument that uniform source taxes do not violate competitive neutrality
under the assumption that residence is fixed. If we were to relax that assumption by
assuming that some people could freely change their residence, it would still be the case that
uniform source and residence taxes would not distort competitive neutrality. In terms of the
example, if residents could freely elect their residence, they would choose France over
Germany because of its lower residence taxes. Taxes would affect choice of residence, but
once residence was selected they would not affect job choice. Alternatively, if we assumed
that residence followed where one worked, then higher residence taxes in Germany would
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means that any tax that does not fall equally on two adjacent quadrants of
Figure 1 distorts competitive neutrality. For example, a tax only on German
workers in Germany (Germany taxes only Quadrant 1)172 distorts competition
because it encourages German workers to work in France and French workers
to work in Germany.173
E. Simple Guidelines for Tax Neutrality
Interpreting the tax nondiscrimination principle to require any of
locational, leisure, or competitive neutrality would produce simple guidelines
for resolving cases. In this Section, we briefly summarize those guidelines
under the assumptions that states will not harmonize their tax rates and bases,
and that states will not forego source taxation.
We begin with the guidelines for implementing locational neutrality.
Although each state may set its own tax rates, all states must enact worldwide
taxation with unlimited credits for source taxes. Such worldwide taxation
constitutes what we have been calling a “uniform residence tax” because it
applies on the same basis to all of a state’s residents, no matter where they earn
their income. Locational neutrality permits the assessment of source taxes in
addition to residence taxes, and because any locational distortions introduced
at source will be effectively negated at residence by the availability of unlimited

171.

172.
173.

make Germany a less desirable state in which to work and so German wages would have to
rise relative to French wages. However, as long as states had uniform source and residence
taxes, competitive neutrality would not be compromised. Under uniform source and
residence taxes, the only way there could be a distortion to competitive neutrality is if there
were a threshold amount of work above which a nonresident worker would be considered to
be a resident of the source state (and, presumably, not of the former residence state). In
such circumstances, nonresidents might avoid exceeding the work threshold in high-tax
jurisdictions in order to avoid becoming residents there. As far as we know, no jurisdiction
imposes such an explicit threshold rule. However, physical presence rules, which are
common, will have the same effect for many workers who need to live close to their jobs.
Uniform residence taxes maintain both competitive neutrality and locational neutrality.
Uniform source taxes maintain both competitive neutrality and leisure neutrality. Although
nonuniform source taxes violate competitive neutrality, the violation can be cured via global
adoption of worldwide taxation with unlimited foreign tax credits. Thus, whether a
nonuniform source tax violates competitive neutrality depends on the method of double tax
relief adopted by the states.
Such a tax could be enacted by Germany as either a nonuniform source tax or a nonuniform
residence tax.
In cases, such as user fees, where the “tax” is not a tax, but rather a payment for services
received where the tax (cost) equals the value received, there is no distortion.
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foreign tax credits, locational neutrality contains no tax proscriptions for source
states. In other words, locational neutrality permits all manner of source taxes.
The second benchmark is leisure neutrality. Under leisure neutrality, no
state may tax on a residence basis (assuming residence taxes are not
harmonized). In addition to forbidding residence taxation, leisure neutrality
requires all states to assess only what we have been calling “uniform source
taxes,” meaning that although each state can choose its source tax rates and
base, those rates and base must apply on the same basis to all workers within
the source jurisdiction, no matter where those workers reside.
Finally, to maintain competitive neutrality, states may assess taxes on either
a residence-basis, a source-basis, or on both bases. Whether competitive
neutrality requires source uniformity depends on how states achieve
competitive neutrality. If states achieve competitive neutrality via ideal
deduction, then source taxation must be uniform. In contrast, if states achieve
competitive neutrality by adopting worldwide taxation with unlimited credits
for source taxes, then any manner of source taxation would be permitted, since
the unlimited foreign tax credit at residence would make source taxes irrelevant
to competition. In either case, if states assess residence taxes, then such taxes
must be uniform, meaning that, although states are free to set their own
residence tax rates, each state must apply its residence taxes the same way to all
its residents, no matter where they earn their income. The following table
summarizes these prescriptions for tax neutrality:
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Table 5.

prescriptions for tax neutrality
COMPETITIVE NEUTRALITY
VIA WORLDWIDE
VIA IDEAL
TAXATION
DEDUCTION

LOCATIONAL
NEUTRALITY

LEISURE
NEUTRALITY

SOURCE
TAXES

Permitted without
restriction

Permits only
uniform
source taxes

Permitted without
restriction

Permits only
uniform source
taxes

RESIDENCE
TAXES

Permits only
uniform residence
taxation,
specifically
worldwide taxation
with unlimited
foreign tax credits

Not
Permitted

Permits only
uniform residence
taxation,
specifically
worldwide
taxation with
unlimited foreign
tax credits

Permits only
uniform
residence taxation
with deductions
for source
174
taxes

Note that although the prescriptions of locational neutrality are
incompatible with those of leisure neutrality, competitive neutrality can be
achieved simultaneously with either locational neutrality or leisure neutrality,
but not both (unless tax rates and bases are harmonized). Adoption by all
states of worldwide taxation with unlimited foreign tax credits would achieve
both locational and competitive neutrality. In contrast, adoption by all states of
one particular form of the ideal deduction method, namely exemption, would
achieve both leisure neutrality and competitive neutrality.
F. Limits on Judicial Authority To Impose Tax Neutrality
This Section explains that although courts generally lack the authority to
do all that would be necessary to fully achieve any of the tax neutrality
benchmarks, they can, without exceeding their institutional competence, help
advance any of the alternative benchmarks by interpreting the
nondiscrimination principle to require uniform taxation.
As is clear from our discussion so far and from Table 5 above, achieving any
of the neutrality benchmarks requires significant international coordination in
the selection of a method for alleviating the double tax on foreign income.

174.

The deduction method includes exemption systems, in which there is no residence taxation
(i.e., the second stage, or residence, tax rate is zero), and therefore deductions for source
taxes have no effect. It also includes tax systems in which the residence tax rate is effectively
negative because, for example, the residence state grants refundable tax benefits on a
residence basis.

1074

what is tax discrimination?

Specifically, locational neutrality requires all states to adopt uniform worldwide
taxation with unlimited foreign tax credits. Conversely, leisure neutrality
requires all states to exempt foreign-source income and impose only uniform
source taxation. Although competitive neutrality is consistent with both
methods of alleviating double taxation, all states must agree on one or the
other method. That is to say, the tax system will not be competitively neutral if
some states enact worldwide taxation (with unlimited foreign tax credits)
while other states enact exemption. Instead, to achieve competitive neutrality,
all states must either converge on worldwide taxation with an unlimited
foreign tax credit or converge on the ideal deduction method, which includes
exemption. Thus, full achievement of any of the benchmarks by the EU
member states requires all states to adopt the same method for taxing crossborder income.
But, as the ECJ itself has acknowledged, the ECJ lacks the institutional
competence to impose upon the member states a specific method for taxing
cross-border income.175 That is, the ECJ cannot require states to implement
worldwide taxation, or any particular form of the ideal deduction method,
including exemption. Likewise, it is unlikely that any national court in an EU
member state possesses the authority to choose its state’s method for taxing
cross-border income. Instead, the choice of how to tax cross-border income is a
legislative question.
Since full achievement of any of the neutrality benchmarks requires states
to coordinate their methods for taxing cross-border income, full
implementation of any of the tax neutrality benchmarks we have discussed
requires legislative harmonization. This could be done at the national level by
coordinated efforts of the individual EU member states or at the EU level
under the authority of Article 115 of the TFEU.176 Thus, one of the policy
recommendations that arises from our analysis is that if states desire to fully
achieve any of the conceptions of tax neutrality advanced in this Article, they
do not have to harmonize their tax rates, but they must harmonize their

175.

176.

See, e.g., Case C-513/04, Kerckhaert & Morres v. Belgium, 2006 E.C.R. I-10967, para. 22
(noting that EU law “does not lay down any general criteria for the attribution of areas of
competence between the Member States in relation to the elimination of double taxation
within the Community”); Case C-336/96, Gilly v. Directeur des Services Fiscaux du BasRhin, 1998 E.C.R. I-2793, para. 24 (“The Member States are competent to determine the
criteria for taxation on income and wealth with a view to eliminating double taxation . . . .”).
See TFEU, supra note 45, art. 115 (“[T]he Council shall, acting unanimously in accordance
with a special legislative procedure and after consulting the European Parliament and the
Economic and Social Committee, issue directives for the approximation of such laws,
regulations or administrative provisions of the Member States as directly affect the
establishment or functioning of the internal market.”).
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methods of taxing cross-border income. Since most of the EU member states
already employ exemption systems, EU-wide adoption of the ideal deduction
method (of which exemption is one instantiation) probably represents the
easiest path to harmonization.
In light of the need for legislative harmonization to fully achieve any of the
neutrality benchmarks, it is reasonable to ask what courts can do to advance tax
neutrality without exceeding their institutional authority. Our answer is that
courts can advance tax neutrality goals by interpreting the nondiscrimination
principle to require fidelity to the uniformity requirement specified by the
relevant neutrality benchmark. Later, we will show that this approach finds a
striking analogy in the tax discrimination jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme
Court under the dormant Commerce Clause.177
Thus, to promote locational neutrality, courts would interpret the
nondiscrimination principle to require uniform residence taxes. This would
mean that courts would strike down a state law that, for example, taxed
foreign-source income more harshly than domestic income. In contrast, to
promote leisure neutrality, courts would interpret the nondiscrimination
principle to require uniform source taxes. This would mean that courts would
strike down a state law that, for example, taxed nonresidents more harshly
than residents for work performed in its jurisdiction. Finally, to promote
competitive neutrality, courts would interpret the nondiscrimination principle
to require both uniform residence taxes and uniform source taxes. It bears
emphasizing that the uniformity requirements do not amount to rate
harmonization requirements. Each state may set its own tax rates. Source
uniformity requires only that the state apply the same source tax regime to all
workers within its jurisdiction (no matter where they reside), and residence
uniformity requires only that the state apply the same residence tax regime to
all its residents (no matter where they earn their income). As we show in the
next Section, any of these alternative standards would be easy for courts to
apply.
G. Resolving Cases Using the Benchmarks
This Section applies each of the three neutrality benchmarks to the ECJ
labor tax cases we presented in Part I to show that interpreting the

177.

See infra Part IV for a discussion of the internal consistency test applied by the U.S.
Supreme Court to evaluate whether state apportionment formulas violate the
nondiscrimination principle of the dormant Commerce Clause.
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nondiscrimination principle to require any of locational, leisure, or competitive
neutrality would provide simple rules for resolving even such difficult cases.
We first revisit Schumacker, the case brought against a source state. Recall
that Schumacker was a Belgian resident working in Germany who argued that
Germany discriminated against him by denying him the personal tax benefits
that it granted to German residents, including marital income splitting and
deductions for family expenses.
Germany’s decision to exclude nonresident workers from tax benefits it
granted to resident workers did not violate locational neutrality, simply
because locational neutrality is not concerned with how source states tax. This
point bears emphasizing: under locational neutrality, states impose worldwide
taxation with unlimited foreign tax credits to ensure that residents pay the
same taxes on their worldwide income, no matter where it is earned.178 With
unlimited foreign tax credits, taxation by the source state has no impact on
locational neutrality, so there would be no obligations concerning how source
states may tax.179
In terms of Figure 6 below, locational neutrality requires Germany to assess
uniform residence taxes on Quadrants 1 and 2, but it says nothing about how
Germany should tax Quadrant 3.

178.
179.

Worldwide taxation with unlimited foreign tax credits is the only way to achieve locational
neutrality while allowing both source taxation and unharmonized tax rates.
Cf. Green, supra note 114, at 128 (noting that as long as the residence state makes the
taxpayer whole by fully crediting source taxes, there should be no locational distortions
from differentially applying source taxes); Warren, supra note 4, at 160 (same). Obliging
source states to tax nonresidents the same as residents, however, likely would make
maintenance of locational neutrality cheaper for residence states that must credit source
taxes without limitation.
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Figure 6.

requirements to maintain locational neutrality
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German residence tax on
Quadrant 1 must be the same
as the
German residence tax on
Quadrant 2.

Interpreting nondiscrimination to require locational neutrality would
greatly simplify resolution of tax cases: all cases against source states would be
dismissed because they all concern how states tax Quadrant 3 compared to how
they tax Quadrant 1.
Since Schumacker involved German source taxes on other EU residents (i.e.,
German taxes on workers in Quadrant 3), it would be dismissed under a
locational neutrality interpretation of nondiscrimination. Instead, under
locational neutrality the focus of nondiscrimination cases would be on
residence taxes, and residence taxes would have to be uniform. Thus, under a
locational neutrality interpretation of nondiscrimination, we would conclude
that Schumacker sued the wrong member state. Instead of suing Germany for
failing to treat him the same as competing resident workers, he should have
sued his own residence state, Belgium, for failing to provide him the same
personal tax benefits (in refundable form, if necessary) provided to residents
with only domestic income.180 Consistent with locational neutrality, the
provision of personal tax benefits—including family deductions, personal
exemptions, and progressive taxation—at residence would prevent national
differences in tax benefits and tax rates from distorting workers’ decisions
about whether to work at home or abroad.

180.

In other words, the violation of locational neutrality in Schumacker stemmed from the failure
of Belgium to apply the same residence taxes to Quadrants 1 and 2. If it instead had a
locationally neutral tax system characterized by worldwide taxation with unlimited credits
for foreign taxes, then Schumacker would have been able to collect personal tax benefits at
home on the same basis as fellow residents with only domestic income.
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Resolution of tax discrimination cases under leisure neutrality would be
equally straightforward. Under leisure neutrality, residence taxes are
forbidden, and a state’s source taxes must be uniform—they must apply the
same way to residents and nonresidents working in the same jurisdiction. In
terms of Figure 7 below, Germany would be prohibited from taxing Quadrant
2, and it would be required to tax Quadrants 1 and 3 the same.
Figure 7.

requirements to maintain leisure neutrality
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In Schumacker, by denying nonresidents the same personal tax benefits that
it granted to residents, Germany violated the source tax uniformity
requirement. In other words, it assessed different taxes on Quadrants 1 and 3.
As a result, Germany violated leisure neutrality.
To resolve Schumacker under a competitive neutrality construction of
nondiscrimination, we need more information about the German tax system.
Recall that Germany can, without violating competitive neutrality, assess
uniform source taxes or uniform residence taxes or both.181 In terms of Figure 8
below, any German source taxes must treat Quadrants 1 and 3 the same, and
any German residence taxes must treat Quadrants 1 and 2 the same.

181.

To be consistent with competitive neutrality, imposition of both source and residence taxes
would require the state to use either the ideal deduction method (in which source taxes
apply uniformly to both residents and nonresidents and are deductible from the worldwide
income of residents) or worldwide taxation (in which source taxes apply uniformly and the
residence state grants unlimited foreign tax credits). For a numerical example, see infra note
249.
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Figure 8.

requirements to maintain competitive neutrality
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The German residence tax on
Quadrant 1 must be the same as
the German residence tax on
Quadrant 2; the German source
tax on Quadrant 3 must be the
same as the German source tax on
Quadrant 1.182

We know from the facts of Schumacker that Germany did not confer
personal tax benefits on a uniform source basis to all workers in Germany.
Does this mean that Germany put nonresident workers at a competitive
disadvantage compared to resident workers? Not necessarily, because Germany
could have offered those benefits on a uniform residence basis, which would
allow exclusion of nonresident taxpayers without violating competitive
neutrality. Germany would comply with the requirement to offer tax benefits
on a uniform residence basis if it offered the same tax benefits to all its
residents, regardless of where they earned their income.183 In terms of Figure 8,
Germany would not violate competitive neutrality as long as it distributed the
benefits on a uniform residence basis to all taxpayers in Quadrants 1 and 2,
notwithstanding that it denied such benefits to taxpayers in Quadrant 3. Thus,
to resolve Schumacker under a competitive neutrality interpretation of
nondiscrimination, we need to know how Germany taxed Quadrant 2, that is,
how it taxed German-resident taxpayers earning income abroad.

182.

183.

While competitive neutrality requires the German source tax on Quadrants 1 and 3 to be the
same, and it requires the German residence tax on Quadrants 1 and 2 to be the same, it does
not, for example, require the total tax on Quadrant 1 to equal the total tax on Quadrant 3,
since taxpayers in Quadrant 1 are taxable by Germany on a source and a residence basis, and
those taxes can be cumulative. Similarly, workers in Quadrant 3 are subject to German
source taxes and the residence taxes of their home state. These taxes can be cumulative, and
the foreign residence tax can differ from the residence taxes applicable to Germans.
Competitive neutrality requires that the benefits actually be provided in cash or in kind to
residents at the same value, regardless of where they work.
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If German residents always receive German tax benefits, no matter where
they work (as opposed to only if they work in Germany), then they will not
reduce the wage they demand in Germany relative to the wage they demand
elsewhere on account of those benefits. Thus, if offered on a uniform residence
basis, the German benefits would not affect the relative wages paid in Germany
or elsewhere, and the German benefits would not distort the matching of
workers and jobs. If Germany conferred tax benefits in this way, nonresidents
would not be at a comparative disadvantage when competing for jobs in
Germany against German residents, despite the fact that German residents
would receive tax benefits that nonresidents like Schumacker did not. Because
he would be entitled to fewer tax benefits in Germany than German residents,
a nonresident like Schumacker might pay higher absolute taxes than
comparable German residents working in Germany. But this would not affect
his ability to compete with German residents for jobs because competitive
neutrality is concerned with comparative advantage. Thus, for a tax system to
be competitively neutral it is not necessary that all workers in the same
jurisdiction face the same absolute tax rates (or receive the same personal tax
benefits). Instead, in order for a tax system to be competitively neutral, it is
only necessary that the system not change comparative advantage. Higher or
lower taxes—as long as they are conferred on a uniform source or residence
basis—will not affect comparative advantage and therefore will not
compromise competitive neutrality.184
This conclusion may seem counterintuitive. If Germany denies Schumacker
personal tax benefits, and Schumacker has no income at home in Belgium
against which he can use Belgian personal tax benefits, he seems to be at a taxinduced competitive disadvantage. That may be, but the disadvantage would
not stem from his tax treatment in Germany, provided Germany confers
personal tax benefits on a uniform residence basis to all German workers.
Instead, the disadvantage would stem from his treatment at home in Belgium.
If Belgium offered personal tax benefits on a nonuniform basis, such that
Belgian residents received personal tax benefits only if they worked in Belgium,
then Belgium would violate competitive neutrality. In contrast, if Belgium did
not offer personal tax benefits at all, or if it offered them on a uniform source
basis only to residents and nonresidents who worked in Belgium, then
Schumacker would not be at a competitive disadvantage compared to German
residents working in Germany, notwithstanding that Schumacker would
receive personal tax benefits nowhere in the EU.

184.

See supra Section II.D.
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Likewise, imagine that Schumacker had managed to secure personal tax
benefits at home in Belgium because Belgium offered them on a (fully
refundable) residence basis. This would not dispose of the question of whether
he should also have received them in Germany under a competitive neutrality
interpretation of tax nondiscrimination. If Germany offered its personal tax
benefits only to Germans working at home—that is, on a nonuniform (source
or residence) basis only to taxpayers in Quadrant 1—then notwithstanding that
Schumacker secured personal tax benefits at home in Belgium, the German
fiscal system would still discourage Schumacker and all other nonresidents
from working in Germany.185
To see why, consider a German resident who is just as productive as
Schumacker in both Belgium and Germany. If Belgium offers personal tax
benefits on a uniform residence basis, then Schumacker will not reduce the
wage he seeks in Belgium relative to the wage he seeks in Germany on account
of the Belgian personal tax benefits because he receives them no matter where
he works. But if Schumacker’s competitor, the German resident, receives
German personal tax benefits only when she works at home in Germany, then
she will lower the wage she seeks in Germany relative to the wage she seeks in
Belgium on account of those benefits. The nonuniform German tax preference
thus allows the German to bid down the wages she seeks in Germany relative
to those she seeks in Belgium on account of the benefit, allowing her to outcompete Schumacker (and other foreign workers) in Germany. Of course, in a
case where Schumacker received personal tax benefits at home, he might
appear to be a less compelling plaintiff, but he should not be, because the
German tax system just described would discourage Schumacker from working
in Germany by putting him at a tax-induced competitive disadvantage
compared to German workers who receive personal tax benefits from Germany
only if they work in Germany.
This analysis suggests that under a competitive neutrality approach to
nondiscrimination, the ECJ should not determine whether there has been
discrimination by examining whether the cross-border worker has received
personal tax benefits at least “once somewhere” in the EU.186 Competitive
neutrality does not require that taxpayers receive at least one set of personal tax
benefits. Instead, all competitive neutrality requires is that states confer
benefits on a uniform basis. They must confer benefits either on a uniform
source basis to everyone working in their territory (no matter where they

185.
186.

Since violations of competitive neutrality cause distortions in two directions, it would also
discourage Germans from working outside of Germany.
See supra text accompanying notes 69-73.
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reside) or on a uniform residence basis to all residents (no matter where they
work).187 This makes sense because EU member states retain autonomy under
EU law to decide whether they want to offer personal tax benefits at all. If an
EU member state decided not to offer personal tax benefits, the “once
somewhere” method would lead the court astray. Checking for double
recoveries or double denials is no more effective a way to identify violations of
competitive neutrality than is comparing absolute tax rates.188
Our analysis of Schumacker ends with the observation that, as a matter of
tax policy, most states offer their own residents the same family deductions and
other personal tax benefits regardless of where in the world those residents
earn their income. In terms of Figure 8, they offer benefits on a uniform
residence basis to taxpayers in Quadrants 1 and 2, while excluding taxpayers in
Quadrant 3. This common practice does not violate competitive neutrality. If
Germany followed this traditional practice, then it did not place Schumacker at
a comparative tax disadvantage in Germany, even if it denied him those
benefits. Thus, a competitive neutrality interpretation of nondiscrimination
would not force states to alter the well-settled practice, memorialized in the
OECD model tax treaty, of excluding nonresident taxpayers from personal tax
benefits.189 Whether Germany actually offered the tax benefits at issue in
Schumacker on a uniform residence basis was not addressed by the ECJ, likely
because no one thought it relevant to the issue at hand.
The other case discussed in Part I was De Groot, in which the defendant
state was the taxpayer’s residence state. Recall that De Groot, a Dutch resident,
challenged the Dutch practice of proportionately reducing residents’ personal
tax benefits on account of their exempt foreign-source income. Proportionality
can be illustrated by a simple example. Suppose a Dutch resident earned 40%
of his income in the Netherlands and 60% abroad. The Netherlands would tax
only the 40% of income that was earned in the Netherlands, but it also would
grant him only 40% of Dutch personal tax benefits. The Netherlands argued
that such a cross-border worker should seek the remainder of his personal tax
benefits from the source state where he earned (and paid tax on) the other 60%

187.

188.
189.

That is, states may confer benefits uniformly on Quadrants 1 and 3, or they may confer
benefits uniformly on Quadrants 1 and 2. But they may not, for example, confer benefits
only on Quadrant 1.
See the numerical examples discussed supra Subsection II.D.3.
The OECD Model Tax Treaty nondiscrimination article provides that a source state is not
obliged “to grant to residents of [its tax treaty partner] any personal allowances, reliefs and
reductions for taxation purposes on account of civil status or family responsibilities which it
grants to its own residents.” OECD Model Tax Treaty, supra note 13, art. 24, para. 3.
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of his income.190 The ECJ struck down the Dutch proportionality method,
holding that except in Schumacker situations, conferring personal tax benefits is
the resident state’s responsibility.
It would have been easy for the ECJ to dispose of De Groot under either a
locational neutrality or a leisure neutrality interpretation of tax discrimination.
The Netherlands’ reduction of De Groot’s personal tax benefits on account of
his foreign-source income represented a clear violation of locational neutrality,
which requires uniform taxation of residents’ foreign and domestic income.
The residence tax regime challenged in De Groot also violated leisure neutrality,
since any residence-based taxation violates leisure neutrality.
In order to resolve De Groot under a competitive neutrality interpretation of
nondiscrimination, we need more information. If the Netherlands extended
personal tax benefits only on a residence basis, but it denied residents a fraction
of those benefits proportional to their foreign-source income, then the practice
would violate competitive neutrality because it would be a nonuniform
residence tax. In terms of Figure 8, the Netherlands would be applying
different residence taxes to Quadrants 1 and 2.
But recall that, in addition to offering personal tax benefits on a uniform
residence basis, competitive neutrality also permits states to offer them on a
uniform source basis to all workers earning income in the jurisdiction. If the
Netherlands applied the proportionality method on a uniform source basis,
such that the Netherlands conferred personal tax benefits to all workers in the
Netherlands, regardless of their residence (i.e., to everyone in Quadrants 1 and
3), then proportionality would constitute a uniform source tax that would not
violate competitive neutrality.
The facts of De Groot do not resolve the question of whether the
Netherlands conferred personal tax benefits on a uniform source basis.
However, Professor Peter Wattel wrote an article about the case that
reproduced much of the opinion he rendered in his role as Advocate General
for the case when it came before the Supreme Court of the Netherlands prior to
referral to the ECJ.191 In his opinion, Advocate General Wattel found it
probative that the Netherlands would extend personal tax benefits to both
resident and nonresident workers in proportion to their Dutch-taxable

190.
191.

Case C-385/00, De Groot v. Staatssecretaris van Financiën, 2002 E.C.R. I-11819, paras.
54-60.
Peter J. Wattel, Progressive Taxation of Non-Residents and Intra-EC Allocation of Personal Tax
Allowances: Why Schumacker, Asscher, Gilly and Gschwind Do Not Suffice, 40 EUR. TAX’N
210 (2000). Like Advocates General for the ECJ, Advocates General for the Dutch Supreme
Court do not represent any litigant in the case and provide advisory opinions to the court in
advance of its ruling.
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income.192 Thus, in our terminology, the Netherlands offered personal tax
benefits on a uniform source basis. From an international tax perspective, this
practice is highly unusual. However, conferral of personal tax benefits on a
uniform source basis maintains competitive neutrality. Perhaps for this reason,
Wattel advocated that all the EU member states should adopt the Dutch
proportionality method for conferring personal tax benefits.193 If the
nondiscrimination principle were interpreted to require competitive neutrality,
the Dutch proportionality method would be nondiscriminatory: if the
Netherlands confers personal tax benefits on a uniform source basis to both
resident and nonresident workers, it does not violate competitive neutrality.
iii. eu nondiscrimination as competitive neutrality
In the previous Part, we described three alternative efficiency-based
benchmarks that the ECJ could use to define nondiscrimination, showed how
each approach could be implemented, and applied each approach to two ECJ
cases. Interpreting the tax nondiscrimination principle to require any of the
three alternative efficiency benchmarks described in this Article would have
several advantages, including making tax discrimination cases much easier to
resolve. However, because the benchmarks contain contradictory prescriptions
for how states should tax, no court can pursue all three benchmarks
simultaneously.194 It is our view that, in the context of the EU common market,
nondiscrimination should be interpreted to promote competitive neutrality.
Accordingly, we describe in this Part some aspects of the language, structure,
and history of the EU treaties that support or are consistent with our
interpretation. We also describe some of the benefits that would accrue if
the ECJ explicitly adopted a competitive neutrality interpretation of
nondiscrimination.
Before diving into that discussion, it is worth looking at the choices that the
ECJ faces with its tax discrimination jurisprudence. One possibility is for the
ECJ to continue to decide cases in an ad hoc way that gives little guidance to
future parties. That is not an attractive option. The extensive critical
commentary of the ECJ’s tax discrimination jurisprudence and the ongoing

192.
193.

194.

Id. at 215 (calling the Dutch approach a “solution with a very high degree of international
neutrality and therefore, from the perspective of the Internal Market, laudable”).
Id. at 222-23 (arguing for the Dutch proportionality method in terms consistent with
interpreting the nondiscrimination principle to require competitive neutrality); see, e.g., id.
at 222 (“Taxing non-residents as if they were residents would remove both the progression
advantage and the allowance disadvantage . . . .”).
See discussion supra Section II.D.
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efforts of practitioners, government officials, and scholars to determine what
tax discrimination means underscore the need for clearer guidance. A second
possibility is that the ECJ could reverse itself and hold that the
nondiscrimination principle does not apply to direct taxation. That is also
unattractive because the requirement of member state unanimity for EU-wide
direct tax legislation has resulted in the court’s nondiscrimination doctrine
being the principal means of removing direct tax obstacles to the EU common
market. Removing direct taxation from the scope of the nondiscrimination
principle would eviscerate it. Member states could then enact with impunity all
sorts of nonuniform tax laws that burdened nonresidents and interstate
commerce more heavily than residents and domestic commerce. If the
nondiscrimination principle did not cover direct taxation, it would be far more
difficult for the ECJ to protect free movement rights. A third possibility would
be for the court to identify as the motivation behind the tax nondiscrimination
principle a single value (or a set of values) other than the three we discuss in
this Article, and to enforce the nondiscrimination principle in a way that
rigorously promotes that value (or values). The problem with this option is
that we are unaware of any values other than those that we discuss in this
Article that have been seriously proposed as a foundation for the
nondiscrimination principle. Nor have we any to offer. The fourth approach is
to choose between the three efficiency values that we discuss: locational
neutrality, leisure neutrality, and competitive neutrality. We thus believe that
the ECJ should make a choice.
Support for a competitive neutrality interpretation of tax discrimination
derives from the goals of the EU common market, the language and structure
of the EU treaties, and the ECJ’s case law. Although we do not primarily
advocate competitive neutrality from first principles, in this Part, we also
consider some normative arguments (including economic efficiency) for a
competitive neutrality interpretation of nondiscrimination.195 As part of this
analysis, we observe that expressly interpreting the EU nondiscrimination
principle to require competitive neutrality would link the fundamental
freedoms with a value espoused not only by economists, but also by taxpayers,
politicians, lawyers, and policy analysts.

195.

We do not argue in favor of a competitive neutrality interpretation for tax discrimination
from economic or philosophical first principles. Thus, we do not argue that a competitive
neutrality interpretation of nondiscrimination would do a better job of promoting economic
welfare or any specific notion of the good, justice, or fairness than other possible
interpretations that might be imposed on the member states.
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A. Interpretive Arguments
This Section describes how the goals of the EU and the language and
structure of the fundamental freedoms support a competitive neutrality
interpretation of nondiscrimination. Because leisure neutrality receives so little
support as a goal of international tax policy, we primarily focus on comparing
locational neutrality with competitive neutrality. 196
1. The Goals of the EU Treaties
The nondiscrimination principle derives from the fundamental freedoms,
which themselves represent the foundation of the EU’s internal market. That
market is intended to encourage increased competition, increased
specialization, and larger economies of scale. A competitive neutrality
interpretation of nondiscrimination would advance the EU goal to integrate the
economies of Europe because it would constrain state practices (including tax
laws) that decrease competition, hamper specialization, and prevent the
exploitation of economies of scale.
Support for the contention that creating an integrated market in which
larger companies can operate and compete was one of the purposes behind the
establishment of the common market can be found in the 1956 Spaak Report,
one of the EU’s few foundational documents that were readily available to the
states that initially created what would later become the EU.197 The report198 is
named for Belgian foreign minister Paul-Henri Spaak, chair of the
Intergovernmental Committee on European Integration. The report calls for a
European common market that would fuse together separate national markets
in order to promote the growth of Europe’s productive facilities.199 The report
emphasized that this common market should prize competition and forbid

196.

197.

198.

199.

Commentators often advocate for a tax system that achieves locational neutrality. Rarely, if
at all, do commentators advocate pursuing leisure or savings neutrality. When they advocate
for exemption, the argument is usually on the grounds of competitiveness.
Joseph J. A. Ellis, Source Material for Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty, 32 FORDHAM L. REV. 247,
248 (1961) (noting that few of the preparatory acts to the Rome Treaty were published or
submitted to the national legislatures when states introduced bills to ratify the Rome
Treaty).
COMITÉ INTERGOUVERNEMENTAL CRÉÉ PAR LA CONFÉRENCE DE MESSINE, RAPPORT DES
CHEFS DE DÉLÉGATION AUX MINISTRES DES AFFAIRES ETRANGÈRES: REPORT OF THE HEADS OF
DELEGATION TO THE MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Doc. MAE 120 f/56 (1956) [hereinafter
SPAAK REPORT].
de la Feria & Fuest, supra note 35, at 3.
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national laws that would restrain competition, since “[s]ystems of protection
which eliminate outside competition have . . . particularly harmful consequences
on the progress of production and the raising of the standard of living . . . .”200
The Report was a crucial step in the path to the Treaty of Rome, a predecessor
to the modern TFEU.201
As the Spaak Report makes clear, one of the motivations behind the
creation of a European common market was to encourage the formation and
development of large, competitive European companies that could operate on a
multinational scale without becoming monopolies. Achieving this goal
required companies based in one member state to be able to acquire productive
assets in other member states. A prohibition against tax systems that distort
competition to acquire such assets furthers that vision, while allowing member
states to maintain significant control of their domestic tax systems. Although
the treaties governing the EU have been amended over time, the prominent
place accorded competition has not. For example, the member states hope to
make the EU “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy
in the world.”202
2. The Language and Structure of the Treaty
The last Subsection explained that interpreting the nondiscrimination
principle to promote level competition among EU nationals would advance the
overarching goals of the EU. This Section discusses aspects of the structure and
language of the TFEU that support a competitive neutrality interpretation of
nondiscrimination.
a. Avoiding Construing Treaty Provisions as Superfluous
Whereas construing the nondiscrimination principle to require competitive
neutrality would give independent force to each of the fundamental freedoms,
construing nondiscrimination to require either locational or leisure neutrality
in taxation would render some of the fundamental freedoms superfluous.

200.
201.
202.

SPAAK REPORT, supra note 198, at 13-14, translated in Ellis, supra note 197, at 261-62.
Pinar Akman, Searching for the Long-Lost Soul of Article 82EC, 29 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 267,
278 (2009); de la Feria & Fuest, supra note 35, at 3.
Towards an Internal Market Without Tax Obstacles—A Strategy for Providing Companies with a
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base for their EU-Wide Activities, at 3, COM (2001) 582 final (Oct.
23, 2001).
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For example, Article 49 of the TFEU, which sets forth the freedom of
establishment, would be unnecessary if the only goal of the fundamental
freedoms were to achieve locational neutrality.203 To obtain locational
neutrality with respect to capital, it is sufficient to provide for the free
movement of portfolio investments (“capital movements” in EU parlance).
Allowing free movement of direct investments (“establishments” in EU
parlance) simply is not necessary for achieving locational neutrality. Thus, in
order for the freedom of establishment to have meaning independent of the
freedom of capital movement, the freedom of establishment must pursue a goal
or goals other than locational neutrality.204
In the same vein, the ECJ has interpreted Article 63 of the TFEU, the
freedom of capital movement, to apply to both portfolio and direct
investment.205 But again, free movement of portfolio investments is sufficient
to achieve locational neutrality for capital. Protecting direct investments makes
sense only if the provision aims to promote a goal other than locational
neutrality, such as competitive neutrality.
Similarly, interpreting the nondiscrimination principle to require savings
neutrality (leisure neutrality’s capital analogue) likewise would render certain
fundamental freedoms superfluous. For example, free movement of portfolio
investments is sufficient to secure savings neutrality because savings neutrality
requires only that individual investors earn the same after-tax rate of return
regardless of where they reside. Thus, if the exclusive purpose of the
fundamental freedoms were to promote savings neutrality, the freedom of
capital movement would be sufficient to achieve that purpose, rendering the
freedom of establishment superfluous. In contrast, construing the
nondiscrimination principle to require competitive neutrality would give each
of these provisions independent meaning because each provision is needed for
there to be competitive neutrality with respect to the subject matter covered by
that freedom.

203.
204.
205.

See TFEU, supra note 45, art. 49.
See Horst, supra note 60, at 796.
For a nonexhaustive list of covered capital movements, see Council Directive 88/361/EEC,
Annex 1, 1998 O.J. (L 178) 5, 8-11. Although this Directive implemented Articles 69 and 70
of the Treaty Establishing the Economic Community, which is no longer in force, the ECJ
has continued to refer to the Directive’s Annex for the list of covered capital investments.
See, e.g., Case C-510/08, Mattner v. Finanzamt Velbert, para. 19 (2010), available at
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=83008&pageIndex=0
&doclang=EN&mode=doc&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=40969HTML (“[T]he Court has
previously recognised the nomenclature which forms Annex I to Directive 88/361 as having
indicative value, even though that directive was adopted on the basis of Articles 69 and
70(1) of the EEC Treaty . . . .”).
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b. Consistency in Interpreting the Fundamental Freedoms
The nondiscrimination principle applies not only to taxes, but also to all
other areas of law. And there is no reason to think that the interpretation of the
nondiscrimination principle or the fundamental freedoms should be different
in the tax area than in other areas.
Taxation is one of the few areas in which it is theoretically possible for
member states to achieve locational neutrality without harmonizing their
policies. That is because taxes are assessed in money, and so one state’s taxes
(those of the source state) can be offset by another state’s taxes (those of the
residence state).206 That is precisely how worldwide taxation with an unlimited
foreign tax credit in principle works. Through the residence state’s taxes and
credits, the source state’s taxes are effectively rendered invisible to the taxpayer.
However, in other situations, the allegedly offending practices are rules and
regulations. In such cases, residence states cannot readily offset the practices of
source states—there is no equivalent of the foreign tax credit for regulation.
Instead, to assure efficient allocation across the EU of the factors of production
(i.e., to secure locational neutrality), member states would have to either
harmonize their substantive law or forbid regulation by source states.207 In
contrast, a competitive neutrality interpretation of nondiscrimination would
carry the same implication for regulation that it carries for taxation, namely,
that destination (source) states must apply the same regulation to residents
and nonresidents and that origin (residence) states must apply the same
regulation to residents engaged in domestic and intra-EU commerce. Thus, if
the nondiscrimination principle were interpreted to promote competitive
neutrality in the tax area, that interpretation could be carried over into other
regulatory areas.208
c. The Language of the Fundamental Freedoms
The language of the fundamental freedoms supports a competitive
neutrality interpretation of nondiscrimination. For example, Article 45 calls for
the “abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers of

206.
207.
208.

Ian Roxan, Assuring Real Freedom of Movement in EU Direct Taxation, 63 MOD. L. REV. 831,
833-34 (2000).
This latter option would be the regulatory equivalent of “residence-only” taxation, that is,
the prohibition of source taxes.
It is not clear how leisure neutrality is affected by regulations. That states could regulate as
they please without any limitation is another reason for rejecting a leisure neutrality
interpretation of nondiscrimination.
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the Member States as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions
of work and employment.”209 Likewise, Article 45 ensures that EU nationals
may “stay in a Member State for the purpose of employment,” and that they
may “remain in the territory of a Member State after having been employed in
that State.”210 Similarly, Article 45 includes the right of nationals of a member
state to “accept offers of employment.”211 This language protects cross-border
workers themselves, and it reflects concerns about the matching of jobs and
workers, which is a part of competitive neutrality.212
Other articles are similar. For example, Article 49, which sets forth the
freedom of establishment, states that “restrictions on the freedom of
establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of another
Member State shall be prohibited.”213 This language suggests that the freedom
applies on both an inbound and an outbound basis—that is, it restrains an EU
national’s own member state from preventing that national from establishing
business abroad, and it also prevents a host member state from preventing an
EU national of another member state from establishing business in its own
territory. Thus, the freedom of establishment applies to both residence states
and source states, which is consistent with the idea of leveling competition
among businesses. Indeed, Article 49 emphasizes obligations on source states:
“Freedom of establishment shall include the right to take up and pursue
activities as self-employed persons and to set up and manage undertakings, in
particular companies or firms . . . under the conditions laid down for its own
nationals by the law of the country where such establishment is effected.”214
This emphasis on uniformity of treatment in the source state is consistent with
the idea of leveling competition among businesses. Moreover, as noted earlier,
the freedom of establishment would be superfluous if efficient allocation of
capital were the only goal of the fundamental freedoms, since an efficient
allocation of capital can be achieved via the free movement of portfolio
investments alone.

209.
210.
211.
212.

213.
214.

TFEU, supra note 45, art. 45, para. 2.
Id. art. 45, paras. 3(c) & 3(d).
Id. art. 45, para. 3(a).
Cf. Communication from the Commission to the Spring European Council: Implementing the
Renewed Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs, para. 2.3, COM (2006) 816 final (Dec. 12, 2006),
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=SPLIT_COM:2006
:0816(01):FIN:EN:PDF (describing the Lisbon strategy as pursuing “flexicurity” for
workers, and noting that “[r]ather than protecting jobs, the aim is to protect the worker,
help them deal with rapid change and so ensure secure employment” (emphasis added)).
TFEU, supra note 45, art. 49.
Id.
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3. ECJ Nondiscrimination Doctrine
The ECJ’s tax discrimination case law also supports a competitive—but not
a locational or leisure—neutrality interpretation of the tax nondiscrimination
principle.
a. “Direct Effect”
Interpreting the nondiscrimination norm to require competitive neutrality
is consistent with the idea found in many legal contexts that discriminatory
taxes harm specific, identifiable taxpayers. For example, bilateral tax treaties
give taxpayers legal recourse against the contracting states for violating the
nondiscrimination article of the tax treaty. Likewise, state and federal courts in
the United States regularly hear tax discrimination cases brought by individual
taxpayers under the dormant Commerce Clause and the Privileges and
Immunities Clause. In the EU, the doctrine of “direct effect” reflects the notion
that violations of the nondiscrimination principle constitute violations of
personal rights.215 Under this doctrine, EU nationals may sue their own (or
other) member states for discrimination that violates EU law. That courts pay
careful attention to whether challenging taxpayers possess standing to bring
their claims shows that courts regard discriminatory taxes as harming specific,
identifiable taxpayers.
The notion that discriminatory taxes harm particular parties aligns well
with competitive neutrality, but not with locational or leisure neutrality. For
example, identifying the specific taxpayers harmed by violations of locational
neutrality is problematic because such violations do not disadvantage a
particular taxpayer relative to another. Instead, in the simplest models, a
violation of locational neutrality distorts the location of capital and labor to the
detriment of everyone. Rather than creating winners and losers (or even larger
and smaller losers) or leaving some with more than others, locational
distortions cause all investors to earn a lower return on their capital and all
workers to earn lower after-tax wages. Thus, locational neutrality simply does
not make sense as a personal right. Nor does leisure neutrality.216 In this sense,

215.

216.

See Case C-26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen,
1963 E.C.R. 1 (holding that EC rights have direct effect, that is, they give rise to a private
right of enforcement in national courts).
While it is possible to conceptualize a violation of leisure neutrality as a violation of a
personal right, all income tax systems distort choices between labor and leisure because all
income tax systems currently tax the returns from labor, but they do not tax leisure. Thus,
income taxes distort labor/leisure decisions even for residents of a single state engaged in
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construing nondiscrimination as requiring competitive neutrality fits the plain
meaning of nondiscrimination better than does construing it to require
locational neutrality. Conceiving of tax nondiscrimination as a personal right
also matches conventional nontax notions of nondiscrimination, including
prohibitions of discrimination on the basis of race, sex, or nationality. Thus,
the framing of tax discrimination as a violation of personal rights seems to
accord better with competitive neutrality than with locational neutrality.
A competitive neutrality interpretation of nondiscrimination is also
consistent with the court’s general approach to resolving tax cases, in which it
compares the tax treatment of idealized taxpayers; typically the court compares
a resident taxpayer with purely domestic income to a resident taxpayer with
foreign income or to a nonresident taxpayer with income sourced in the
defendant state. Comparing the tax treatment of particular taxpayers in this
way is a sensible approach to identifying discrimination if discrimination
means violations of competitive neutrality. This is because, as explained in Part
II, the court can identify violations of competitive neutrality by comparing
taxpayers’ relative tax rates on work opportunities.217 In contrast, because
violations of locational neutrality involve tax distortions to the overall
allocation of workers across member states, comparing the tax treatment of a
resident taxpayer and a cross-border taxpayer would not tell the court whether
there has been a violation of locational neutrality.
b. Tax Cases
As we discussed in Part II, the ECJ’s decisions in Schumacker and De Groot
provide anecdotal evidence that the ECJ does not interpret the
nondiscrimination principle to require locational neutrality or leisure
neutrality. We also explained in Part II that determining whether the ECJ’s
rulings in these cases comported with competitive neutrality would require
more information about the German and Dutch tax systems. In both cases, the
rulings could be reconciled with competitive neutrality. While the ability to
reconcile these cases with competitive neutrality hardly constitutes persuasive
evidence that the ECJ interprets the nondiscrimination principle to require
competitive neutrality, at least the court’s decisions do not directly violate that

217.

purely domestic economic activities. Furthermore, there is widespread, though not
universal, support for tax systems with increasing marginal tax rates. Progressive tax rates
distort leisure choices among residents of the same state, but they are not generally
understood to discriminate illegally against high-bracket taxpayers or to give rise to personal
causes of action for discrimination by such taxpayers.
Tax discrimination occurs only when states impose nonuniform source or residence taxes.

1093

the yale law journal

principle. In contrast, far from upholding locational or leisure neutrality, the
ECJ’s rulings in those two cases themselves introduced new locational and
leisure distortions.218
More probative than the anecdotal evidence provided in just two labor tax
cases is the ECJ’s overall approach to deciding tax cases. Interpreting the
nondiscrimination principle to require locational neutrality would force the
ECJ to rule out exemption as a valid method of taxing international income.
That is because in the absence of harmonization of member state tax rates,
locational neutrality requires states to tax their residents’ worldwide income
while providing unlimited credits for source taxes. The ECJ, however, has held
that nondiscrimination both permits exemption219 and does not require tax rate
harmonization.220
Furthermore, locational neutrality would place no nondiscrimination
burdens on source states—no matter how onerous or selective their taxes.
Under a locational neutrality interpretation, the expectation would be that any
source state distortion would be negated by foreign tax credits in the residence
state. But the ECJ repeatedly has found source states to discriminate. Taken

218.

219.

220.

For example, the ruling in Schumacker—that where a cross-border worker earns “almost all”
his income in the source state, the source state should grant him personal tax benefits—itself
violates both locational and leisure neutrality. See Case C-279/93, Finanzamt Köln-Altstadt
v. Schumacker, 1995 E.C.R. I-225, para. 38. The ruling also contradicts provisions in tax
treaties that expressly disclaim such obligations. See, e.g., OECD Model Tax Treaty, supra
note 13, art. 24, para. 3 (providing that source states need not extend personal tax benefits to
nonresidents). To the extent that the decision in Schumacker results in EU taxpayers
receiving personal tax benefits in their source state, rather than exclusively from their
residence state, it violates locational neutrality by presenting an opportunity for crossborder workers to access substantively different personal tax benefits by working abroad.
Such cross-border differences could be expected to distort the global allocation of labor. The
ruling in Schumacker also violates leisure neutrality because it does not require states to
apply the same taxes to resident and nonresident workers. Instead, Schumacker requires the
source state to tax residents and nonresidents identically only when nonresidents earn
“almost all” their income in the source state. Thus, in Schumacker, the court ensures
maintenance of neither locational nor leisure neutrality. Because the ECJ in De Groot applied
the Schumacker rule, that decision also violates both locational and leisure neutrality.
See, e.g., Case C-513/04, Kerckhaert v. Belgium, 2006 E.C.R. I-10967, para. 22 (holding that
member states are not obliged to relieve double taxation on cross-border income within the
EU and noting that EU law “does not lay down any general criteria for the attribution of
areas of competence between the Member States in relation to the elimination of double
taxation within the Community”); Case C-336/96, Gilly v. Directeur des Services Fiscaux du
Bas-Rhin, 1998 E.C.R. I-2793, para. 24 (“The Member States are competent to determine
the criteria for taxation on income and wealth with a view to eliminating double taxation.”).
See, e.g., Gilly, 1998 E.C.R. I-2793, para. 34 (holding that divergences in the “level” of
taxation among member states are nondiscriminatory because EU law does not prescribe or
harmonize member state tax rates).
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together, the ECJ’s approval of exemption and national rate differences and its
imposition of nondiscrimination burdens on source states suggest that it does
not understand the EU tax nondiscrimination principle to require locational
neutrality.221
The ECJ’s case law is also inconsistent with leisure neutrality. First, leisure
neutrality would forbid taxation at residence, but the ECJ has upheld a variety
of residence taxes under the EU nondiscrimination principle.222 Second, states
would have no specific nondiscrimination obligations when taxing in a
residence capacity under a leisure neutrality interpretation of
nondiscrimination—beyond the requirement that they exempt foreign-source
income. But the ECJ has repeatedly found residence states to have specific
nondiscrimination obligations other than exemption.223 Third, to maintain
leisure neutrality, source states would have to tax residents identically in all
circumstances for work performed in their jurisdiction, but the ECJ has
repeatedly approved different tax treatment of residents and nonresidents.224
These factors suggest that the ECJ does not understand the nondiscrimination
principle to require leisure neutrality.
Because competitive neutrality can be achieved via either global adoption of
worldwide taxation with unlimited foreign tax credits or global adoption of
ideal deduction (of which exemption is one instantiation), none of the holdings
just mentioned—that failure to grant unlimited foreign tax credits is not
necessarily discriminatory, that EU law does not require tax rate
harmonization, that nondiscrimination imposes obligations upon source states,
and that nondiscrimination imposes obligations on residence states—is
inconsistent with competitive neutrality. Rather, each of these rulings is

221.

222.
223.

224.

Slightly fewer than half of ECJ tax claims have been brought against source states, with the
remainder brought against residence states. See Mason, supra note 63, at 95 n.88. Defendant
states lose the overwhelming majority of tax cases before the ECJ whether defending their
source tax or residence tax regimes. See id. at 76 n.18.
See, e.g., Gilly, 1998 E.C.R. I-2793.
See, e.g., Case C-385/00, De Groot v. Staatssecretaris van Financiën, 2002 E.C.R. I-11819
(holding that a state must confer a full complement of personal tax benefits on residents
who earn foreign income, even if the state exempts residents’ foreign-source income).
See, e.g., Case C-279/93, Finanzamt Köln-Altstadt v. Schumacker, 1995 E.C.R. I-225
(holding that the source state’s obligation to treat nonresidents the same as residents was
triggered only when nonresidents earn “almost all” their income in the source state).
Different final tax treatment of residents and nonresidents is permissible under competitive
neutrality, but not leisure neutrality. See the numerical example discussed infra note 249.
Although competitive neutrality requires source taxes to be uniform, it does not require
residents and nonresidents to be treated identically, since source states tax nonresidents on
only one basis (source), whereas they tax residents on two bases (source and residence), and
source and residence taxes can be cumulative. See numerical examples, supra Section II.D.
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consistent with a posture of enforcing the source and residence uniformity
requirements of competitive neutrality, while withholding judgment on the
legislative question of whether competitive neutrality should be implemented
through worldwide taxation or ideal deduction.
Finally, although the ECJ does not express itself formally in terms of
competitive neutrality,225 the language it uses in its decisions evinces concern
for the ability of EU taxpayers from different states to compete for jobs on a
level tax playing field, which is the logic behind competitive neutrality. For
example, in Schumacker, the ECJ analyzed whether Germany “discouraged”
nonresidents from working in Germany by excluding them from the personal
tax benefits it provided to German residents, inquiring whether the German
rule placed Schumacker in “a less advantageous position than [German]
residents.”226 This language suggests that the ECJ was interested in the
competition between German residents and other EU residents for jobs in
Germany. The ECJ’s approach in Schumacker is not unique. The ECJ regularly
uses the language of competitive (but not locational or leisure) neutrality when
striking down source tax provisions on the grounds that they “discourage” or
“deter” cross-border economic activity.227 In addition, the ECJ applies the same
type of analysis to residence taxation. For example, in De Groot, the court held
that the Dutch practice of reducing home state tax benefits in proportion to
residents’ foreign-source income “discouraged” De Groot from working in
other member states.228 Application of such principles at both source and
residence is compatible only with competitive neutrality.

225.
226.
227.

228.

In contrast, U.S. tax discrimination cases are filled with language that invokes competitive
neutrality. See discussion infra Part IV.
Schumacker, 1995 E.C.R. I-224, para. 52.
See id. and cases cited supra note 82. The ECJ’s language about “discouraging” or
“deterring” cross-border activity is inconsistent with locational neutrality, which is informed
by the aggregate amount of work (or investment) that occurs in a state, not who holds a
given job (or makes a particular investment). That one nation’s tax policies discourage or
encourage residents of a particular member state from working (or investing) in another
member state is irrelevant, as long as their absence is made up for by others (most likely
from the member state enacting the provision). The ECJ’s language about “discouraging” or
“deterring” cross-border activity also is inconsistent with the technical and non-intuitive
notion of leisure (and savings) neutrality, which concerns the work/leisure (and
saving/consumption) tradeoffs made by taxpayers residing in different states.
De Groot, 2002 E.C.R. I-11819, paras. 84, 103-09.
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c. Distinguishing the ECJ’s “Nondiscrimination” and “Restrictions”
Jurisprudence
Although we argue that the ECJ’s interpretation of the principle of tax
nondiscrimination hews more closely to competitive neutrality than to
locational neutrality (and that it does not coincide at all with leisure neutrality),
that argument does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that locational
neutrality plays no role in EU law. EU law recognizes two distinct aspects to
the fundamental freedoms: prevention of discrimination and prevention of
“restrictions” or “obstacles” to movement.229 Both of these doctrines derive
from the fundamental freedoms.230 Our point in this Article is not to advocate
competitive neutrality to the exclusion of the pursuit of locational neutrality in
Europe (after all, they can be achieved simultaneously if all states adopt
worldwide taxation with unlimited foreign tax credits). Rather, our argument
is that the legal concept of tax nondiscrimination found in the TFEU and
derived from the fundamental freedoms is best understood as promoting
competitive neutrality. If the ECJ expressly adopted this view, the resolution of
tax cases in the EU would become a simpler and more straightforward affair.
Other scholars have argued that the ECJ’s “restrictions” jurisprudence aims to
promote locational neutrality, but we offer no view on that question here.231
B. Normative Arguments
Although we do not advocate competitive neutrality primarily from first
principles, this Section discusses some normative arguments for a competitive
neutrality construction of nondiscrimination, namely, that competitive
neutrality would promote welfare, decrease legal uncertainty, promote

229.

230.
231.

See, e.g., Commission of the European Communities, The EU and Sport: Background and
Context, ¶ 1.3.1, SEC (2007) 935 final (July 11, 2007) (“For the free movement of workers to
be a reality, two main principles must be respected: there must be no discrimination on
grounds of nationality, and there must be no obstacles to free movement.”).
Id.
Scholars dispute whether the concepts of discrimination and restriction have been
distinguished meaningfully in the tax area. See, e.g., Axel Cordewener, The Prohibitions of
Discrimination and Restriction Within the Framework of the Fully Integrated Internal Market, in
EU FREEDOMS AND TAXATION 1, 27 (Frans Vanistendael ed., 2006) (pointing out that “a vast
number of decisions using the term ‘restrictions’ in substance actually dealt with
discriminatory national measures”); see also Mason, supra note 17, at 1313 (likening the ECJ’s
“restriction” doctrine under the fundamental freedoms to the U.S. Supreme Court’s “undue
burdens” doctrine under the dormant Commerce Clause).
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representation reinforcement and political unity among residents of different
EU member states, and allow the ECJ to avoid making legislative decisions.
1. Welfare Promotion
Of the three neutrality benchmarks we discuss, many economists are likely
to view violations of locational neutrality as having the largest negative welfare
consequences.232 In contrast, no one seriously advocates leisure neutrality (or
its capital analogue, savings neutrality) as an important goal from a welfare
perspective. Although some commentators advocate exemption, which is the
only method for achieving leisure neutrality in the absence of tax rate and base
harmonization, they generally do so on the grounds that it promotes
competitiveness, which is to say competitive neutrality.233 There is no
consensus among economists that competitive neutrality should be the goal for
designing cross-border tax systems, or that competitive neutrality is more
important than locational neutrality from a welfare perspective. However,
economists generally agree that policies that interfere with the matching of
owners to investments and workers to jobs reduce welfare. Thus, there is
consensus that violations of competitive neutrality reduce welfare. Economists
also widely recognize that states, unless they are constrained, will enact trade
barriers that tilt the playing field in favor of domestic interests with attendant
negative welfare consequences. In other words, absent legal or other restraints,
states will tend to violate competitive neutrality, which will reduce welfare.
Thus, we do not argue that the ECJ should adopt a competitive neutrality
interpretation of nondiscrimination because a competitively neutral tax system
would best promote EU welfare. Other more extensive and intrusive tax
measures than what we propose here—such as imposing the same tax base and
rate structure on all member states—might best promote EU welfare. We take
no position on the question of which tax system would best promote EU
welfare. Instead, we argue that given the language of the Treaty, the goals of
the EU, and the interpretations of the nondiscrimination principle so far, the
best interpretation of that principle is that it promotes competitive neutrality.
Nevertheless, a competitive neutrality interpretation of nondiscrimination
would improve welfare, compared to a situation in which member states face
no constraints on how they tax nonresidents or residents with income sourced
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Graetz, supra note 23, at 270 (“Typically, economists regard [capital export neutrality] as
essential for worldwide economic efficiency . . . .”); id. at 285 (“[T]aking a worldwide
efficiency perspective, [capital export neutrality] generally is thought to dominate [capital
import neutrality].”).
See id. at 273.
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in other EU member states. As explained above, a competitive neutrality
interpretation of tax discrimination would discourage states from enacting tax
laws that tilt the playing field for jobs against cross-border workers. Because
workers have different skills, nonuniform tax laws interfere with the efficient
matching of workers and jobs.234 Thus, we believe that there would be welfare
gains from adopting a competitive neutrality interpretation of tax
nondiscrimination.235 Indeed, such gains (even if only understood intuitively)
may be what the founders of the EU hoped to secure by implementing the
prohibition on discrimination; those aims likewise may be what the members
of the ECJ understand their interpretations in tax cases to pursue. Of course,
the institutional limitations on the ECJ mean that even if the court expressly
adopted a competitive neutrality interpretation of nondiscrimination, it could
not ensure complete competitive neutrality throughout the EU because
interactions between states using different methods of eliminating double
taxation (that is to say, worldwide taxation or the ideal deduction method) will
undermine competitive neutrality. Nevertheless, the court’s express adoption
of a competitive neutrality interpretation of nondiscrimination, and its
enforcement of the uniformity requirements of competitive neutrality, would
sharply restrict the member states from using their tax systems to provide
advantages for their residents over nonresidents. In contrast, an interpretation
of tax discrimination that does not look to competitive neutrality risks allowing
states to design their tax systems to explicitly and directly tilt the playing field
in favor of domestic residents and domestic economic activity. That would be a
dangerous path—and it could potentially have large negative welfare
consequences—because protectionist sentiments can be strong, especially
during tough economic times, and because the EU already regulates many
alternative tools that states have traditionally used to favor residents.
2. Increased Predictability
A common criticism of courts interpreting nondiscrimination principles is
that their decisions are unpredictable.236 This uncertainty is not only a problem
for the parties to any given litigation; it is a serious problem for the states
subject to legal obligations to avoid tax discrimination. States need to enact and
administer tax systems without fear that particular tax provisions will be held

234.
235.
236.

See supra Section II.D.
Of course, the general theory of the second best precludes making conclusive statements
about welfare as long as some distortions remain.
See sources cited supra notes 2-8.
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discriminatory and therefore need to be rewritten or replaced. Explicitly
interpreting nondiscrimination as competitive neutrality and requiring states to
enact uniform taxes would provide clear guidance to state legislatures, tax
administrators, and taxpayers. As we showed in Part II, the legality of any tax
would be easy to assess under a competitive neutrality interpretation of
nondiscrimination, so states could enact and administer their tax laws with
clear guidance and substantial flexibility.237
3. Promotion of Representation Reinforcement and Political Unity
Although the tax nondiscrimination norm principally promotes economic
efficiency, the fundamental freedoms also promote noneconomic values. Two
important noneconomic values that a competitive neutrality interpretation of
nondiscrimination promotes are representation reinforcement and political
unity. Explicit adoption of a competitive neutrality construction of
nondiscrimination would promote representation reinforcement by protecting
nonresidents from being exploited by residents entitled to participate in the
source state’s political process.238 By insisting that source states tax
nonresidents the same way as residents, competitive neutrality ensures that the
interests of nonresidents secure proxy representation in the source jurisdiction,
which helps prevent the exploitation of nonresidents. Such proxy
representation links the interests of residents and nonresidents, and also may
help to promote feelings of political unity among residents of the common
market.
Likewise, by removing tax barriers to cross-border economic activity, the
nondiscrimination principle also seeks to promote the notion that the relevant
community is not the state, but the whole community subject to the
nondiscrimination rule.239 This, too, promotes political unity. Finally, if
economic integration promotes political unity, then by striking down tax
provisions that would otherwise hinder such integration, competitive
neutrality is likely to further promote political unity. Indeed, reducing animus
among the peoples of Europe by tying their economic fates was one of the
principal motivations for the formation of the EU.240 Thus, in addition to

237.
238.
239.
240.

This benefit would also arise if nondiscrimination were alternatively interpreted as
locational or leisure neutrality.
Cf. Heinzerling, supra note 84, at 220-21 (describing the representation reinforcement
rationale for the dormant Commerce Clause).
Cf. id. at 222 (describing the political unity rationale for the dormant Commerce Clause).
Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950, available at http://europa.eu/abc/symbols/9may/decl_en.htm (describing the coal and steel community as “a first step in the federation
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promoting efficiency, a competitive neutrality interpretation of
nondiscrimination advances two non-efficiency values promoted by common
markets, namely, representation reinforcement and political unity.
4. Avoidance of Legislative Decisions
Because a competitive neutrality interpretation of nondiscrimination would
allow courts to decide tax cases based on a formal inquiry regarding the
uniformity of the challenged state tax law, it would help courts avoid making
the kinds of policy decisions that are typically made by legislatures.
For example, consider the Gerritse case in which the ECJ ruled that
although an EU member state taxing in a source capacity could not exclude a
resident of another EU member state from the benefit of its progressive tax
rates, it could exclude the nonresident from its personal tax exemption.241 The
ECJ reached this ruling because, in its view, the personal exemption
represented a tax benefit related to the worker’s “personal and family
situation,” which, under the Schumacker rule, had to be accounted for by his
residence state, unless the cross-border worker earned “almost all” of his
income in the source state. While the ECJ may have been confident that the
personal exemption represented a “personal and family” tax benefit, while
progressive tax rates did not, the history of tax expenditure analysis has shown
that it is difficult or impossible to distinguish social welfare benefits
administered through the tax system (such as family deductions) from
structural or income-defining tax provisions.242 Is the personal exemption a
family benefit, or is it simply the zero bracket of a progressive tax system? By
distinguishing between different kinds of tax benefits, the court inadvertently
drew an unworkable distinction between personal and family tax benefits and
other tax provisions.
In contrast, a competitive neutrality interpretation of nondiscrimination
would eschew thorny questions regarding what kinds of tax benefits must be
extended to outsiders by insisting only that all tax provisions and all personal
tax benefits—whatever their content—apply on either a uniform source or a
uniform residence basis. Because a competitive neutrality interpretation of tax
nondiscrimination would allow courts to decide cases on a purely formal basis

241.
242.

of Europe” that would produce a “solidarity in production” and make “any war between
France and Germany not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible”).
Case C-234/01, Gerritse v. Finanzamt Neukölln-Nord, 2003 E.C.R. I-5933.
See, e.g., STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG., A RECONSIDERATION OF TAX
EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS (Comm. Print 2008) (reviewing long-standing academic debates
concerning how to define tax expenditures).
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by checking for uniformity, it would allow courts to avoid making legislative
decisions.243
C. Settling Open Questions
Express recognition of competitive neutrality as the value motivating the
efficiency component of the tax nondiscrimination principle would also settle a
number of vexing questions that have generated controversy among
commentators. In this Section, we describe how our approach would resolve
some important and longstanding controversies.
1. Comparing Absolute Tax Rates
For reasons discussed at length in Part II, express adoption of a competitive
neutrality construction of nondiscrimination would imply that comparing a
resident’s and a nonresident’s absolute tax rates is not an effective way to
identify tax discrimination. Noneconomists—including members of the
ECJ244—tend to believe that a tax’s impact on competitiveness can be
ascertained simply by comparing competitors’ absolute tax rates. Under this
reasoning, if a French resident has an effective marginal tax rate of 20% in
France, while a German resident has an effective marginal tax rate of 40%
in France, the French resident has a tax-induced competitive advantage in
securing a job in France. This reasoning is intuitive, but wrong. To establish
that the French resident has a competitive advantage over the German resident
in acquiring the job in France, we need to know more. Specifically, we need to
know what effective tax rate the French resident would face if she worked
elsewhere, as well as the effective tax rate the German worker would face if he
worked elsewhere. While this point is well understood by public finance
economists, it may have been lost by advocates general and judges interpreting
nondiscrimination principles, leading to unsatisfying decisions.245

243.
244.

245.

This benefit would also arise if nondiscrimination were alternatively interpreted as locational
or leisure neutrality.
See, e.g., Case C-513/04, Kerckhaert v. Belgium, 2006 E.C.R. I-10967, paras. 26-27 (opinion
of Advocate General Geelhoed) (evaluating whether there was discrimination by comparing
absolute tax rates). But see Mason, supra note 17, at 1295-97 (arguing that the comparison of
absolute tax rates in Kerckhaert was insufficient because a tax credit granted by the source
state obscured underlying discrimination by the taxpayer’s residence state).
Mason, supra note 17, at 1295-97. For more on measuring tax-induced competitive
advantages, see generally Michael S. Knoll, Taxation and the Competitiveness of Sovereign
Wealth Funds: Do Taxes Encourage Sovereign Wealth Funds To Invest in the United States?,
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2. Progressive Taxation
Another open question is what implications the nondiscrimination
principle has for progressive taxation. All the member states of the EU have
progressive income tax systems, but each state has a different rate structure.
Which state’s progressive tax rates should apply to an EU national with income
from more than one state? One of the authors of this Article previously
analyzed this question from an equity perspective and concluded that the
progressive tax rates of the cross-border worker’s residence state should apply
to his income.246 This conclusion was based in part on the fact that the
residence state is generally the one where the cross-border worker votes, and as
a result, the cross-border worker helps to decide both the content of the tax
rates and the public expenditures that those rates fund.247 From an
administrative perspective, assessment of progressive tax rates only at residence
is also desirable because residence states generally have better access to
information on taxpayers’ overall income and because assessment of
progressive tax rates only at residence relieves cross-border taxpayers of the
need to file full returns in every state in which they earn income.248
Competitive neutrality allows states to apply progressive tax rates to their
own residents’ worldwide income while applying flat tax rates to nonresidents
for work performed in their territory. For example, as long as Germany applies
the flat taxes on a uniform source basis to both residents and nonresidents
working in Germany, then Germany’s assessment of additional progressive
taxes on a uniform residence basis need not violate competitive neutrality.249

246.
247.
248.
249.

82 S. CAL. L. REV. 703 (2009); and Michael S. Knoll, The UBIT: Leveling an Uneven Playing
Field or Tilting a Level One?, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 857 (2007).
Mason, supra note 20, at 1585-93.
Id.
Id. at 1599-1604.
To subject nonresidents to flat tax rates while subjecting residents to progressive taxation
consistently with competitive neutrality requires use of the ideal deduction method in which
source taxes apply uniformly to both resident and nonresident workers, and in which
residents are uniformly taxable on their worldwide income, but all source taxes are
deductible from income.
For example, suppose that in addition to a 25% German source tax, which applies
uniformly to resident and nonresident workers, Germany also taxes its residents on their
worldwide labor income. Suppose further that Germany allows residents to deduct any
source taxes (including German source taxes) assessed against that income. (Thus, Germany
implements ideal deduction.) Moreover, assume that Germany’s progressive residence tax
rate ranges from negative 33⅓% to positive 33⅓%. Under those assumptions, the total tax
paid by German residents would range from 0 to 50%. Thus Wilhelm, a German resident
who earns €100 in Germany and has no other income, would pay €25 in source taxes to
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Because free mobility of labor will tend to push after-tax wages into equality
across states for the residents of any state, the fact that residents and
nonresidents pay different total (source and residence) tax rates on work in
Germany will not compromise competitive neutrality because it is differences
in relative tax rates—not differences in absolute tax rates—that affect
competition. This is an important result because it accords with our intuitions
about what equity demands. It also preserves longstanding tax practices
memorialized in thousands of bilateral tax treaties of taxing nonresidents at flat
rates but residents at progressive rates. Finally, it substantially reduces taxpayer
compliance costs by avoiding the need for cross-border workers to file full
income tax returns in every jurisdiction where they earn income.
3. Double Benefits and Burdens
Express adoption of a competitive neutrality interpretation of tax
nondiscrimination also provides insight into how to resolve cases involving
double burdens and double benefits. As we noted earlier, in the Schumacker line
of cases, the ECJ expressed concern that cross-border EU workers should not
be completely denied personal tax benefits, nor should they be able to secure
duplicative benefits from their source and residence states. We characterized
this as the “once somewhere” approach, but the issue can be cast more
generally. Instead, it really concerns whether the reviewing court should
resolve tax discrimination questions by appeal only to the challenged state’s
law, or whether it should take into consideration the laws of any other state

Germany. He would also be liable to Germany for residence taxes on his worldwide income
of €100. Against the €100, Germany would allow a deduction of €25 for the German source
tax, leaving €75 against which Germany’s progressive residence tax rates would apply. If we
assume that all of Wilhelm’s net income is taxable at the highest German residence rate
(33⅓%), he would owe an additional €25 in taxes to Germany, which would leave him with
€50 after taxes, yielding a net effective tax rate of 50%. Had Wilhelm been subject to the
lowest German residence rate (negative 33⅓%), he would have received a refundable credit
of €25, bringing his net effective tax rate to zero. We constructed this example with
residence tax rates ranging from negative 33⅓% to positive 33⅓% in order to approximate
the actual progressive tax rates for German residents described in the well-known Gerritse
case, which ranged from 0 to 50%. See Case C-234/01, Gerritse v. Finanzamt NeuköllnNord, 2003 E.C.R. I-5933, para. 55 (holding that, for nonresidents that do not earn almost
all their income in the source state, the source state may deny nonresidents the benefit of
personal tax exemptions but not the benefit of progressive tax rates).
In the example just explored, nonresidents would be subject to source tax in Germany
at 25%, whereas German residents would be subject to source tax in Germany at 25% and to
residence tax in Germany at rates ranging from negative 33⅓% to positive 33⅓% (before
deduction of German source taxes), which translates into net taxes from 0 to 50% (after
deduction of German source taxes). This tax regime does not violate competitive neutrality.
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that taxes the cross-border worker. For example, suppose the challenged tax
rule is a source rule. When making its determination of whether there has been
discrimination, some commentators have suggested that courts also must take
into consideration any rules to which the taxpayer may be subject in his or her
residence state. This view has been endorsed by at least one ECJ Advocate
General,250 and the ECJ has vacillated between the two approaches.251
Competitive neutrality provides a convincing justification for limiting
judicial review to the laws of the challenged state. Violations of competitive
neutrality can be identified simply by checking to see whether the challenged
tax law (be it a residence rule or a source rule) applies uniformly. The
interactions of the rules of the source and residence states have no bearing on
this inquiry. This is a good result because it simplifies judicial decisionmaking
in an area characterized by highly complex substantive law. Furthermore, by
limiting analysis to the laws of only one state, a competitive neutrality
conception of nondiscrimination would prevent the possibility that a single tax
law will be held to be discriminatory when applied to workers from some, but
not all, other states.
Thus, despite the intuitive appeal of the “once somewhere” approach,
limiting judicial review to the laws of only the challenged state accords better
with the economic principles that ground the nondiscrimination principle. It
has the added advantage of simplifying judicial review in an already complex
area. Finally, we observe that because no law we are aware of requires any state
to offer personal tax benefits, the “once somewhere” approach would lead
courts astray because the failure of an EU national to secure personal tax
benefits does not necessarily indicate wrongdoing by any state.
4. A Way out of the Labyrinth
Finally, a competitive neutrality interpretation provides a powerful
response to the claims by Professors Graetz and Warren. Graetz and Warren
argue that the ECJ’s approach to nondiscrimination, under which it imposes
burdens upon both source and residence states, is incoherent because it
simultaneously promotes both locational neutrality and savings neutrality (the
capital analog of leisure neutrality). But these two neutralities are inconsistent

250.

251.

See Case C-374/04, Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Grp. Litig. v. Comm’rs of Inland
Revenue, 2006 E.C.R. I-11673, para.95 (opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed) (supporting
the “overall” approach).
Compare Case C-294/97, Eurowings Luftverkehrs AG v. Finanzamt Dortmund-Unna, 1999
E.C.R. I-7447, paras. 43-44 (adopting the per-country approach), with Case C-319/02, In re
Manninen, 2004 E.C.R. I-7477, para. 54 (adopting the overall approach).
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with one another in the absence of tax rate harmonization. We have shown that
imposition of nondiscrimination obligations at both source and residence does
not necessarily imply that a court is trying to do the impossible by
simultaneously achieving locational and savings (or leisure) neutrality without
harmonizing taxes. Instead, such an approach can be consistent with
competitive neutrality. Moreover, the notion that the nondiscrimination norm
should apply at both source and residence is in accordance with many people’s
intuition that states may impermissibly discriminate in either capacity: when
taxing in a source capacity, they may discriminate between resident and
nonresident workers; when taxing in a residence capacity, they may
discriminate between residents’ foreign and domestic income.
iv. tax nondiscrimination in the united states
In laying out our arguments about how legal prohibitions of tax
discrimination in common markets might be interpreted, we relied on
examples from the ECJ for several reasons. First, our arguments are designed
in part to respond to Graetz and Warren’s criticism that imposition of
nondiscrimination obligations at both source and residence is incoherent.
Although this criticism also could be leveled against U.S. courts, which have
imposed nondiscrimination burdens at source and residence, Graetz and
Warren addressed the EU context, and so we found it appropriate to respond
by analyzing ECJ cases. Second, the new efficiency conception we offer in this
Article derives from economics literature that analyzes international taxation.
Although taxation of cross-border labor income by U.S. states bears substantial
similarity to taxation of international income by nation-states, the ECJ cases
are a better fit because they involve taxation of international income by nationstates. Finally, the ECJ decides many more tax discrimination cases than does
the Supreme Court. As a result, it is easier to find cases with straightforward
legal and factual scenarios in the ECJ doctrine. One reason for the relative
abundance of ECJ tax cases could be that the ECJ cannot refuse to hear tax
cases because there presently is no EU counterpart to the U.S. certiorari
process.252 As a result, tax cases constitute about 10% of the ECJ’s caseload.253
Despite our use of EU examples to illustrate our arguments, this Part shows

252.

253.

As two chroniclers of the Court noted, Justice Brennan’s typical reaction to a certiorari
request in a tax case was: “This is a tax case. Deny.” BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG,
THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 362 (1979).
See Mason, supra note 17, at 1281 (citing annual statistics kept by the ECJ).
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that those arguments apply with equal, if not more, force to the interpretation
of constitutional prohibitions of U.S. state tax discrimination.
U.S. states taxing interstate income face challenges similar to those of
nation-states taxing international income. For example, when a taxpayer
resides in one U.S. state but works in another, both states may tax him.254 To
avoid double taxation, the residence state typically credits the income taxes
levied on the labor income by the source state.255 The taxation of interstate
workers by the U.S. states raises issues similar to those raised by taxation of
intra-EU workers by the EU member states. The Supreme Court, lower federal
courts, and state courts have decided important tax discrimination cases,
mostly under the Commerce Clause and the Privileges and Immunities
Clause.256
The nondiscrimination provisions in the U.S. Constitution are even less
explicit than those in the TFEU. For example, in the Supreme Court’s view,
because the Constitution reserves the power exclusively to Congress “to
regulate Commerce . . . among the several States,” in the absence of federal
regulation, the states may not regulate or inhibit interstate commerce,
including by applying discriminatory taxes that interfere with interstate
commerce (this negative implication of the Commerce Clause has been called
the “dormant Commerce Clause”).257 Likewise, the Supreme Court has
interpreted the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, which provides
that “[t]he Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and
Immunities of Citizens in the several States,” to prohibit tax discrimination by
one U.S. state against residents of another U.S. state.258

254.
255.
256.

257.

258.

HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 10, ¶ 20.10.
Id.
The Supreme Court also has decided some tax discrimination cases under the Equal
Protection Clause, which provides that “[n]o state shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see, e.g., Metro.
Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985) (holding that, under the Equal Protection
Clause, Alabama could not assess nonresident insurance companies to higher taxes than
resident insurance companies); see also HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 10, ¶¶ 3.01-.05
(analyzing tax discrimination jurisprudence under the Equal Protection Clause).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see, e.g., Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274
(1977) (setting forth four factors used in evaluating whether states comply with the dormant
Commerce Clause: nondiscrimination, nexus, fair apportionment, and reasonable-relationto-government-services-provided). See generally HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note
10, ¶¶ 4.01-.26 (analyzing tax discrimination jurisprudence under the Commerce Clause).
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; Lunding v. N.Y. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287 (1998)
(holding that New York violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause when it denied
alimony deductions to a Connecticut resident with New York-taxable income while
permitting New York residents to deduct alimony). See generally HELLERSTEIN &
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One question that immediately presents itself is whether the tax
nondiscrimination principle under the dormant Commerce Clause means the
same thing as the tax nondiscrimination principle under the Privileges and
Immunities Clause. The Supreme Court has not interpreted the two provisions
the same way. For example, the personal scope of those provisions differs
because corporations cannot raise nondiscrimination claims under the
Privileges and Immunities Clause. Likewise, although Congress can consent to
state tax rules that would violate the nondiscrimination principle under the
dormant Commerce Clause, congressional consent cannot cure tax
discrimination that violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Although
the personal scope and available justifications for tax discrimination vary across
these two constitutional provisions, it is possible (and we suggest here
plausible) that the economic efficiency component of both prohibitions of tax
discrimination seeks to promote competitive neutrality. This notion is perfectly
consistent with the idea that nondiscrimination under the dormant Commerce
Clause emphasizes economic efficiency more than does nondiscrimination
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, which emphasizes equality more.
A second preliminary question is whether there is any reason to think that
the nondiscrimination principle in either of these constitutional provisions
would have the same meaning as the EU nondiscrimination principle. We
suggest that there is. The U.S. Constitution and the EU treaties both reflect the
goals of their framers to foster political and economic unity among the
residents of each union. Prohibiting states from using their tax systems to
interfere with economic integration is an important part of that process. And,
like the ECJ, in deciding tax discrimination cases, the Supreme Court
emphasizes the goal, embodied in the Constitution, of forming a common
market where state laws do not unreasonably impede interstate commerce.
Thus, although a premise of this Article is that tax nondiscrimination
principles have not been interpreted clearly, one clear purpose of those
principles in both the U.S. Constitution and the TFEU is to prevent states
from enacting tax barriers to interstate commerce. In other words, although
nondiscrimination principles in different contexts may promote different
values, one component that they have in common is the goal of promoting a
level playing field among residents of different member states.
Moreover, the case for a competitive neutrality interpretation of
nondiscrimination is, if anything, stronger in the United States than in the EU
because in applying nondiscrimination, the Supreme Court expressly considers
whether the challenged tax distorts competition between in-state residents and

HELLERSTEIN, supra note 10, ¶ 20.06 (analyzing tax discrimination jurisprudence under the
Privileges and Immunities Clause).
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out-of-state residents. For example, in West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, the
Supreme Court used the dormant Commerce Clause to strike down a tax that
applied to both in-state and out-of-state milk dealers doing business in
Massachusetts because it was linked to a preferential subsidy for in-state milk
producers. In the Court’s view, the combination of the tax and preferential
subsidy “neutraliz[ed] the advantage possessed by lower cost out-of-state
producers.”259 This analysis expressly evinces a concern that states should not
use taxes to undermine out-of-state residents’ comparative advantage over instate residents.
Likewise, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause suggests that that Clause also promotes competitive
neutrality. For example, in one of its earliest interpretations, the Court stated
that the purpose of the Clause was to “place the citizens of each State upon the
same footing with citizens of other States, so far as the advantages resulting
from citizenship in those States are concerned.”260 Similarly, in a concurring
opinion in Toomer v. Witsell, Justice Frankfurter argued that the decisions
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause “bar a State from penalizing the
citizens of other States by subjecting them to heavier taxation merely because
they are such citizens or by discriminating against citizens of other States in the
pursuit of ordinary livelihoods in competition with local citizens.”261 And writing
for the majority in Travis v. Yale & Towne Manufacturing Co., Justice Pitney
expressed the concern that an out-of-state worker who was denied a personal
exemption by a source state nevertheless had to “compet[e]” with in-state
workers “as to wages, salaries, and other terms of employment.”262 Thus, the
Supreme Court has expressly appealed to competitive neutrality values in
deciding tax discrimination cases.
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the nondiscrimination principle as
having what the Europeans call “direct effect” bolsters the claim that the
principle promotes competitive neutrality. Specifically, violations of
the nondiscrimination principles of both the dormant Commerce Clause and
the Privileges and Immunities Clause give rise to private rights of action by
affected taxpayers. Such direct effect is consistent with competitive, but not
locational, neutrality. Explicit adoption by the Supreme Court of a competitive

259.

260.
261.
262.

West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 194 (1994); see also id. at 193 (noting that
the Constitution forbids internal tariffs because they “artificially encourage in-state
production even when the same goods could be produced at lower cost in other states”).
Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 180 (1868).
334 U.S. 385, 408 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
252 U.S. 60, 80 (1920) (holding that a state violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause
when it denied nonresident taxpayers personal exemptions available to resident taxpayers).
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neutrality construction of nondiscrimination and endorsement of the
interpretive rules we develop in this Article could bring predictability and
coherence to the Court’s tax discrimination jurisprudence. It would also
generate some of the advantages discussed in the previous Part.
For example, like the ECJ, the Supreme Court has been caught up in
legislative questions in its own tax discrimination jurisprudence. In Lunding v.
New York Tax Appeals Tribunal, the Supreme Court set forth its views on
personal tax benefits.263 Unlike the ECJ in Schumacker, the Supreme Court in
Lunding refused to hold that personal expenses generally should be allocated to
the taxpayer’s residence state.264 Instead, the Supreme Court concluded that a
source state could categorically deny nonresidents personal expense deductions
only under limited circumstances, such as when the particular expense could be
“geographically fixed” in another state.265 The Court gave examples of personal
expenses that it believed could be geographically fixed, including mortgage
interest and real estate taxes.266 But the Supreme Court’s “geographic”
approach in Lunding is no more administrable than the ECJ’s “personal and
family” benefit approach in Schumacker. For example, in her dissent in Lunding,
Justice Ginsburg argued that the quality of house that a taxpayer can afford
(and therefore the size of her mortgage) relates to how much she earns
overall.267 This point calls into question the majority’s assertion that mortgage
interest deductions have a clear geographic nexus with the state in which the
property is located, as opposed to the state or states in which the homeowner
earns her income.268 The Supreme Court’s express adoption of a competitive
neutrality interpretation of tax nondiscrimination would render unnecessary
the need to categorize tax benefits by reference to their geographic nexus with a
particular state. Instead, the Court would have to ensure that both taxes and
tax benefits were conferred on either a uniform source or a uniform residence
basis. 269

263.
264.
265.
266.

267.
268.
269.
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522 U.S. 287 (1998).
Id. at 314.
Id. at 311.
Id. The Lunding Court considered how to allocate a deduction for an expense actually
incurred by the taxpayer. It is unclear how the Court’s reasoning in Lunding would apply to
other personal tax benefits, although the Court previously had held that a source state could
not categorically deny nonresidents personal tax exemptions. Travis, 252 U.S. at 79.
Lunding, 522 U.S. at 327 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See id. at 327-28.
Accordingly, under a competitive neutrality interpretation, the Supreme Court should have
upheld New York’s tax treatment of alimony payments, because it appears that New York
offered the alimony deduction on a uniform residence basis. That is, New York provided the
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Likewise, members of the Supreme Court could leave behind their debates
about whether constitutional prohibitions of tax discrimination require a twostate or a single-state analysis. Consider again Lunding, which involved a
Connecticut resident’s privileges-and-immunities claim of discrimination
against New York for New York’s failure to grant him the same alimony
deductions that it granted to New York residents. Both the majority in Lunding
and Justice Ginsburg writing in dissent considered what significance to assign
to the fact that Lunding could not obtain an alimony deduction in Connecticut
because at that time Connecticut neither taxed income nor allowed deductions
for alimony.270 While the majority found the law of Connecticut had no
bearing on whether New York discriminated, Justice Ginsburg thought it
mattered. A competitive neutrality interpretation of nondiscrimination,
however, would imply that the Court should consider only the law of the
defendant state. This approach is largely consistent with the Supreme Court’s
practice. Notwithstanding Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Lunding, the Court
generally has adopted a single-state approach because to do otherwise would
mean that the constitutionality of the defendant state’s tax law “would depend
on the shifting complexities of the tax codes of 49 other States.”271
The Supreme Court’s tax discrimination jurisprudence resembles that of
the ECJ in another way. The Supreme Court has been criticized for producing
a series of confused and incoherent tax discrimination decisions.272 For
example, although they do not raise the issue, the criticism that Professors
Graetz and Warren level against the ECJ’s tax jurisprudence also could be
leveled against the tax jurisprudence of U.S. state and federal courts.
Specifically, because courts have applied the nondiscrimination principle to

270.
271.
272.

deduction on the same basis to all New York residents, no matter where they earned their
income. This alimony treatment is furthermore consistent with New York’s overall method
of taxation, under which it taxed residents on their worldwide income and granted credits
for the taxes paid to other states.
Id.
Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 645 (1984).
Tracy A. Kaye, Tax Discrimination: A Comparative Analysis of U.S. and EU Approaches, 7 FLA.
TAX REV. 47, 80, 91 (2005) (calling tax cases decided under the Privileges and Immunities
Clause “ad hoc”); see also id. at 91 (quoting Professor Kirk Stark as saying that the Court’s
tax jurisprudence has a “wild west quality to it”); id. at 90-91 (noting that, in Boston Stock
Exchange, “the Supreme Court itself observed again that its judicial application of
constitutional principles to the multitude of state tax cases ‘left much room for controversy
and confusion and little in the way of precise guides to the States in the exercise of their
indispensable power of taxation’” (quoting Bos. Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm’r, 429 U.S.
318, 329 (1977))).
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states taxing in both source273 and residence capacities,274 U.S. courts could be
seen as attempting to pursue both locational neutrality and leisure (or savings)
neutrality. But pursuit of both goals simultaneously is futile unless all U.S.
states harmonize their tax rates. However, as the Supreme Court has
acknowledged, the Constitution does not require the U.S. states to harmonize
their tax rates.275 Competitive neutrality resolves the seeming incongruity of
imposing nondiscrimination obligations at both source and residence in the
absence of rate harmonization.
One more lesson can be drawn from comparing U.S. and EU law, and it
relates to the issue we raised earlier of the competence of courts to impose any
of the efficiency benchmarks in their respective jurisdictions. As we noted
above, the ECJ lacks the institutional competence to impose upon the member
states a specific method for taxing cross-border income, even though
international harmonization of the method for taxing cross-border income is a
prerequisite to fully achieving competitive neutrality.276 Similarly, the U.S.
Supreme Court lacks authority to impose upon the U.S. states a common
method for dividing interstate income among the states,277 although Congress
could impose a common method on the states, or the states could coordinate a
common method among themselves.278

273.

274.

275.
276.

277.

278.
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See, e.g., Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60 (1920) (holding that a state violated
the Privileges and Immunities Clause when it denied nonresident taxpayers personal
exemptions available to resident taxpayers).
Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325 (1996) (striking down a state intangibles tax that had
the effect of exempting the stock of a corporation doing all of its business in-state, while taxing
the stock of a corporation doing none of its business in-state); Ceridian Corp. v. Franchise Tax
Bd., 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 611, 615 n.2 (Ct. App. 2000) (striking down under the Commerce
Clause a state dividends-received deduction that was limited to the portion of the dividends
that came from in-state sources).
Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 526-27 (1959) (discussing states’ wide
discretion in taxation).
See, e.g., Case C-336/96, Gilly v. Directeur des Services Fiscaux du Bas-Rhin, 1998 E.C.R.
I-2793, para. 24 (“The Member States are competent to determine the criteria for taxation on
income and wealth with a view to eliminating double taxation . . . .”); Case C-513/04,
Kerckhaert v. Belgium, 2006 E.C.R. I-10967, para. 22 (noting that EU law “does not lay
down any general criteria for the attribution of areas of competence between the Member
States in relation to the elimination of double taxation within the Community”).
See Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair 437 U.S. 267, 279 (1978) (holding that since the Constitution
prescribed no standards for choosing a single method for dividing cross-border income
among the states, the Supreme Court would not impose such a standard, and stating that
“[t]he Constitution . . . is neutral with respect to the content of any uniform [apportionment]
rule”).
See id. at 280 (“[T]he legislative power granted to Congress by the Commerce Clause of the
Constitution would amply justify the enactment of legislation requiring all States to adhere
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U.S. states (like nation-states) tax labor income according to source and
residence principles, but unlike nation-states, U.S. states do not tax active
business income according to source and residence principles. Instead, they use
formulary apportionment.279 Rather than focusing on the (often elusive)
geographic source of income, formulary apportionment divides the overall
profits of an integrated enterprise doing business in the United States among
the states in which the enterprise does business according to a formula that
takes into account the presence in each state of the enterprise’s productive
factors, such as its payroll, property, and sales.280 If every state used the exact
same formula to determine its portion of the enterprise’s overall income, no
double taxation would arise, even if the states applied different tax rates.
Unfortunately, not all states use the same apportionment formula, and
differences in the formulas lead to gaps and overlaps in state income taxation.
Use of different apportionment formulas by the U.S. states gave rise to
dormant Commerce Clause challenges by taxpayers claiming that overlaps in
state apportionment formulas discriminated against out-of-state businesses or
imposed unjustifiable burdens on interstate commerce.281 Despite the Supreme
Court’s acknowledgement of its lack of institutional competence to impose
upon the states a common method for dividing interstate income,282 the Court
has taken a strong position on what the nondiscrimination principle of the
dormant Commerce Clause requires of state apportionment formulas.
Notwithstanding the states’ substantial latitude in taxing cross-border income,
the Court has held that states may not choose a method for dividing crossborder income that is biased against nonresidents or interstate commerce.
Specifically, the Court developed the “internal consistency test” to judge
whether state apportionment formulas violate the dormant Commerce Clause.
Under this test, the Supreme Court asks: If all fifty states adopted the
challenged formula, would multiple taxation inevitably result?283 If so, the

279.
280.

281.
282.
283.

to uniform rules for the division of income. It is to that body, and not this Court, that the
Constitution has committed such policy decisions.”).
See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 10, ¶¶ 20.05-.10.
The model formula under the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA)
equally weighs sales, property, and payroll. For example, if a taxpayer had $100 of
apportionable income, and 30% of its payroll, property, and sales were located in California,
California would apply its tax rate to $30. For analysis and criticism of UDITPA, see Charles
E. McLure, Jr., A Comprehensive and Sensible UDITPA, 37 ST. TAX NOTES 929 (2005).
See, e.g., Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169 (1983); Moorman,
437 U.S. 267.
Moorman, 437 U.S. 267.
Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 185 (1995); see also Container Corp.,
463 U.S. at 169 (holding that a state’s apportionment formula “must be such that, if applied
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apportionment formula is invalid. The internal consistency test provides a
formal method for courts to evaluate whether a state’s tax law improperly
impedes interstate commerce without embroiling the reviewing court in
legislative second-guessing and without invading states’ tax sovereignty. Thus,
under the dormant Commerce Clause, states retain substantial tax autonomy—
they can select their tax base, rates, and apportionment formulas—but their tax
choices are nevertheless constrained by the dormant Commerce Clause and
judicial review. The Supreme Court recognized that it could not always prevent
taxation from being a drag on cross-border commerce because states’ use of
different apportionment formulas create such drags, and the Court lacks
institutional authority to impose a common formula. However, the internal
consistency test ensures that states do not adopt formulas that are inherently
biased against cross-border commerce.
Like the Supreme Court, the ECJ faces institutional constraints that
prevent it from fully achieving any of the neutrality benchmarks on its own.
Instead, achieving any of the benchmarks would require legislative cooperation
to harmonize states’ methods for taxing cross-border income. In light of the
need for legislative harmonization to fully achieve any of the neutrality
benchmarks, we argued earlier that courts should advance competitive
neutrality by interpreting the nondiscrimination principle to require fidelity to
competitive neutrality’s uniformity requirements, namely the requirements of
uniform residence taxes and uniform source taxes. The requirement under
competitive neutrality that states apply only uniform source and residence
taxes works similarly to the U.S. internal consistency test. While it does not
eliminate the drags on cross-border commerce that stem from states’ use of
different methods of taxing cross-border income (for example, worldwide
taxation or exemption), it nevertheless strikes down tax provisions that directly
tilt the tax playing field between residents and nonresidents. The Supreme
Court’s deployment of the internal consistency test shows that courts can
coherently advance notions of economic efficiency even when they lack
institutional competence to impose particular legislative outcomes upon states.
We urge the ECJ similarly to advance tax neutrality without overstepping its
institutional authority.

by every jurisdiction, it would result in no more than all of the unitary business’ income
being taxed”).
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conclusion
If taxes imposed at either source or residence can disrupt cross-border
commerce by tilting the playing field against cross-border workers, one might
then ask, why have courts failed to expressly adopt a competitive neutrality
interpretation of nondiscrimination? Our answer is that until recently formally
trained economists all but ignored competitive neutrality, so judges and
lawyers have lacked guidance on what competitive neutrality required of state
tax rules.
Contrary to the requirements for competitive neutrality, the requirements
for locational and savings neutrality have long been understood. Thus, had the
ECJ wanted to interpret nondiscrimination to require either of these two
traditional capital neutrality benchmarks, the court and legal advocates could
have found clear direction in the economic literature. Even if judges and
advocates did not understand the implications for labor taxation of the
traditional capital neutrality benchmarks (because they have, until now, lacked
the analysis provided in Part II of this Article), they still could have applied the
traditional benchmarks to capital tax cases. However, as Graetz and Warren
showed, despite their ready availability and prominent use in international tax
policymaking, the ECJ did not coherently apply either traditional benchmark
to capital tax discrimination cases. Nor, we would add, has the Supreme Court
coherently applied either traditional benchmark in its own tax discrimination
case law, despite long-standing scholarly calls for it to do so.284 Because courts
failed to interpret the nondiscrimination principle as requiring either of the
two traditional neutrality benchmarks, commentators justifiably concluded
that the tax nondiscrimination concept was empty, incoherent, or inconsistent.
In contrast, formal economic analysis of taxation and competitive neutrality
only came to prominence in 2004 when economists Desai and Hines published
their influential paper on the effects of capital taxation on competition for the
ownership of assets.285 Although economists are only now formalizing the
connection between taxes and competitiveness, noneconomists have long been
concerned with considerations of competitiveness, including how taxation can
tilt the playing field between residents and nonresidents. Thus, it would not be
surprising if such non-experts read protections for level competition into legal
prohibitions of tax discrimination.

284.

285.

See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro, An Economic and Political Look at Federalism in Taxation, 90 MICH.
L. REV. 895 (1992) (advocating that the nondiscrimination principle in the dormant
Commerce Clause should be interpreted to require locational neutrality).
Desai & Hines, supra note 33, at 494.
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Moreover, as we show above, competitive neutrality remains a complex and
subtle concept. That may help explain why, even though we argue that
applications of tax nondiscrimination rules in the EU and United States reflect
competitive neutrality goals, they do not reflect rigorous application of our
formal conception of competitive neutrality. The complexities and subtleties of
competitive neutrality do not, however, make it an unworkable standard for
enforcement by noneconomist judges. As we have explained, to interpret
nondiscrimination to promote competitive neutrality, courts would not have to
conduct in-depth economic analysis. Instead, to uphold a challenged tax, a
court would merely have to confirm that the defendant state assessed it
uniformly. Specifically, if a state assesses the challenged tax on a residence
basis, then the tax must apply the same way to both residents with out-of-state
income and residents with domestic income. Similarly, if the state assesses the
challenged tax on a source basis, then the tax must apply the same way to both
residents and nonresidents working within the jurisdiction. All that a court
must do to assess whether a tax provision is discriminatory is to ask whether
the provision applies on a uniform residence or uniform source basis.
Sophisticated economic analysis shows this to be the right question to ask, but
the answer to the question in a particular case does not depend on fancy
economic theories, reams of data, or advanced econometrics.
For courts that agree with our argument that nondiscrimination requires
competitive neutrality, we provide simple guidelines for resolving practically
any case. For courts that do not agree with our conclusions, we also provide
clear guidelines for interpreting nondiscrimination to require adherence to
either of the traditional efficiency goals of locational or savings (and leisure)
neutrality. Whether they agree with our analysis or not, we hope our Article
will encourage courts to articulate the goal or goals that they believe the
nondiscrimination principle promotes and to undertake a rigorous analysis of
whether a challenged tax interferes with those goals.
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